• United States
• Steven A. Cook

July 22, 2025, 10:09 AM View Comments ()

Eight months after the fall of the Assad regime, Syria is still a source of instability in the heart of the Levant. The horrifying violence that took place in the southwestern Syrian province of Suwayda last week is the latest in a pattern of sectarian, ethnic, and tribal violence that has plagued the country since Bashar al-Assad’s flight to Moscow. It belies the feel-good stories and testaments of politicians and officials about self-anointed President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s professed desire to build a “Syria for all Syrians.” Bad habits die hard. Assad was once believed to be a reformer in the years before he presided over industrial-level slaughter in a bloody effort to save his regime.

No one knows how Sharaa, who led an extremist group and once had a U.S. bounty on his head, will govern, though healthy skepticism is in order. And no one has an answer to the divisions within society that actors in the Syrian drama have exploited violently in pursuit of power. These circumstances make it an inauspicious moment for the United States to wade into Syria. But there are things Washington could do that would increase the chances for Syrians to enjoy some modicum of peace both at home and along their borders.

To make that happen, President Donald Trump needs to leverage his unique standing with Middle Eastern leaders. He must set limits on Syria’s neighbors and incentivize them to provide Syria with a pathway for reconstruction, development, and reintegration in the region. This does not require an American commitment to transform Syria. That would be foolish given Washington’s abysmal record with international political and social engineering. Rather, it requires the judicious use of the extraordinary diplomatic and political capital Trump has accumulated with the region’s players. The idea of leverage is overblown, but if any president has ever had it, it is Trump, and he should use it in Syria.

Any “Trump Plan for Syria” must address the problem of Israel and Turkey. Since the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, during which Israeli commandos killed nine Turks and an American trying to break through Israel’s naval blockade of the Gaza Strip, American presidents have been forced to manage tension between these two allies—one a fellow NATO member and the other a country with a “special relationship” to the United States. The deterioration of Turkey-Israel relations over the last 15 years has been a headache for Washington but was never before a major problem.

To American policymakers, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s periodic remarks likening Israelis to Nazis were gross and unhelpful. Yet so long as his pledge to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque remained rhetorical, they determined Erdogan’s offensive words were better left unaddressed. The Israelis, for their part, could demonstrate their military prowess by undertaking major exercises in Cyprus in full view of Turkish occupation forces. So long as this martial preening was just that, there was no reason for the United States to be overly concerned. Throughout the last decade and a half, most officials and analysts in Washington were correct to believe that the likelihood of a military confrontation between the two was low at best.

That assumption might be worth revisiting. Erdogan’s willingness to allow Hamas to use Turkey and its financial institutions to run operations against Israel prior to Oct. 7, 2023—and his support for the Hamas attack on Israel that day—have altered the dynamic between the two countries. Israel now regards Turkey as an enemy state. In its post-Oct. 7 approach to security, Israel is determined to prevent its adversaries from establishing a presence near its borders. At least indirectly, that now includes Turkey, which doesn’t share a border with Israel but has broad influence over a country that does: Syria.

Assad’s unexpected fall provided Turkey an opportunity to reshape Syria in a way that reflects Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party’s values and sensibilities. An expansive Turkish role in Syria would close off the possibility of Kurdish autonomy there, be a boon for Turkish business, ensure Ankara a permanent and influential position in the heart of the Levant, and validate Erdogan’s claim that Turkey is a leading Muslim power. The collision of Turkish and Israeli interests in Syria is self-evident.

This is where Trump comes in. In the weeks before he was inaugurated, the president declared that Syria was not America’s fight. He was correct. But that does not mean that the United States has no role to play. Trump is not going to revive Israel-Turkey relations—neither country has any interest. But because Erdogan reveres Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu owes him (for bombing Iranian nuclear sites), the president can knock heads in ways his predecessors never could. In the process, Trump could table a “take it or leave it” proposal for the Israelis, Syrians, Turks, and Gulf states. The Trump Plan for Syria would have five components:

1. Within six months, Israel must withdraw from its self-declared buffer zone, which will become, by agreement with the Syrian leadership, a demilitarized zone for 50 years subject to a U.S.-Israeli-Syrian monitoring committee. Syria and Israel will undertake confidence-building measures to ensure the stability of the 1974 armistice lines.
2. Turkey may not establish military bases in Syria, and it must withdraw from Afrin and its environs within 12 months.
3. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates will provide funding to refloat Syria’s economy.
4. Turkish companies will play a leading role in rebuilding Syrian infrastructure.
5. Syria will be integrated into the region through the restoration of diplomatic and economic ties. American sanctions will remain suspended so long as the Syrian leadership cooperates with the four aforementioned points. With Iran down (but not out), this is the opportune moment to pull Damascus from Tehran permanently.

The added advantage of the Trump Plan for Syria is that it helps create an environment in which Syria’s reconstruction and development become self-sustaining in large part because of the country’s unique location—something Trump, as a real estate executive, understands is crucial. Look at the map: The Turkish city of Gaziantep is 710 miles from Istanbul, but just 80 miles from Aleppo. Before the Syrian uprising and during a period of particularly warm relations between Ankara and Damascus, trade between Turkey’s southeast and Syria’s northwest grew significantly. There is no reason why it should not once again. Also, Syria is potentially a Levantine bridge between the Gulf, Anatolia, Europe, and beyond. It is not hard to imagine the significant benefits to Syria from the resulting trade and investment along this corridor.

The Trump Plan for Syria would not impose lofty governance conditions on Sharaa—as in inclusivity, pragmatism, etc. This may be regrettable to some observers, especially since Sharaa’s rule in Idlib and the constitutional principles Syria’s new authorities promulgated in March do not inspire much confidence in the new leader’s approach. This is the world that exists, however, and as Trump made clear in Riyadh, he has no intention of nation-building.

But if Trump puts his fist on the table in a way that prevents Israeli overreach and prevents Turkish adventurism, he will make it possible for Turks, Syrians, Jordanians, Saudis, Emiratis, and others to invest in and trade with Syria. Even if the Trump Plan for Syria is partially successful, it will be good for everyone—including Israelis. No doubt it smacks of a warmed-over economic determinism—which is a fair criticism—but given the many powerful players in Syria with their conflicting interests (Sharaa, Trump, Erdogan, Netanyahu, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Emirati President Mohamed bin Zayed, and Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani), creating an environment that improves the prospects for the country’s reconstruction and redevelopment is the best anyone can hope for.

There are moments when the United States can pursue a narrow and easily defined set of goals that can transform tactical gains into strategic ones. In the case of Syria, this is one of those moments.