2024

We have medium-to-high confidence in all the probabilities we have assigned to each of the risks below, given the credible to high-quality level of information that was available and used. As it is for intelligence estimates, a high- or medium-confidence judgment still carries the possibility of being wrong.

Africa’s second lost decade

Displaced people at a food distribution area at Berley Camp near Gode, Ethiopia, on January 10, 2023. Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images

Numerous disruptive global trends unfortunately merge in Africa. With an intractable debt crisis, the drying up of capital flows, the growing impacts of climate change, and major drought, conflict and political instability are now endemic across a large swath of the continent—from the Sahel and Niger to southern Sudan and Ethiopia.

By 2050, a quarter of the world’s population will be African, with a projected 1 billion in their prime working-age years of 25-59, a “doubling of its share of world population workforce from 12% to 23%,” according to the United Nations. Absent more economic growth and greater job opportunities, the risk of Africa’s demographic bounty becoming a liability for the region as well as the world will continue to grow.

Africa saw modest economic growth in the 1990s when it grew at 2.5 percent, growing to  5.1 percent in the following decade, but slowing even before the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Debt ballooned with the pandemic’s increased health costs, becoming now a major impediment to Africa’s growth. That growth is now at risk. According to the World Bank, 21 African states are facing debt distress or the risk of it. The continent’s public debt has nearly tripled since 2010 to $656 billion, with annual servicing of the debt amounting to about 23 percent of Africa’s GDP.

For Africa to achieve a new development trajectory, OECD nations would need to qualitatively ramp up G-20 efforts in the Common Framework—working with China—to relieve debt stress. But the recent breakdown in a debt agreement for Zambia augurs badly for any quick relief. China, along with other official creditors, forced the mineral-rich nation to suspend a deal of almost $4 billion in dollar bonds that had received the International Monetary Fund’s approval.

As the world economy becomes increasingly fragmented, protectionist, and region-centric, Africa’s development will become more challenging—an emblem of the gap between industrialized and developing nations that is becoming more difficult to narrow. While members of the global community need to view Africa as an essential part of their future and invest and trade with African countries more, these countries have some levers to attract more economic help. Diversifying trade with Asia would provide new opportunities that do not necessarily compete with current trade patterns focused on Europe and the Americas. But conflict, climate change, and a less friendly global environment steepen the curve for economic recovery and development.

Probability of Africa experiencing development quandaries:

Trump 2.0

Former U.S. President Donald Trump arrives during a rally at the Waco Regional Airport on March 25, 2023 in Waco, Texas. Brandon Bell/Getty Images

Former U.S. President Donald Trump has a good prospect of winning the 2024 U.S. presidential election. His main theme would be revenge—and his reelection would most likely wreak havoc on U.S. democracy and further destabilize the world system. As Trump said to supporters last March, “I am your retribution.” Though polls are just snapshots in time, Trump is running neck and neck with President Joe Biden and is ahead in most key swing states, according to at least one survey from last November.

Domestically, Trump’s authoritarian ambitions have become even more ambitious. Internationally, Trump aims to pursue his “anti-globalist” agenda, more unilateralist than isolationist. He would probably revoke U.S. climate pledges, and his advisors say he would scrap the Inflation Reduction Act and boost fossil fuel production.

Under a Trump presidency, the United States would probably end aid to Ukraine, renew ties with Moscow, and seek a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Ukraine over Kyiv’s head. Meanwhile, Trump might try again to reach a deal with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on nuclear weapons.

Trump’s election could fuel a surge in populist nationalism in Europe. Already the recent electoral successes of far-right nativist parties in three nations (the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Italy) show an emerging popular drift in the direction of Hungary’s authoritarian regime and a change in the political landscape.

Should Trump come to power, the entire West might veer away from its long-standing internationalist path.

He has hinted that he wants the United States to leave or reduce its role in NATO (e.g., suspend the U.S. commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty) if demands for much greater European spending are not met and similarly might try to pull U.S. troops out of South Korea and Japan if these countries do not agree to more burden-sharing of the costs associated with stationing U.S. forces in Asia. More broadly, Trump has suggested imposing a 10 percent tariff on all imports; this step would foster a trade war and curb support for international institutions. Trump’s agenda could be mitigated if Democrats win back the House and/or keep the Senate. Alternatively, as unlikely as it seems, if former South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley or Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis were to nab the Republican nomination and win, there would be more continuity and less radical change.

Probability of Trump disruption

Stalemate in Ukraine

A Ukrainian serviceman rests near the town of Bakhmut, in the Donetsk region on Ukraine on April 28, 2023.Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

2023 saw a disappointing Ukraine counteroffensive turn into a war of attrition with few gains or losses. Ukraine has been more successful in breaking Russia’s Black Sea blockade and attacking targets in Crimea and on Russian soil, but Putin’s war economy has expanded military production since the war began. For Ukraine, the minor territorial gains have been coupled with waning support from the United States and the European Union, fueled partly by the absence of a Ukrainian breakthrough but also by growing Republican opposition to continued arms shipments.

