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Among other positions, Trump ran on the promise of extricating the United States from the conflict in Ukraine. His closest allies have openly disparaged Kyiv and made overtures to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Thus, with this transition of power begins a new chapter of the war in which Western support for Ukraine could fall by the wayside.

Outgoing U.S. President Joe Biden’s belated decision to allow Ukraine to use U.S. missiles to strike targets deep within Russian territory, a critical condition of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s “victory plan,” is hardly a godsend. These missiles cannot singlehandedly change the course of the war, and they put Zelensky in an awkward position. Striking Russian targets will trigger not only the wrath of Putin, but also that of Trump, who will undoubtedly view any escalation as a shot against his own prospects for dealmaking.

With Trump making threats to pull out of NATO and cut a deal with Putin, Europe is also having second thoughts on backing Ukraine. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz spoke with Putin on Nov. 15 about bringing an end to the war, while Czech President Petr Pavel announced plans in October to send a new ambassador to the Czech Embassy in Moscow in early 2025.

Meanwhile, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres recently attended the annual summit of the BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and several recently added members—hosted in Kazan, Russia. The U.N.’s involvement in an event hosted by a country engaged in a war of aggression, whose president is wanted under an International Criminal Court warrant, sends a disheartening message.

Almost three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the West is tired. It no longer has the political will to help Ukraine win by military means and is seeking a settlement with the aggressor instead.

The U.S. shift toward isolationism may hasten the inevitable: Ukraine and the West will soon find themselves negotiating with Russia to define the terms of a settlement—and, by extension, shaping a new world order. This emerging order will not be the rules-based system established after World War II, but one driven by idiosyncratic dealmaking among strongmen.

The problem is that any deal will amount to Ukraine’s—and the West’s—capitulation to Russia.

Halyna, a resident of a multistory building damaged by a Russian airstrike, is seen with her head bandaged in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, on Sept. 29. Ukrinform/NurPhoto via Getty Images

Even before Trump’s election, some of Ukraine’s staunchest allies began expressing the view that Ukraine would have to accept some loss of land. The most obvious settlement strategy, then, would likely involve buying Ukrainian and European security with territory—possibly including Donetsk; large chunks of the Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions; and the peninsula of Crimea, which Russia first seized in 2014.

This outcome is a far cry from the Western leaders’ earlier commitments to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and hopes for regime change in Russia, but realpolitik leaves little room for moral considerations.

Should Zelensky agree to this loss of territory, the only realistic security guarantee for Ukraine would be membership in NATO. Yet this runs counter to what U.S. Vice President-elect J.D. Vance has lobbied for: a demilitarized zone along the current front lines and an enduring commitment to Ukraine’s neutrality.

The next White House does not seem to have a plan for what happens to Europe in a few years, when it would face a revanchist Russia with a subdued Ukraine at its Western borders. Such an outcome is not in Trump’s best interest. Another option, therefore, may have Trump concede to Ukraine’s membership in a new NATO—one without the United States, perhaps—leaving Europeans to be the masters of their own security.

Battered and curtailed but still sovereign, Ukraine would gain a nuclear umbrella against future Russian aggression, and Europe would fund the postwar reconstruction. There would be no international tribunal and no reparations. (Putin won’t be negotiating his own sentence.) Sanctions against Russia would remain for the time being. Europe would accept the occupation de facto, but it wouldn’t de jure recognize the territory as Russian land.

It will be difficult to come up with a deal that satisfies all parties. But in any negotiation, reaching a mutually satisfactory outcome depends on the motivation and constraints of those involved. The West is motivated to settle in Ukraine because it is tired of war, and because Trump is uninterested in leading the existential fight for democracy. Ukraine, understanding that it cannot win on its own, can be motivated to settle in order to stop the now-pointless bloodshed.

Putin’s motivations are murkier. In fact, a closer look would reveal that Putin has no need for lasting peace.

Putin’s megalomaniacal intransigence is now reinforced by his perception that he is winning, even if it is taking longer than he hoped. Piecemeal shipments of Western military aid have made Russian advances slow and painful—but they have been advances nevertheless. While Ukraine’s ability to affect Russian military logistics was until recently severely hampered by Western restrictions, the Russian army has faced no such limitations, regularly bombing civilian infrastructure and military targets alike.

In wars of attrition, the side with more resources is poised to win, and Russia still mobilizes resources with frightening force. Russia has activated the economic and cultural mechanisms necessary for around-the-clock military production—bread-making factories churning out drones, schoolchildren making camouflage nets, and old Soviet tanks hauled out of Siberian forests and shipped to Ukrainian front lines.

Now that the economy has been switched on to military footing, there is no shortage of munitions. Meanwhile, government payouts ensure an ample supply of volunteers to enlist in the military, meaning Russia does not have a manpower crisis like Ukraine does.

No human toll is too high for Russia. During World War II, Russia lost more than 27 million people—the largest number of fatalities of all involved. Peter the Great’s 18th-century Great Northern War, which established Russia’s power in the Baltics, lasted 21 years and incurred enormous casualties, as did the 25-year-long Livonian War fought by Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century.

Russia has already suffered upward of 700,000 people dead or wounded during the Ukraine war, according to estimates from the National Interest. But with families of dead soldiers mollified by the “coffin money” they receive, society writ large has not budged in its support for the war. It will likely stay that way short of another mobilization.

