In 2019, the Trump administration ratcheted up those punitive measures in a campaign it called “maximum pressure.” The aim was to remove Maduro from power, Chatham House’s Christopher Sabatini wrote in Foreign Policy in July 2023. Maduro had been elected to a second term as president in 2018 in a contest Chile’s then-leader said did “not meet the minimum standards for a true democracy.” Alleging a rigged vote, opposition legislator Juan Guaidó declared himself Venezuela’s rightful interim president after Maduro’s inauguration in 2019.

Elections to Watch in 2024: This story is part of a package on 15 key elections this year (besides the United States). Read the full analysis here. 

The United States and some other countries initially joined in recognizing Guaidó, but over the years, he fell out of favor with the global community. It became clear that the 2019 Venezuelan presidential crisis was most likely a botched attempt at U.S.-backed regime change. Former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton—who served under President Donald Trump—told CNN in 2022 that he had “helped plan coups” and mentioned Venezuela as an example that “turned out not to be successful.” Guaidó now lives in exile in Miami after a dramatic escape from Venezuela; in January 2023, the White House confirmed that it no longer regarded him as Venezuela’s president.

Even as the Guaidó fad came and went, U.S. sanctions on Venezuela remained—and decimated the country’s economy. “From 2014 to 2021, Venezuela’s economy contracted by three-quarters; inflation soared at one point to an estimated annualized rate of more than 1 million percent,” Sabatini wrote. About half of the country lived in poverty as of late 2022. The combined political and economic crisis has created a refugee exodus from Venezuela that is comparable to Ukraine’s in size—but has received far less funding and support from international actors, FP’s Robbie Gramer reported in September 2022.

The U.N. refugee agency estimates that there are about 7.7 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants worldwide. While Latin American countries have taken the lead in integrating them, they have also become bargaining chips in the U.S. immigration debate. In September 2022, Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, now a Republican presidential candidate, shipped a group of Venezuelan refugees to Martha’s Vineyard in a widely condemned political stunt. Last fall, the Biden administration announced it would offer temporary protection to nearly 500,000 Venezuelan migrants already in the United States.

It’s no secret that Washington wants to reduce migration throughout the Western Hemisphere. But that’s not the only reason policymakers are reexamining U.S. sanctions policy toward Venezuela. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine—and a Western embargo on Russian oil—U.S. policymakers have turned their eyes to Caracas’s ample reserves of the fossil fuel. In November 2022, the United States allowed Chevron to begin limited operations in Venezuela—signaling a potential U.S. reentry into the country’s oil sector.

The United States agreed to explore ways to lift sanctions on Venezuela in exchange for a commitment from Maduro that he would return to stalled negotiations with the opposition, held in Mexico City. There was an urgency to that requirement: The aim of the talks, which had been held on-and-off since 2021, was to agree to conditions for Venezuela’s planned 2024 elections.

Then, last October, a deal was announced: The Maduro government agreed to hold free elections in the latter half of this year. In exchange, the United States lifted sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector. (They can be reinstated if Caracas does not meet the deal’s requirements.) FP’s Catherine Osborn, the author of Latin America Brief, called the compromise a “breakthrough.”

It’s unclear whether the much-heralded agreement will bear fruit, however. Ryan C. Berg of the Center for Strategic and International Studies called the deal a “huge gamble” in Foreign Policy in December 2023, as sanctions relief preceded any major moves by Maduro. Berg warned that Maduro may already be violating the accord by failing to lift bans on political opponents. In late December, the United States conducted a prisoner swap with Venezuela that saw 10 Americans and 20 political prisoners released from incarceration in the country. Washington sent a jailed Maduro ally to Caracas in return.

Ahead of this year’s expected vote, the Venezuelan opposition—called the Unitary Platform—has rallied behind candidate María Corina Machado, a self-styled libertarian who counts former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as one of her political role models. But Venezuelan authorities last summer banned Machado from holding office for 15 years due to her support of Guaidó.

Now, Maduro is in a bind: If he wants enduring sanctions relief from the United States, he will have to allow Machado to run. Her chances of ousting him in a free and fair election are good. Machado is considered popular and won the opposition primary with more than 90 percent of the vote.

So far, Machado is the only declared candidate in the yet-to-be-confirmed presidential race. Maduro is widely expected to run again as the PSUV’s candidate; Venezuelan presidents serve six-year terms and face no limits on reelection. Only a plurality is required to win.

Maduro appears to be worried about his prospects. He recently called a referendum on whether Venezuela should incorporate the disputed (and oil-rich) Essequibo region, which falls within Guyana’s international boundaries but which most Venezuelans claim as their own. The move—approved by 95 percent of voters but with disputed turnout—was widely perceived as an attempt to curry nationalist fervor ahead of the expected elections. Now, there are genuine fears of a land war in Latin America. The things autocrats will do to stay in power.