• Human Rights
• United States

The headlines covering his overhaul of the federal government have largely focused on a few earthquakes, such as the demise of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the dismantling of State Department bureaus dealing with human rights and refugees. But Trump’s cuts have also battered scores of civil society organizations and policy centers that received funding from the U.S. government.

These institutions—including the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, Freedom House, and refugee resettlement groups—have been shuttered, shriveled, or mired in existential legal challenges. Career professionals have had to abort projects, betray trusted global partners, abandon vulnerable populations, and seek new ways to make a living.

Many of those affected by Trump’s moves have gone through the stages of grief: denial, outrage, and efforts to bargain with legislators and courts, followed increasingly by depression. Now, they must move toward acceptance—not seeing the administration’s choices as justifiable but rather admitting that many are unstoppable and likely irreversible. In short, idealists need to become realists to ensure that the values they treasure survive to fight another day.

Even as ongoing court challenges could salvage some vestiges of the internationalist system, foreign-policy idealists must begin to envision new futures. It is time to collectively reckon with Trump’s great dismantling of the liberal internationalist project and the internal weaknesses that made it possible. Only then can the liberal beliefs that underwrote the old order find new life.

U.S. President Donald Trump steps off Air Force One in Miami, Florida, on Feb. 19. Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images

Well before Trump’s second term, the system was in urgent need of revitalization. The post-World War II consensus that drove the creation of multilateral bodies, human rights treaties, and international law—all heavily influenced by the United States—had given way to fierce great-power competition, resentment over Western dominance, and the increasing prioritization of self-interest over principle.

The United States has not ratified a human rights treaty since 2002. Russia and China have grown increasingly opportunistic, seeking to remake international institutions by installing their personnel and agendas across United Nations bodies. The U.N. Security Council’s outdated composition and deadlock over sensitive issues have made it an afterthought in major conflicts such as those in Ukraine and Gaza.

Such tensions have made it nearly impossible to confront new challenges, including climate change and COVID-19. The U.N.’s 2024 Summit of the Future, heralded as a “once-in-a-generation opportunity to reimagine the multilateral system,” ended with a whimper as stalemated negotiations culminated in a watered-down pact that garnered scant global attention. Meanwhile, economic dislocation and mass refugee flows, especially in Europe, have fueled the rise of populists appealing to national self-interest. For Americans, drawn-out wars, rising income inequality, and economic shocks have turned the political tide against globalization.

Despite this, the liberal internationalist project continued to enjoy robust bipartisan support in Congress and the policy community in Washington—even as the emergence of a cottage industry of USAID contractors, a sprawling national security bureaucracy, mostly fruitless reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and sustained democratic backsliding around the world all sowed doubt about whether liberal internationalism could deliver benefits for the American people.

These and other weaknesses yielded a brittle system that was vulnerable to Trump’s blows. Trump’s first administration was reined in by members of Congress and populated by officials who valued foreign aid and alliances. When then-U.S. President Joe Biden declared four years ago that “America is back,” a return to the status quo ante still seemed possible. But just six months into Trump’s second term, that is no longer the case.

The Trump administration has unapologetically embraced authoritarians and, worse, emulated their tactics, including attacks on universities, the media, the civil service, the courts, and checks and balances. Even if a future administration restores respect for these institutions and principles, the rest of the world will view liberal values as a politically contingent credo rather than a transcendent U.S. tradition.

U.S. Speaker of the House Mike Johnson holds up the vote total as he delivers remarks alongside fellow House Republicans during a ceremony for the “One Big, Beautiful Bill Act” at the U.S. Capitol in Washington on July 3. Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images

The world can no longer dismiss Trump as an anomaly who does not represent the country’s national character. Just as Israel, which has a vigorous political opposition and narrow governing majorities, is known around the world by the face of long-serving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, so has Trump become the emblem of today’s United States.

Trump’s approach will shade the country’s status as a global leader for decades to come. It is hard to imagine another president resurrecting anything near the breadth and depth of the liberal infrastructure that has been disassembled. Already, goodwill toward the United States is dissipating around the world. Through Trump’s brash foreign-policy moves, including his decision to strike Iran, have elicited a pragmatic applause from some global leaders, there are signs that the world is realigning to circumnavigate the United States.

Moreover, those left without food, medicine, or shelter due to Trump’s decision to yank away aid will not soon forget Washington’s betrayal. An April Ipsos poll showed that the belief that the United States will have a positive impact on global affairs fell among respondents in 26 out of 29 countries over the preceding six months. The steepest drop—from 52 percent to 19 percent—occurred in Canada.

Wild swings in U.S. foreign policy are also undercutting global perceptions of the country’s economic stability. The George W. Bush administration urged Beijing to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system; now the tables have turned, with states making similar calls on Washington. Trump’s failure to pay U.N. dues and his withdrawal from the World Health Organization and Human Rights Council have plunged the U.N. system into crisis, forcing painful budget cuts. Meanwhile, his unprecedented tariff regime, suspension of funding for the World Trade Organization, and threats to politicize the U.S. Federal Reserve have upended global trade and roiled markets.

Also gone, likely for good, is the intangible influence of the United States as a democratic standard-setter—or what Biden called “the power of our example.” The country’s reputation for free and credible elections, robust public debate, an unfettered press, widely respected courts, and the separation of powers has taken a beating. Trump’s time in office has drained terms such as “our values,” “our allies,” and “our commitments” of meaning. No longer a “city on a hill,” the United States now relies more on threats and quid pro quos than on respect or shared interests.

