• Foreign & Public Diplomacy
• Iran
• Middle East and North Africa

November 26, 2024, 6:00 AM View Comments ()

As the sun sets on Joe Biden’s presidency, the specter of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump looms over the Middle East. With weeks to go until Inauguration Day, the situation across the Middle East is precarious. Israel continues its destructive bombing campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon while Iran has promised a “teeth-breaking response” to recent Israeli strikes. Despite his bombastic support for Israel, Trump has declared a desire to end the war in the Middle East and to extricate the United States from military entanglements, yet escalation between Israel and Iran could have the opposite effect. Central to diplomatic efforts to prevent wider escalation will, almost certainly, be Saudi Arabia.

Saudi newspapers have heralded Trump’s victory, while Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud penned an open letter to the president-elect, congratulating him on his victory and urging him to work with friends in the country and beyond in pursuit of peace. Such remarks were hardly surprising given how favorably Gulf states viewed the first Trump administration. Yet things are different this time around. The Saudis and others continue to prioritize de-escalation with Iran, acknowledging the need to integrate it into regional affairs while preventing a regional conflict is a top priority.

In the past, the idea of Saudi Arabia playing a mediatory role in preventing military action against Iran would have been fanciful. Since 1979, the two states have been embroiled in a struggle to shape regional affairs that has manifested in violence across Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. Diplomatic relations between the two states were severed after the execution of the Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr by Saudi Arabia in 2016. When the Houthis attacked Saudi oil refineries in Abqaiq and Khurais in 2019, many feared that Riyadh and Tehran were on the path to war. And yet, across 2023, these longtime rivals were able to take significant steps toward normalization.

At the core of Saudi-Iranian normalization was the acknowledgement that conflict was not in the interests of either party. For Saudi Arabia, its Vision 2030 plan—the flagship transformation project of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—is only possible if the region avoids conflict. Iranian leadership, too, acknowledged the need for economic investment. The Chinese-brokered agreement set in motion a way to achieve the needs of both states and, shortly after, the Saudis entered into talks with the Houthis to bring about an end to their costly military action in Yemen.

Though some have rejected the progress made, arguing instead that a “clash of ideologies” remains between Saudi Arabia and Iran, this ignores changing dynamics within and between states. Persian restaurants have become increasingly popular in Riyadh, while the two states have been involved in joint naval exercises in the Sea of Oman and are planning more in the Red Sea. Increased security cooperation was a key feature of the agreement and recent developments suggest that it should be viewed favorably, with Saudi military chiefs meeting their Iranian counterparts in Tehran. At the joint summit of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Riyadh earlier in November, Mohammed bin Salman called on the international community to “compel Israel to respect Iran’s sovereignty and not to attack its territories,” in remarks that would have been almost inconceivable two years ago. While taking steps toward normalization with Iran is impressive, mediating a complex set of conflict dynamics is a different beast.

Fundamentally, though, Saudi Arabia needs regional stability to enact Vision 2030. It has the ear of decision-makers in Iran, Israel, and the United States and can offer incentives to encourage participation. It wants a defense pact with the United States—something perhaps more likely under Trump and with a Republican-controlled Congress—and stability with Iran. It would benefit from normalization with Israel, undeniably, but not without a Palestinian state.

Normalization with Saudi Arabia would be the big diplomatic prize for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Trump, particularly after the Biden administration failed to get it over the line. Achieving this will not be easy, however, and it will come at a price. A cease-fire in Gaza is necessary but not sufficient for Saudi Arabia. In the Financial Times, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan wrote that Palestinian statehood is essential and that Israel must take irreversible steps toward the establishment of a Palestinian state—a stance that has hardened in recent months. And yet, it is difficult to see Netanyahu’s government embarking on this path without significant pressure from close allies in Washington and elsewhere. While the Biden administration has been unwilling or unable to put pressure on Israel, Trump has reportedly told Israel to end the fighting before his inauguration, reflecting a campaign promise of ending wars. So how can Israel be brought over the line?

