“We are working to save our Druze brothers,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared on July 16 as Israel targeted the Syrian military’s headquarters in Damascus. Netanyahu’s comments came after Israel intervened in a complicated power struggle involving Sunni Arab Bedouin tribes, Druze militias, and Syrian government forces, during which hundreds of predominantly Druze civilians suffered horrific violence.
In explaining their actions, Israeli officials have presented the Syrian Druze as a single bloc that is unified in resisting government control and rejecting integration into the Syrian state. The reality, however, is more complex. The Druze community is certainly concerned about the rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa and the Islamist influence in his new government. But different Druze leaders have taken diverse approaches to Damascus: Some have signaled a conciliatory approach to Sharaa, while others have resisted state control completely.
Ultimately, a peaceful and lasting power-sharing arrangement will require compromise between Damascus and the Druze community. U.S. and Israeli pressure can help make this possible—but only if it is deployed constructively. This means supporting Druze leaders who see a future within Syria, rather than deepening divisions by weighing in on behalf of one particular faction.
The Druze in Syria number around 700,000, making up about 3 percent of the country’s population. The vast majority of them reside in Sweida governorate, located in southwestern Syria along the border with Israel, while smaller communities are also found in Idlib, Quneitra, and Rif Dimashq. Due to their relatively small number, the Druze have long strived to avoid persecution from Damascus.
Today, the Druze community is indeed worried about its future under Syria’s new leaders. Many fear that Sharaa will create a coercive new security regime that will operate according to Islamist principles, marginalize the Druze community, and deny them constitutional protections for their religious and cultural distinctiveness.
These concerns are certainly justified. After Sharaa’s rise to power, he integrated 18 militias into the new Sunni-dominated Syrian military. Simultaneously, his constitutional declaration that outlined Syria’s political future was exclusionary. It concentrated power in Sharaa’s hands, granting him the authority to appoint lawmakers, control the judicial system, and operate with no oversight. This process marginalized the Druze and other minority groups, whom Damascus neither consulted nor acknowledged.
The Druze endured a turbulent relationship with Islamist groups throughout the Syrian civil war, particularly with Sharaa’s former faction, the Nusra Front. The tensions turned deadly in 2015, when Nusra fighters opened fire on protesters in the village of Qalb Lawzah in Idlib, killing at least 20 Druze. In the aftermath, the Druze urged Nusra to hold the perpetrator accountable. But the militant group never prosecuted anyone, leaving the community with a lingering sense of fear. This lack of accountability only deepened the Druze’s distrust of the new government.
Still, degrees of trust in the new government vary significantly across Druze factions, shaping the extent of their collaboration with the state. While the Druze in Syria share a strong sense of identity, they lack an organized and formal leadership structure akin to Lebanon’s Druze community, which is represented by the Progressive Socialist Party and individuals such as Walid Jumblatt. Instead, their leadership is primarily spiritual, centered on three key religious figures in Sweida: Sheikhs Hammoud al-Hinnawi, Yousef Jarbou, and Hikmat al-Hijri. Collectively, these men hold the most influence over Syria’s Druze, guiding both their spiritual and political decisions.
The three leaders represent diverging agendas within the Druze community. The split between the three occurred in 2012, when Hijri led the Druze from his town of Qanawat, while both Hinnawi and Jarbou led the community from Ain al-Zaman.
The politics of the three sheikhs have also diverged significantly; Jarbou is pragmatic and open to negotiations with the new Syrian state and integration; Hinnawi shares a similar outlook, opposing internal divisions and focusing on putting all arms under the state’s control. However, Hijri is the most vocal and determined opponent of Sharaa’s rule. He was the first to firmly reject Syrian government control over Sweida. In April, he sharply condemned the new government, calling it a collection of “terrorist factions” and declaring its hold over Damascus to be “unacceptable both domestically and internationally.” Hijri has repeatedly described the government as an “extremist group wanted by international justice.” Hinnawi has affirmed Sharaa as Syria’s president, expressing his willingness to “cooperate with him for the sake of the nation.” Jarbou has echoed these sentiments, signaling a more conciliatory stance toward Sharaa’s government.
In addition to the new government in Damascus, Israel has also become a point of contention between the three leaders. Hijri has repeatedly called for “international intervention” to resolve the crisis in southern Syria, even explicitly advocating an Israeli intervention to preserve his local autonomy over Sweida. Such intervention would also thwart any attempt by the Syrian government to centralize its rule in the area. By contrast, the other two Druze leaders have consistently framed their issues with Damascus as domestic, rejecting foreign involvement.