War is unpredictable, and 2024 could see greater Ukrainian successes, triggering new questions about Russia’s military sustainability. Washington was disappointed that Ukrainian forces disregarded U.S. advice on massing troops in the south, a move that could have severed the Russian line, threatening Russia’s control on Crimea and delivering a psychological blow to Putin. Should 2024 be another disappointing year for the Ukrainians, Western pressure on Kyiv for cease-fire talks will most likely increase. Biden would reap a political benefit in his upcoming campaign by bringing an end to the fighting. Outside of a humiliating military defeat, however, it is unclear whether Putin would actually want cease-fire talks.

Putin probably wants to wait for the possibility of a Trump presidency, in which case he might come under strong U.S. pressure to stop the fighting but could expect more favorable treatment in a peace deal. In the interim, Putin’s strategy might be centered on greatly intensifying drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, infrastructure, and ports in an effort to destroy Ukraine as a functioning nation-state rather than taking more territory. It is unclear how the United States or NATO would respond to such an approach.

Probability of a stalemate and a war of attrition:

Ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict

People search through buildings, destroyed during Israeli air strikes in Khan Yunis, in the southern Gaza Strip on Nov. 12, 2023. Ahmad Hasaballah/Getty Images

The Israel Defense Forces may have destroyed most of Hamas’s military capabilities, but the destruction of housing and infrastructure will leave most Palestinians homeless and Gaza a hotbed for recruitment under Hamas or a successor group. Although Arab publics may remain angry, surrounding states will be loath to help much beyond providing more humanitarian assistance, though they will be more reluctant to overtly partner with the United States.

Washington will struggle to find any takers for running Gaza, absent a demonstrated Israeli commitment to a two-state solution, which has proved elusive for 50 years.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is unlikely to survive postwar scrutiny: Polls show most Israelis blame him for the war, with only 4 percent of Jewish Israelis trusting him, and a November Israeli poll showed that 76 percent want him to resign. But a strengthened conservative Israeli movement does not need him and will be even more hard-line, making a two-state solution virtually unworkable. Outside pressure to restart serious negotiations that require concessions to Palestinians will fail. The anger, rage, and grief on both sides likely foreshadow that the region will remain a tinderbox, with settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, Hamas attacks from Gaza, or Hezbollah attacks in northern Israel or attacks by other Iranian proxies elsewhere, including against soft Western targets.

Probability of an ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

Global gap on climate change

Climate activists take part in the Global Day of Action for Climate Justice near Manila, Philippines, during the COP28 Climate Conference on Dec. 9, 2023. Ezra Acayan/Getty Images

On the world’s current course, temperatures will rise to 2.9 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels, according to the latest U.N. Emissions Gap Report. Temperatures have already risen 1.1 degrees, close to the desired limit of 1.5 degrees. There is only a 14 percent chance of keeping temperature rise to 1.5 degrees, even if states meet their goals.

Although G-7 leaders set new collective targets for renewables last April, the U.N. report nevertheless shows that inequalities remain high: The richest 10 percent of the world’s population accounted for nearly half of emissions in 2021, while the poorest 50 percent contributed only 12 percent of total emissions; historical emissions are even more unbalanced.

Rich countries first promised $100 billion a year for climate adaptation in poorer nations at the Copenhagen climate summit in 2009. At the time, rich countries promised to deliver that amount by 2020 but missed the deadline.

This historical fairness issue has become a rallying cause for the global south, prompting last year’s COP28 climate summit in Dubai to make a “loss and damage” fund as its first decision. The United Arab Emirates and Germany both pledged $100 million; the United Kingdom about $76 million; Japan $10 million; and the EU (including Germany) about $245 million. Washington was criticized for promising only $17.5 million by climate activists, but Republican legislators are likely to block any amount. McKinsey Sustainability estimates that the “world faces a $41 trillion mitigation investment gap to 2030, with emerging markets facing a higher gap as a share of their GDP. There is also an adaptation financing gap of $600 billion required annually to 2050, which is 10-18 times greater than current flows.”

COP28 made some headway in marshaling the needed capital for mitigation and adaptation, but there is still a long way to go. The sense of inequity felt by developing countries—many more of which are impacted by climate change than richer countries—is unlikely to dissipate. Most developing-country representatives did not leave COP28 feeling in any way assured that the West “had their back” on meeting the demands of climate change.

