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August 14, 2025, 11:08 AM View Comments ()

Last month, the U.S. State Department carried out its largest single-day layoffs ever—more than 1,300 employees gone overnight in a sweeping shake-up. Diplomats, consular officers, and foreign affairs specialists woke up one morning ready to serve and found themselves locked out of their emails by day’s end. The Trump administration said the dismissals were part of a “comprehensive reorganization plan.” But those familiar with the institution and its mission know that the White House’s moves are a dangerous mistake.

In a recent Foreign Policy piece, columnist Matthew Kroenig argued that the State Department cuts were a smart, long-overdue streamlining that would make the department more focused, agile, and strategically relevant. After 37 years in the U.S. Foreign Service and now as president of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), I can state emphatically that the reality looks very different.

AFSA is a professional association and union representing members of the Foreign Service from six foreign affairs agencies, including the State Department. While AFSA has long worked productively with both Republican and Democratic administrations, never has it experienced such a complete disregard for the expertise and perspective of those who know the U.S. diplomatic workforce best.

There is broad consensus in the foreign affairs community that operational procedures do need reform—if only to streamline the infamous clearance process or clarify the division of oversight between regional and functional bureaus. But the Trump administration’s chaotic firing of the very subject-matter experts who could most effectively bring about such changes is a prime example of mismanagement at its worst.

AFSA has seen past administrations execute good reforms—ones that made the department nimbler, smarter, and better. These were marked by careful planning, broad consultation, and a focus on strengthening diplomats’ ability to serve the American people. For example, in 1999, after a careful review process, the Clinton administration consolidated the U.S. Information Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into the State Department with minimal disruption. Leadership provided ample notice to all parties involved, sought (and received) input from them, and obtained their buy-in to assure a smooth transition of critical functions.

This latest round of reforms had none of those qualities. It was fast, chaotic, and more about making headlines than making the department stronger. The Trump administration’s diplomatic shake-up did not just unsettle people in Foggy Bottom—it left the United States weaker, less respected, and less safe.

Kroenig’s portrayal of a bloated Washington bureaucracy misses the mark. The State Department’s growth over the past two decades—under leadership of both political parties—has been commensurate with the mounting threats to U.S. national security and directly tied to national priorities: opening embassies to counter China, hiring more consular officers to meet record demand for passports and visas, and adding experts in cybersecurity and conflict prevention.

Kroenig correctly noted that U.S. diplomats are the “pointy end of the spear” of U.S. foreign policy. But it is subject-matter experts in Washington who aim that spear by analyzing intelligence, assessing U.S. priorities, and directing government resources. In one fell swoop, the department’s leadership undermined their ability to do just that.

Also misleading is Kroenig’s claim that the State Department did not cut any foreign service officers based overseas. I’ve heard from laid-off officers who shared concerning stories that counter this narrative.

One officer in Turkey was managing a crucial visa operation that served applicants from Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. On July 11, they were cut off from their phone and email with no plane ticket home. That office now has no dedicated manager. Another officer was set to lead the U.S. Embassy in Tonga as chargé d’affaires—a strategically important post in the Pacific. They had travel orders and tickets in hand. But on July 11, they were out of a job, leaving the embassy in Tongo leaderless at a time when China is expanding its influence in the region.

Turkey and Tonga are not isolated cases. Around the world, key posts and offices from Senegal to China have been left leaderless in the same abrupt, damaging fashion. Even the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv—one of the highest priority posts—was not spared from cuts.

Kroenig downplayed the State Department’s 1,350 layoffs as just a sliver of an 80,000-person organization. But that number includes more than 50,000 locally hired staff overseas, who are vital to U.S. missions but not part of the Washington-based policy core. (No locally hired overseas staff were part of the July 11 layoffs, according to AFSA’s tallies.) Measured against the actual U.S.-based workforce—which numbered about 17,600 in 2024—the cuts amount to nearly 8 percent. That does more than just trim the fat—it cuts into muscle and bone. Shedding staff in this manner is the difference between a department that can still function and one that can’t.

Moreover, the Trump administration’s reform process was not deliberate. Contrary to Kroenig’s account, the department did not “work for months to get the reorganization right.” A survey of nearly 200 AFSA members who lost their jobs on July 11 revealed they were fired even after the department, in its official notification of the reorganization to Congress, stated that there would be “no significant changes” to its offices. State Department officials said suggestions were “solicited” across the agency, but the lack of transparency in the decision-making process makes us believe that all key choices were made by a small circle of insiders with little or no experience in foreign affairs or managing the department’s complex operations.

Under previous administrations, any potential Foreign Service layoffs had a clear, merit-based process that ranked employees globally on performance, tenure, foreign language ability, and military veteran status, then the hard calls were made. However, just three days before the July 11 layoffs, the Trump administration scrapped those criteria. The only thing that mattered was where an employee was assigned on May 29, directly contradicting the testimony of Michael Rigas, deputy secretary of state for management and resources, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The result was predictable: Seasoned officers with critical language skills—including Russian, Arabic, and Chinese—veterans with disabilities, and people already assigned to high-priority hardship posts were shown the door without consideration for their service or expertise. Imagine closing a military base and firing every soldier stationed there, regardless of rank, record, or pending assignments.

There is still time to avert the cuts’ long-term damage to the United States’ diplomatic power, but only if State Department leadership recognizes its errors and changes course now.  Since the mass layoffs, the department has reversed dozens of its decisions, inviting some employees to return to their duties. This is a step in the right direction, but leadership needs to go further. If they truly believe the department is overstaffed, then they should return to the previously agreed-upon reduction-in-force rules that had been in effect for decades, demonstrate what fields are overstaffed, and proceed with their reorganization plan accordingly.

The United States’ adversaries are watching this self-inflicted wound. The question is whether the country has the will to staunch it before it does permanent damage.

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