• Foreign & Public Diplomacy
• Middle East and North Africa

September 30, 2025, 3:43 PM View Comments ()

“Don’t be a tough guy. Don’t be a fool!” U.S. President Donald Trump implored Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a 2019 letter. The jury might be out on how tough or flexible Erdogan is, but he is certainly no fool. Indeed, he has proven his skill at playing Trump. Not long after receiving the White House’s missive (which he theatrically threw in the bin, according to reports), Erdogan got Washington to swallow a Turkish military intervention in Syria directed against the United States’ Kurdish allies.

On Sept. 25, the Turkish leader was back to the White House, ready to do more geopolitical business with his “valued friend,” Trump. But the fact that talks yielded so little highlights the extent to which the United States and Turkey diverge. The chemistry between Trump and Erdogan, two strongmen with reputations for wheeling and dealing, makes things better—but only slightly.

The reality is that the problems in U.S.-Turkish relations are baked in, and the opportunities for breakthroughs are small. Moreover, the stakes aren’t that high anymore, and U.S.-Turkish relations are a much duller affair than they were during Trump’s first term. As a result, both sides are happy to enjoy a photo op and pocket what wins they can.

Trump’s return to power has been hailed in Ankara as an opportunity. From the outset, Erdogan’s camp believed that the U.S. administration was amenable to Turkish interests. When Trump’s overtures to Moscow facilitated resumed Russian-Ukrainian talks in Istanbul, Turkish commentators cited it as proof of his status as a mover and shaker in international politics. After the fall of Bashar al-Assad strengthened Turkey’s position in Syria, leaders Ankara believe that this gives them more cards with the Trump administration. Now, Turkey hopes that it can play a role in Trump’s new plans for a postwar settlement in Gaza as well.

The attempt to cultivate ties to Washington is taking place against the backdrop of a broader Turkish push to shore up relations with the West. Yes, Erdogan did turn up in China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in August and took part in the BRICS+ gathering in Russia back in October 2024.

But simultaneously, Turkey has moved to reinforce strategic ties to Europe. Ankara has repeatedly touted its potential contribution to the so-called “coalition of the willing,” a group gathered around France and the United Kingdom with the goal of sending an expeditionary force to Ukraine in case there is a cease-fire.

With this in mind, Ankara has been eager to participate in existing NATO efforts to contain Russia. The Turkish Air Force recently dispatched an E-7T Peace Eagle Airborne Early Warning and Control System plane to Lithuania as part to the alliance’s response to escalating Russian drone and fighter jet violations on its eastern flank. Turkey has furthermore applied to join the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) plan, a 150 billion euro ($176 billion) scheme proposed by the European Commission to encourage joint military procurement within the European Union and possibly among its external partners.

Finally, Turkey has continued its long-standing push to update the existing EU-Turkey customs union to cover services and public procurement. With both Europe and Turkey squeezed by Trump’s tariffs and China’s economic expansion, deepening integration makes a great deal of sense.

There is a U.S. part of the story, too, which predates Trump. The Russian invasion of Ukraine drove up Turkey’s geopolitical stock on both sides of the Atlantic, and Erdogan remains keen to exploit that mood. In 2024, Turkey secured a deal with the Biden administration to modernize its existing fleet of F-16 jets and acquire 40 additional aircraft. Though the modernization element has been dropped, the rest of the contract still being implemented. The F-16 bargain involved Ankara’s approval for Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO. Erdogan now hopes he can purchase F-35 fighter jets as well, despite U.S. concerns that their security would be compromised by Turkey’s ownership of the Russian-made S-400 anti-aircraft system.

But neither Erdogan’s bromance with Trump nor his feelers to the West (or whatever remains of it) are enough to produce a genuine rapprochement between Turkey and United States.

First, there is little evidence that Turkey and the United States can team up on Gaza. Erdogan insisted following the White House meeting that Turkish officials had reached a common understanding with Trump, but Trump did not confirm that. There are still many unanswered questions, not least whether Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas are on board with the latest set of proposals made by Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff. Finally, the exact role that Turkey would play after a putative cease-fire remains unclear: Israel is skeptical of Turkish involvement, and Ankara might be unhappy if it was relegated to a status behind that of the Gulf states.

Second, Turkey will not drop energy ties with Russia to reorient to the United States, one of Trump’s key asks. Sure, BOTAS, the Turkish state-controlled gas utility, signed a 20-year contract for U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the run-up to Erdogan’s visit. But the annual 4 billion cubic meters of gas covered by the deal is about a fifth of what Turkey imports annually from Russia through the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines. As with other BOTAS contracts, the LNG deal with the United States is a hedge against future disruptions and price fluctuations rather than a replacement for the Russian volumes.

Moreover, Turkey has not given up on its long-standing ambitions to resell Russian gas to other customers in Europe. Its companies have already made a lot of money by purchasing crude from Russia and passing on refined products to EU countries. All this makes Trump’s demand hard to accept.

Ditto with the memorandum of understanding on civilian nuclear energy signed during Erdogan’s White House visit. As much as the United States wants a piece of the Turkish market, the fact remains that Turkey’s one existing nuclear power plant, Akkuyu, is being built and operated by a subsidiary of Russia’s Rosatom corporation and due to come online by 2028. Progress on any new, U.S.-built plant would be slow. Uncertainty over funding and energy prices could easily derail the project before it became economically viable.

Third, despite the optimistic tone and Trump’s hints that Turkey may be able to buy F-35s, his talks with Erdogan achieved little on the issue. Structural obstacles, such as the U.S. sanctions imposed on Turkey for its purchase of the Russian S-400 missiles, remain in place. There is no critical mass of support in the U.S. Congress to greenlight a resumption of cooperation with Turkey’s defense procurement agency.

Erdogan’s goodwill gestures—dropping some tariffs on U.S. imports and reportedly offering to buy hundreds of Boeing aircraft—may work on Trump, but they will not placate lawmakers on Capitol Hill. Reports about a congressional block on the export of engines for Turkey’s own Kaan jet are being met with disappointment in Ankara.

But if none of the big hopes for this bilateral meeting are realized, it may not matter much. Turkey has adapted well to a multipolar world defined by diminished U.S. influence. For Erdogan, the biggest benefit of the visit was creating the impression that Trump supported his crackdown on the opposition Republican People’s Party. Yet Erdogan’s authoritarian march would have happened regardless.

In short, the United States and Turkey don’t need each other as much as they did in the past. Ankara does not need U.S. support against Russia the way that it did in the Cold War. Nor is Washington counting on Turkey to contain Russia or to serve as a partner in the Middle East. Trump may want Turkey’s support to realize some of his (ever-changing) objectives in the region, but he has plenty of other partners in the neighborhood. As a result, both parties can live with ambiguity, work together when interests overlap, and agree to disagree where they don’t.