It is hard to predict how these dramatic changes to Washington’s identity will shape the world, and much will depend on how the Trump era unfolds. Still, some consequences are foreseeable in the near term.

As China and Russia exert more influence on global media, fact-based journalism will increasingly give way to propaganda and the further erosion of informed discourse. Moves to lessen dependency on the United States will progress apace: Europe deepening trade ties with China, Japan fortifying defense cooperation with India, and Canada reinforcing its links with Europe. Trump’s tariffs will further rewire global supply chains to circumnavigate Washington’s whims.

The United States’ retreat from commitments to human rights, refugee protection, and humanitarian aid risks precipitating a normative slide around the world. Europe seems unlikely to pick up the mantle of human rights leadership, particularly as many European nations seek to get out from under international rules that protect asylum-seekers. There are troubling signs that Trump may accelerate the global trend of leaders turning away from the world and redirecting resources back home. Even before Trump reentered office, other key donor nations were scaling back commitments for international development and democracy promotion.

For liberal internationalists in Washington, there is another reality to confront: namely, that their own influence has been cut down to size. As the world adapts to these changes, the United States—including its experts, diplomats, and civil society organizations—will play a diminished role in crafting the arrangements and institutions that define the global order.

Laid-off U.S. federal workers are among those waiting in line to enter a job fair in Silver Spring, Maryland, located just outside Washington on April 16. Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images

Just as Democrats are conducting an “autopsy” of their 2024 election defeat, liberal internationalists should interrogate the policies of the past couple decades to inform their future plans. Preserving and consolidating the archives of key organizations, including USAID and the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, will be crucial to this effort. Think tanks and researchers should invoke government records preservation provisions to ensure that federal agencies’ archives, which hold decades of wisdom, are not lost or made inaccessible.

Private philanthropists and institutions that do not rely on government funds, such as the Ford, MacArthur, and Open Society Foundations, need to step up and incentivize organizational consolidation through transition grants and funding. Currently, the U.S. nonprofit sector—including traditional nonprofits, think tanks, and academic centers—is highly fragmented, and organizations compete against one another for limited funds.

These organizations should explore how to merge, consolidate, and streamline projects to find life after government funding. Such efforts will require unsentimental triage that prioritizes initiatives best positioned to secure long-term replacement funding from foreign governments, corporations, or other sources. Meanwhile, U.S. organizations may need to be combined with foreign counterparts or brought under the umbrella of academic institutions. Even if this process entails retiring venerable legacies of independence, overhauling mission statements, or sidelining executives or trustees, it will be important to preserving key programs.

Looking ahead, some of USAID’s functions may be absorbed into the World Bank or U.N. agencies. Digital technologies and artificial intelligence might help sustain or resurrect leaner versions of global media outlets such as Voice of America and Radio Free Asia. These retooled efforts may never approach the reach and quality of long-standing government institutions. But whereas liberal internationalism once entailed ambitious edifice building, it will now involve a focus on efficiency and the art of the possible.

Black plastic covers the sign at the entrance to the now-shuttered USAID office at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington on April 1. Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images

The fact that the old international order is gone for good, however painful, represents an opportunity. Over the past 80 years, liberal internationalism has thrived on reinvention. The World Bank was initially created to aid Europe’s postwar reconstruction but evolved into a catalyst for global development and poverty alleviation. Concerns over China’s global investments through its Belt and Road Initiative prompted the United States to refashion the Overseas Private Investment Corporation into the more U.S. interests-centered and flexible International Development Finance Corporation.

Though conceiving new institutions and paradigms for global governance may feel pie in the sky, Project 2025—the far-right blueprint for overhauling the federal government—has illustrated that assembling an ambitious plan ahead of time can work. To lay the groundwork for their own playbook, U.S. internationalists need to invest in transnational dialogue and draw on the expertise of theorists, historians, international lawyers, technologists, and foreign-policy practitioners.

Part of this work must entail remaking the case for liberal internationalism—an open-minded appraisal of how to marry liberal ideals with political realities. Some aspects of the liberal agenda can speak more directly to specific constituencies. For instance, Trump’s tariff machinations have underscored businesses’ stake in a functioning democracy. Although chambers of commerce ostensibly represent corporate interests, they are hesitant to enter contentious policy areas; new collectives of commercial leaders and companies are needed to unite in support of rules and systems that underpin predictability and productivity.

Liberal internationalism also needs to evolve conceptually. When it comes to refugee law, for example, precepts dating to the postwar period have proved to be incompatible with the political imperatives of even the most liberal-minded governments in places such as Scandinavia and Poland, often contributing to their defeat by the right wing. Liberals should soberly examine where international legal norms are most at odds with public opinion and political viability and consider how to bridge the gap. Reconsidering first principles is risky and will unsettle some advocates. But without renewed political momentum, liberal internationalist ideas are in danger of becoming relics.

The most enduring ideals are resilient. Values such as freedom, democracy, open inquiry, trust in science, and the quest for peace have thrived across geographies, cultures, and technological eras. Though the postwar period was an especially fruitful time for the codification and expansion of these values, the close of that epoch does not have to spell the end of the ideals championed within it. By confronting the need to accept their losses and move forward, liberal internationalists can yet fight another day.