Popular attitudes toward Israel also vary. In Sweida, for instance, residents took down and burned an Israeli flag after unknown individuals hoisted it in a public square. After Netanyahu pledged to defend Syria’s Druze back in February, a faction aligned with Hijri began pushing for closer ties with Israel, even as Hijri distanced himself from the effort. This faction, the Sweida Military Council, includes former officers of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
Throughout the civil war, Hijri supported Assad and even formed a local militia in coordination with the regime’s military security apparatus. Hijri has also hosted and met with representatives from Iranian-backed militias in Iraq supported by the Assad regime, such as Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba. Despite this, Hijri began criticizing the Assad regime in the final years of the civil war after Assad’s military intelligence director in Sweida, Louay al-Ali, insulted him and the Druze community during a phone call in 2021.
While the Sweida Military Council initially claimed that Israel did not support it, the situation on the ground told a different story. When the Syrian army announced its plan to enter Sweida on July 15 after two days of clashes between Druze militias and Sunni Arab Bedouin tribes, both Jarbou and Hinnawi accepted the entry of government forces. Hijri, by contrast, rejected it. Almost immediately, Israel launched an intense air campaign against Syrian troops entering Sweida, implying close coordination between Hijri and Israel.
The disagreements between the Druze leaders did not end there. The Syrian government agreed to a cease-fire arrangement with Jarbou and Hinnawi on July 16. However, Hijri rejected it, vowing to continue the fight to expel Sharaa’s forces from Sweida. Jarbou emphasized that “the majority of the people of Sweida hope to restore stability,” stressing that “only integration under the state will bring security and stability.” By contrast, Hijri declared that “anyone who diverges from our position will be held accountable.”
The fighting between Sharaa’s forces and the militias affiliated with Hijri culminated in another cease-fire on July 16. Signed by the Sweida Military Council and the Syrian government, it dictated that government forces exit Sweida. However, the cease-fire faltered the next day. What followed was a campaign by the Hijri-affiliated militias against Bedouins in Sweida, whose homes were torched and many of whom were taken hostage. This in turn prompted Bedouin tribes across Syria to mobilize and commit violations against Druze in Sweida. Then, in response to this fighting, government forces returned to the governorate but refrained from entering Sweida city due to a demand by Hijri. The clashes ended with a deal on July 19 that allowed government forces to retrieve the Bedouins who were taken in exchange for Bedouin militants withdrawing from the governorate.
The situation in Sweida has been the greatest challenge confronting the new government in Damascus since taking control in December. Resolving it will require all sides to act more constructively than they have so far.
First, Sharaa’s government should engage those Druze leaders who have shown openness toward integration, such as Jarbou and Hinnawi, and work to address their concerns. In the short term, the government must establish institutions in Sweida to deliver essential services. Securing the highway connecting Damascus and Sweida, which has become a site for abductions and crime since the fall of the Assad regime, can build trust with the Druze community. The government should also acknowledge local sensitivities, especially concerns over Islamist elements within its security apparatus. One way to do this would be by developing a mechanism to integrate local Druze into the national police force.
In the long term, the Syrian government must hold accountable those responsible for violations against the Druze. On July 22, the committee investigating crimes committed against Alawites in March said it had provided the names of 298 alleged perpetrators, including members of the Syrian armed forces, to the courts for further investigation. The ball is now in Sharaa’s court, as the world watches to see if he’s willing to prosecute those within his own ranks. Beyond accountability, a cohesive political process is needed. This should allow all segments of Syrian society to participate in the country’s government with full respect for their cultural and religious identities.
Israel has shown the Syrian government that it’s willing to use military means to defend Syria’s Druze community. At the same time, Sharaa has made it clear that he does not seek an open confrontation with Israel, putting the interests of Syrians before “chaos and destruction.” This should lend itself to an outcome negotiated via the back channels and security talks that have been underway since May. If Sharaa can offer credible assurances that treatment of the Druze will improve, Netanyahu can claim success and end the airstrikes, thereby meeting Sharaa’s demand as well.
Israel insists it is working to protect the Druze minority. However, Israel must remain cautious with whom it chooses to ally. Hijri does not speak for the entire Druze population, and treating him as such will backfire. If Israel is sucked into a power struggle within the Syrian Druze community, it will ultimately be bad for the Druze, bad for Syria, and bad for Israel.
Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has expressed a desire to stabilize Syria by removing sanctions. However, the United States must also pressure Sharaa to prove to Syria’s ethnoreligious groups that he is a leader they can trust—one who will protect their interests and guarantee their safety. A crucial step in earning trust is for Sharaa to hold accountable fighters responsible for crimes against both the Alawite and Druze communities. Washington must make it clear to Sharaa that any further sanctions relief hinges on his efforts to stop allowing his forces to act with impunity.