Probability of worsening climate change and a deepening West-global south rift:

Eurasian entente

From left to right: President of China Xi Jinping, President of Brazil Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attend the 2023 BRICS Summit in Johannesburg on Aug. 24, 2023. Gianluigi Guercia/AFP via Getty Images

Attempts to dub the current global transition as one of authoritarianism versus democracy, or even to imagine a multipolar world as a bipolar one, fail to capture the complexity in the transformation of the geopolitical landscape. Many pivotal middle powers are now multialigned in pursuit of their interests, as Saudi Arabia’s thickening ties to China, Vietnam’s comprehensive strategic partnerships with the United States and China, and India in the BRICS group illustrate.

In this fragmenting world, a plethora of new alignments are being created that do not as yet rise to the level of alliances. The most ominous is what we are calling the Eurasian entente—a loose, transactional group encompassing two nuclear and veto-wielding U.N. Security Council members, Russia and China, along with one current and one soon-to-be nuclear power, North Korea and Iran. The alignment, held together by opposition to U.S. power, does not yet equate to an alliance—but is nevertheless worrying.

Beijing has dropped the “no limits” designation for its partnership with Moscow, but Russia and China increasingly collaborate on a strategy to counter the United States. North Korea and Iran, long pariahs, are using new transactional interactions to align more with Sino-Russian interests. Iranian drones have proved to be important for Russia’s war against Ukraine, and North Korea is providing more arms after Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia. Moreover, Russian missile technology aided North Korea’s first successful military satellite launch in November. Beijing seeks to build a Sino-centric alternative global order and benefits in multiple ways from solid partnerships with its Eurasian neighbors.

A congressionally mandated commission is already calling for an increase in U.S. nuclear arms to counter the Sino-Russian alignment. Ties among all four countries vary, but for Washington, which has underestimated the strength of the Russia-China bond and often fantasized about a renewed split between Moscow and Beijing, the expansion of that alignment is not good news, ensuring even more strategic fragmentation and the potential for greater conflict.

Probability of a Eurasian entente:

Looming Taiwanese elections

Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Lai Ching-te greets supporters while arriving at a campaign rally Yilan, Taiwan on Dec. 21, 2023. Annabelle Chih/Getty Images

Whether the opposition or the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) wins Taiwan’s wide-open Jan. 13 presidential election, the results are likely to impact the cross-strait predicament and U.S.-China relations writ large. The DPP candidate, Lai Ching-te, in contrast to Taiwan’s more cautious current president, Tsai Ing-wen, is an outspoken, more overtly pro-independence leader, though he has said he would continue Tsai’s cross-strait policies.

China, which has in recent months stepped up already menacing military activity toward Taiwan (which will probably persist through the January election), would most likely overreact to another DPP victory and raise its military, digital, and economic coercion to a new level. Since Taiwan began holding direct presidential elections in 1996, Beijing has pursued heavy-handed intimidation and coercive pressure during election seasons, though on each occasion this tactic has backfired, with Beijing’s favored candidates losing.

After tortured efforts, the opposition candidates failed to unite behind one ticket, making it a three-way race. Absent a unified opposition, Lai will be the probable victor, per current polling. Opposition candidates favor renewed cross-strait dialogue and would most likely pursue significant political, social, and economic interaction with Beijing.

Meanwhile, U.S.-China tensions have eased slightly following the November Biden-Xi summit, designed to put a floor under the relationship through 2024. Nevertheless, if implementation of Chinese commitments on stopping fentanyl precursors, artificial intelligence cooperation, and military-to-military talks falter, all bets are off. Beijing has not reduced its assertive maritime actions in the South China Sea or near Taiwan. Biden reaffirmed the United States’ “One China” policy based on three foundational communiqués and the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. Growing support for arming and defending Taiwan in Congress, high-level visits, stepped-up military aid, and pending legislation deepening U.S.-Taiwanese ties have raised fears in Beijing that Biden is pursuing a “One China, One Taiwan” policy.

A Lai presidency would most likely reinforce these trends; reignite U.S.-China confrontation, possibly sparking an elevated action-reaction cycle; and could undo the modest gains of the recent Biden-Xi summit. A Lai presidency could be constrained if opposition parties win the legislature. On the other hand, a victory by either opposition candidate would upend the Washington narrative, now focused on how to best prepare the United States and Taiwan for an impending conflict. In either outcome, China-bashing rhetoric will continue to escalate as the U.S. presidential election campaign unfolds. This could become a volatile blend, escalating a downward cycle of U.S.-China confrontation, even more so if Trump gets elected.

Probability of Taiwan’s elections impacting U.S.-China relations:

A third nuclear era

Collective memory of nuclear crises such as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis has faded. The post-Cold War framework for strategic stability has unraveled in direct proportion to heightened U.S.-Russia tensions, and the Ukraine war has all but severed these ties, effectively nullifying the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaties.

