Since the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies took control of Damascus and Syria’s government institutions last November, the group’s leadership has been sending out signals about what type of transition and future constitutional order might be in store for the country. HTS officials have repeatedly stated that they plan to be inclusive toward Syria’s Alawite, Christian, Druze, Kurdish, and other minorities, which has reassured many Syrians and international observers. Most importantly, perhaps, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa—also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani—spoke with Al Arabiya News on Dec. 29, 2024, about how the transition may play out.
Behind the rhetoric, however, there is considerable cause to believe that HTS has already decided how Syria should be governed—even though negotiations with other groups have not even started. After he was asked when elections might take place, Sharaa responded that a “presidential election” cannot take place for another few years. The issue here is not the delay, which is not unusual in a post-conflict environment where a state has to be rebuilt. But by talking about presidential elections, HTS appears to take it for granted that Syria will have a presidential system rather than a parliamentary one, which is normally something that is only decided after complex negotiations with all major political groups in a constitutional convention or similar format. Even if the reference to a presidential election was meant as a starting point for discussions, as some have interpreted, the fact that HTS is even considering maintaining Syria’s presidential system is cause for concern, given the terrible experience with such systems in the region, including not only Syria but also Libya and Tunisia.
In addition, Sharaa and many other senior HTS figures have repeatedly stated that there is no scope for any form of federalism, decentralization, or local autonomy. HTS favors centralism as a means to encourage national unity, which seems like a persuasive argument after years of conflict and internal division. But others have argued the opposite—that a centralized state would cause more division and conflict and that enshrining local autonomy in the country’s future constitutional order would be a means to put the country back together. That is certainly the perspective of many of Syria’s local communities, including the Kurds and Druze. Centralized power has a ruinous, conflict-ridden history in many countries with sectarian or ethnic divides, not least in Syria itself. The point, however, is that these issues are a core topic for constitutional negotiations, which HTS appears to have preempted despite its attempts to reassure.
There is a third substantive issue that is likely to be difficult or controversial in a constitutional negotiation: the relationship between the state and religion, as well as the role of Islamic sharia law. Once again, HTS is already proceeding apace. It has already made numerous statements that Syria’s population is essentially Muslim and that sharia should govern. The HTS-appointed caretaker administration is already making changes on the ground, including adjustments to the education system—for example, by removing references to Charles Darwin and evolution from the curriculum. Many Syrians and outside observers have expressed alarm at these changes, particularly given how fast they are being made.
In terms of process, HTS has also been busy setting the parameters. It has made it clear that the United Nations and international community should not play a significant role in the constitutional process. Most Syrians will agree. For years, the U.N. played a dubious role in trying to bring peace to Syria, pretending that an agreement with the Assad regime was somehow possible and organizing futile and distracting discussion sessions in Geneva. It is no wonder that Syrians, not just HTS, are unenthusiastic about any U.N.-led process.
HTS also has stated that a permanent constitution could take years to negotiate. This is entirely reasonable: No other country in the region has successfully negotiated a full constitution in just a few months, apart from those, such as Jordan and Morocco, where a constitutional reset was part of the regular political process rather than the result of major conflict. Syria is still territorially divided, and there is still fighting taking place in different places. In that sense, Syria is more likely to resemble Libya, which, 14 years ago, planned to finalize its constitution in just a few months but still has not adopted a final text to this day. Or it could resemble Iraq, where an incomplete text was adopted in 2005 and where the legislation needed to bring essential parts of the semi-constitution to life still has not been passed 20 years later.
HTS’s position that elections, including those for a constitutional convention, cannot take place for several years is probably correct, given vast organizational problems such as millions of exiles and internal refugees. But this means that constitutional negotiations will be led by appointees instead of elected delegates. Inevitably, given Syria’s recent history, most of these will be representative of armed groups. However, HTS has also stated that once negotiations commence, it will be up to negotiators to reach agreement by “voting,” which means by majority rather than through consensus. While that may appear innocuous in other political settings, in the context of a constitutional negotiation in a highly volatile and fragile setting—with the rights of minorities being one of the most critical areas of contention—majoritarianism could spell disaster.
Islamists everywhere have an irrepressible urge to dominate decision-making, and HTS will feel that urge even more strongly given the rush of victory after ousting the Assad regime. Around the region, all other Islamist movements that were involved in constitutional negotiations sought to push other groups aside when it came to discussions on fundamental issues, such as the system of government and role of Islam. In all countries where individual groups have sought to impose their vision on a constitutional process, including Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, and others, the result has been violence and conflict.
The only partial exception is Tunisia, where a consensual approach was adopted right at the end of negotiations in 2014, which staved off disaster—at least temporarily. Consensus is difficult and sometimes close to impossible to achieve but, given that the alternative almost certainly means violence and repression, it is a price that must be paid.
While it is still early, recent developments in Syria already indicate how the future may play out. Despite the inclusive rhetoric that seems to have soothed many Syrians and international observers, the new government’s senior officials have already made up their minds about many fundamental issues in ways that ultimately cause the current transition to break down altogether. Given how badly things have played out in the rest of the region since 2011 and given the strong tendency for transitional arrangements to become permanent, Syrian and international officials should pause to think about prospects and the potential consequences of their actions before they proceed much further.
If HTS’s stated positions are taken at face value, as they should be, then what the group appears to be saying is that it favors inclusivity within its own predetermined system of government, which is conservative and repeats many of the Arab region’s failed constitutional legacies. The challenge for Syrians and for the international community will therefore be to encourage HTS to take a step back and commit to negotiating a system of government in good faith and based on genuine consensus—before it’s too late.