As Taiwan’s elections approach on Jan. 13, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has warned that Chinese disinformation and propaganda may influence the vote. While this is possible, the rhetoric around disinformation is also hindering legitimate political debate and criticism—and can lead to analysts missing the island’s real political problems.
According to Taiwan’s government and civil service groups, disinformation from China is possibly being spread in Taiwan in the form of social media rumors, articles, and clips, as in previous elections in Taiwan. Last year, news that the United States would ask Taiwan to develop biological weapons was debunked as being an example of Chinese disinformation. So far during the later stages of the current election campaign, there have been warnings about possible Chinese disinformation as part of so-called cognitive warfare—but not so many actual examples.
Besides spreading false news, the authorities and certain organizations have claimed that Chinese disinformation seeks to promote skepticism of U.S. military support for Taiwan, especially in light of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine. To be sure, many articles and news segments have expressed doubt about the reliability of U.S. support for Taiwan.
Past elections have also seen alleged Chinese disinformation, such as in the 2018 local elections, when fake news was spread about President Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP, while fake social media accounts spread pro-Beijing content ahead of the 2020 presidential election.
However, there are plenty of reasons for Taiwanese to feel concerned about U.S. credibility without being unduly influenced by Chinese or pro-China content. Claiming that debating the reliability of U.S. support is inherently disinformation may produce a troubling situation in which legitimate criticism and even skepticism can be silenced or clamped down on. Without actual evidence of China funding such discussions, the existence of the discourse alone is not a sign of Beijing’s meddling.
The discussions around Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC), the world’s largest and most valuable semiconductor foundry, are another example where disinformation has been alleged without strong evidence. TSMC’s importance to the global semiconductor industry has led to concerns about whether it would fall into Beijing’s hands if China attacked Taiwan. Several American experts, former officials, and even a congressman have said on record that TSMC should be destroyed if this happens, causing alarm in Taiwan and a stout declaration from the Taiwanese defense ministry last May that it would not allow the United States to attack TSMC.
More recently, in November 2023, Taiwan’s government announced an intention to sign a memorandum of understanding with India on bringing Indian migrant workers to the island. After Bloomberg reported that senior officials had said up to 100,000 Indian workers could come, there was an outcry on Taiwanese social media, with some racist and derogatory remarks. Online posters on a popular Taiwanese forum then called for a rally, which was held in early December in Taipei. The government first played down the number of workers who would come, saying the 100,000 figure was fake news, and then criticized the racist remarks, which it blamed on Chinese sources.
Though the government claimed to have carried out an investigation where it found that many accounts that had made the racist remarks were suspicious, it did not provide conclusive proof that they had been set up by Chinese users. It is clear that at least some of the posts were made by Taiwanese users, and people of color such as Southeast Asian migrant workers often face discrimination and racism in Taiwan.
Even the most notable example of supposed Chinese disinformation, which resulted in the suicide of a Taiwanese diplomat based in Osaka, Japan, in September 2018, is not as clear-cut as it might seem. While China was blamed for creating false rumors alleging that the Taiwanese consulate in Osaka had been negligent in helping Taiwanese tourists, a Taiwanese influencer linked to the DPP was eventually charged with spreading these rumors.
As such, sometimes even when the disinformation is real, it can come from Taiwanese sources. Anyone familiar with the internet knows that people online generate plenty of nonsense by themselves without any help from hostile governments. Taiwan’s contentious media environment, split between outlets supporting the DPP and the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), produces plenty of attacks on politicians and dubious stories itself. As local researchers admit, it has been more challenging to determine whether alleged disinformation in this election campaign originated in China or in Taiwan.
The DPP could very well lose due to its weak record in power, without the opposition needing any help from Beijing. There are significant domestic factors for criticism of the DPP that have nothing to do with China. During the last few years, economic growth was relatively strong up until early 2022 but has been accompanied by rising housing prices and weak salary growth, inequality, and inflation. The party has also experienced a spate of scandals from COVID-19 vaccines to egg imports to alleged gang ties to the cover-up of sexual harassment of female staff. As a result, many younger voters have turned away from the DPP to the Taiwan People’s Party, headed by presidential candidate and former Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je.
In the lead-up to Taiwan’s last local elections in 2022, Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu admitted that there had not been much Chinese interference. (The DPP would go on to win only five municipalities and counties, compared with 14 for the KMT.) Indeed, the main reasons for the DPP’s defeat were domestic factors, despite the party’s attempt to highlight the threat from China.
While Chinese disinformation is a potential hazard, it is dangerous to automatically assume that strong and valid criticisms of the government are influenced or directed from China without proof. It is also patronizing to assume that Taiwanese voters, especially opposition supporters, are not intelligent enough to have reasonable criticisms of their own government.
It is not a secret that China does not like the DPP, with which it has not held any high-level direct communications since Tsai’s first term began in 2016, and most Taiwanese voters are of course aware of this.
Likewise, it is well-known that the KMT leans toward getting closer to China while the DPP prefers the United States. It is not surprising that some criticisms of the DPP used by the KMT or by members of the general public would bear a resemblance to those used by Chinese outlets, but this does not necessitate direct collusion.
China has tried to influence Taiwan’s elections in other ways, such as by announcing economic incentives or, conversely, issuing restrictions, as well as funding trips for local Taiwanese officials and their constituents. As with disinformation, it is not clear how effective or influential these attempts are, especially as the Taiwanese public is used to those. As dangerous as disinformation can be, Taiwan’s government needs to start offering concrete proof to back up its claims—and certainly can’t use it as an excuse for electoral failure.