Moreover, on the first anniversary of its Ukraine invasion, Moscow declared that it was suspending participation in the New START accord that limits the United States and Russia to 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and expires in 2026. Putin also signed a law withdrawing Russia from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

North Korea is building a formidable second-strike capability and new missile capacity with Russia’s help, and there are prospective chains of proliferation in the greater Middle East if Iran attains a nuclear weapons capability and in Northeast Asia in response to North Korea’s capabilities.

The new nuclear action-reaction rivalry is particularly troubling: The United States, Russia, and China are all modernizing and expanding their nuclear weapons capabilities. For Washington, this is creating a “three-body problem”—a new challenge of how to deter Russia and new nuclear peer China simultaneously. The United States is replacing and modernizing all three legs of its nuclear triad, including new short-range sea-launched cruise missiles, in an effort that could cost $2 trillion over the next 30 years.

Putin’s threats to use short-range nuclear weapons in Ukraine underscore that the threshold for employing nuclear weapons could be lowered. Russia’s supposed doctrine of “escalate to de-escalate” suggests that limited nuclear wars might occur, leading some U.S. analysts to consider the possibility. Emerging technologies—such as AI, offensive cyber-, and anti-satellite weapons—are creating new vulnerabilities for nuclear powers, shrinking decision times and stoking fears of first strikes, even as arms control efforts seem far off. Talks with China on committing to having humans in control of nuclear weapons is a modestly encouraging step.

Probability of a perilous third nuclear era:

Out of control AI

Staff prepares to decorate a robot during the World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai on July 7, 2023. Wang Zhao/AFP via Getty Images

The fear that AI and its physical expression—robots—could soon be smarter than humans has divided Silicon Valley, with one of the godfathers of AI, Geoffrey Hinton, and dozens of other leading AI developers warning of the “risk of extinction,” and most dramatically at OpenAI, which created ChatGPT, now fully on the side of speeding up AI development and promoting the opportunities.

Large language models of generative AI are exponentially improving a wide range of capabilities as OpenAI, Google, Meta, Microsoft, dozens of start-ups, and China race ahead. In 2024, OpenAI will release a more powerful language model, GPT-5; it could be a watershed year determining whether governments can surmount the governance deficit. Biden’s recent executive order imposing regulations for safe and secure development and use of AI, as well as the U.K.-led Bletchley Declaration, with its vague commitments to cooperate on AI safety, are modest but promising steps.

No U.S. congressional legislation exists on AI standards, safety, and accountability, nor on digital privacy and data protection. Leading AI nations have separate regulatory regimes reflecting growing global fragmentation: The EU has produced, though not yet adopted, the most comprehensive legal framework for AI on top of digital privacy legislation to protect the public from unwanted algorithms. It also has a Digital Markets Act aimed at Big Tech.

China has published generative AI services regulations, following earlier restrictive digital commerce and data protection laws. AI is increasing exponentially, yet global safety and accountability norms are still elusive. But regulation alone would not contain AI. As Mustafa Suleyman, an AI pioneer and a co-founder of DeepMind, argues in a new book, The Coming Wave, containing AI may be all but impossible. Suleyman writes that regulation must be paired with adequate systematic research on AI safety, of which there is relatively little: We need to know why and how mistakes are made by AI, whether governments can stress-test AI systems and access and correct flawed systems, and whether there is a solely human-controlled off switch.

Probability of AI running wild:

Moral absolutism

Supporters of former U.S. President Donald Trump clash with an anti-Trump protester outside of the Trump National Doral resort on June 12, 2023 in Miami, Florida. Stephanie Keith/Getty Images

All the risks discussed above are, to use former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s term, “known unknowns”—discernable events or trends whose trajectories we can assess. But one intangible driver of many of these trends has not been adequately considered: certainty or moral absolutism.

This mindset views issues through a Manichean us-versus-them, good-versus-evil lens and tends toward intolerance and identity politics. This approach is marked by what psychologists call “cognitive bias,” a proclivity to filter all events through a rigid, religious-like belief or set of beliefs and animating behavior, to wit: Putinism, Xi Jinping Thought, Christian nationalism, “woke” progressivism, radical Islamism, far-left and far-right antisemitism, U.S. exceptionalism and its perpetual primacy, and the “civilizing mission” ethos.

This mindset also tends to cling to outmoded assumptions, leading to what social scientists call “path dependence”—relying on past decisions and actions to achieve goals rather than evaluating current conditions and trends. Such black-and-white idées fixe could result in tragic outcomes, if not World War III. This trend is fueling internal polarization in the United States as well as global fragmentation. A balance of interests can be negotiated; absolute faith, not so much.

Theologian and political philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr warned of the illusion of “managing history,” explaining that “modern man lacks the humility to accept the fact that the whole drama of history is enacted in a frame of meaning too large for human comprehension or management.” As former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger admonished, “History presents unambiguous alternatives only in the rarest of circumstances.”

Probability of moral absolutism undermining global cooperation:

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