It certainly helps that the brunt of the war is borne by recruited volunteers, who sign up to fight to improve their and their family’s economic standings, and by convicts—both groups making up a significant number of those killed and wounded in Ukraine. Another large constituency fighting Russia’s war is national minorities, often from depressed economic areas and the lowest strata of society. And now, those minorities are joined by North Korean soldiers and potentially by citizens of the other dictatorships that Putin courts.

Russian service members, involved in the country’s war in Ukraine, march on Red Square during the Victory Day military parade in central Moscow on May 9. Natalia Kolesnikova/AFP via Getty Images

Contrast this low visibility of Russia’s war toll, further obscured by Kremlin propaganda, to its loudly celebrated nativist successes. In the last two years, not only did Russia fail to fold under the weight of Western sanctions, but it also managed to build parallel economic, financial, and cultural structures that are independent of the West.

Economically, Russia has reoriented itself toward the East, increasing trade with China, India, and other countries in Asia and the Middle East. It has shifted its energy exports away from Europe and developed domestic production capabilities. Despite sanctions, oil money—the main source of Russia’s war financing—keeps flowing, albeit from a different direction than before. Cross-border payments are now handled through SPFS, a homegrown alternative to the SWIFT global financial system, and the Mir payment system that replaced Visa and MasterCard. Russia touts these systems to its BRICS partners as alternatives to “Western financial hegemony.”

If anything, the war in Ukraine has given Putin more money to play with than before. Assets belonging to Western companies exiting Russia have been nationalized or bought for cheap and redistributed to businesses with ties to the Kremlin—one of the largest property transfers in Russia’s history. Cut off from Western banks, Russian oligarchs must invest their money domestically. Sanctions evasion schemes protect Russians’ access to Western consumer goods, creating enormous enrichment opportunities for Russian and Western business agents alike. Tankers shuttle Russian oil with payments cleared through offshore shell companies. Putin’s personal wealth, estimated at somewhere between $70 billion and $200 billion, remains safe. Though he is a product of a socialist state, the Russian leader is a master of capitalism.

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Cultural shifts in Russia increase Putin’s confidence in victory. What little dissent remained before the war has largely been rooted out, with Russians closing ranks around their leader. According to a recent poll conducted by the Levada Center in September and October, more than two-thirds of Russians who said they want the war to end are against returning Russian-occupied territories to Ukraine.

On the global stage, Russia has managed to upgrade its status from a regional power to a leader of the anti-Western coalition. These coalition members have their own stakes in Ukraine. A Russian victory would embarrass the United States, weakening its influence in Asia and helping China. North Korea has found exports—bad shells and soldiers—that it can exchange for food, money, and energy. And Iran is happy to keep the United States distracted from the Middle East.

Even if Putin wanted to end the war, it would entail serious risk for his regime. Drones, shells, and missile production would have to be scaled down, ending the economic boom. The sudden drop in government spending would create real prospects of an economic collapse. Around 1.5 million veterans would have to be pulled out of Ukraine to find new roles in a corrupt Russian society. The manufactured sense of national unity would give way to envy that beyond the border, on Russia’s “ancestral lands,” Ukrainians are thriving under European Union and NATO banners.

Taken together, in a country reacclimatized to grand-scale violence, the prospect of revolt becomes clear and present. To find an outlet for that aggression, Putin would have to start a new war not long after agreeing to settle for peace.

Ultimately, the status quo—an ongoing border squabble with conventional weapons—suits all but Ukraine and Europe, for which security deteriorates in direct proportion to Putin’s success.

A woman votes in Russia’s presidential election at a polling station in Donetsk in the Russian-controlled portion of eastern Ukraine on March 16. AFP via Getty Images

He is not, however, as invincible as he seems. The BRICS countries are not rushing to replace SWIFT with the Russian alternative. By putting all his economic eggs into the military basket, Putin has siphoned off resources from everywhere else, an unsustainable move. Inflation is real, and the ruble is weakening. Even the overheated military sector can’t keep up with demands. Moreover, as a student of Russian history, Putin knows that the support and adoration of the Russian masses can turn on its head overnight.

But Putin also knows how to keep a poker face. Having staked his survival on this war, Putin would be negotiating from the position of strength and with obligations to his domestic and international stakeholders in mind.

He has already shot an opening volley at the U.S. president-elect: After a call during which Trump told the Russian leader not to escalate in Ukraine, Russian state television released a special on Melania Trump’s modeling career, including nude photos of the once and future first lady.

The West, meanwhile, will be negotiating from a position of inherent weakness. After tiptoeing around the Kremlin’s red lines throughout the war, Western leaders have signaled their readiness to consider cessation of a large chunk of Ukrainian territory, wishing away what little leverage they had.

There is nothing stopping Putin from believing that he can’t get more. Unless Russia is decisively defeated on the battlefield or Putin is given precisely what he wants, he will not stop.

Of the options put forward for a negotiated solution, the only one that Putin would agree to is the one that gives him Ukraine’s capitulation on a platter. He will never agree to a thriving, independent, armed, and Western-aligned Ukraine on his border, because he would lose too much face. Putin will therefore demand an unviable Ukraine—without an army and without NATO membership—and, in effect, a Western surrender.

The issue of European security cannot be solved by a settlement with Moscow because appeasement only increases the aggressor’s appetite. Only the containment of Putin’s expansionism by military means will remove the existential threat to his neighbors. So long as there is an aggressive, revanchist Russia in the picture, lasting peace is an illusion.