For decades, Israel’s political elite has bemoaned their existence in a “bad neighborhood,” surrounded by hostile actors. While peace deals with Egypt and Jordan improved things, and the Abraham Accords pointed to an alternative future for the region, the bigger threat is still from Hamas and Hezbollah, supported by Iran. Securing security guarantees from the two groups alone will not placate Israeli fears. But if they come with guarantees from Iran—backed up by Saudi Arabia and others—then there is a chance it may assuage Israeli security concerns.

Once again, it is hard to see Netanyahu and his war cabinet backing down without significant pressure. Ending the process of “de-escalation through escalation” would be a dramatic shift in policy, with potentially fatal consequences for Netanyahu’s political career. The consensus is that Israel has secured a series of strategic victories over members of the “axis of resistance” and to stop would allow Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas to regroup. Yet Iran’s ability to deter Israeli aggression, either directly or through Hezbollah, has been dramatically curtailed, as Israel has demonstrated the ability to hit targets inside Iranian territory with ease. The killing of key Hamas and Hezbollah figures, including Yahya Sinwar and Hassan Nasrallah, might ease some of these anxieties. Add in a deal to return the hostages, a devastated Hamas, a weakened Hezbollah forced to withdraw from the south in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701—as previously agreed in 2006—could frame Netanyahu, the longest-serving prime minister in Israeli history, as one of its most successful.

Moreover, continuing the war is seen as a necessary condition for Netanyahu to stay in power. His domestic popularity has risen in recent months. His coalition partners, notably Yoav Gallant and Bezalel Smotrich, have also been emboldened and would almost certainly act as spoilers in any deal, meaning a holistic “all-of-Israel” approach would be needed.

But this is only part of the story. Growing international outrage and condemnation at actions in Gaza and Lebanon have isolated Israel. Netanyahu’s speech at the U.N. in September prompted a diplomats to walk out. The ICC has issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, along with Mohammed Deif, increasing global pressure on Israel. U.S.-Israeli relations have become increasingly strained, with Washington fearful of being dragged into another Middle Eastern war—something that Trump will almost certainly want to avoid.

Despite his growing popularity, there remain pockets of resistance to Netanyahu across Israel, coalescing around demands for a hostage-release deal. The impact of the past year is starting to hit the Israeli economy. As Bloomberg reported, inflation is on the rise, a 1 percent value-added tax (VAT) rise is going into effect in January, the average volume of daily flights is down by 40 percent, one-third of building sites are shuttered, and the agricultural workforce is down 40 percent. At the same time, terrorist attacks within the green line are on the rise, and a spy ring allegedly under Iranian control was recently busted.

Israeli relations with other countries in the Middle East are also at risk if the conflict continues. Though few are fans of Hamas, the Palestinian cause continues to resonate in societies across the region, prompting protests and highlighting considerable anger at Israel’s actions in Gaza and Lebanon. When asked about normalization with Israel earlier this year, Mohammed bin Salman told members of the U.S. Congress that he is risking his life by pursuing grand bargain with Israel and the United States, pointing to the case of Anwar Sadat.

At the launch of a global alliance to press for the formal recognition of a Palestinian state, Faisal bin Farhan declared, “Now, more than ever, we should intensify our joint efforts to save the [two-state] solution in order to restore security, stability, and establish peace in our region.” Going further, Mohammed bin Salman accused Israel of committing a genocide in Gaza, demonstrating the increasingly firm line taken by Saudi Arabia. Such comments do not necessarily preclude a grand bargain but perhaps point to the wider posturing involved in getting a deal done.

With few traditional mediators willing or able to bring about an end to the conflict, it is time to take Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic potential seriously. It has already demonstrated its ability to be pragmatic with Iran and has acknowledged a willingness to normalize relations with Israel if the conditions are right. This should play into Trump’s hands, whose campaign pledges included ending wars. If anyone can convince Netanyahu to accept the deal, it is the transactional Trump. While a grand bargain will not be easy, and the next few weeks will almost certainly be precarious, the need to put an end to the suffering of the past year is undeniable.