On June 27, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda signed a comprehensive peace agreement in Washington following the U.S.-brokered “declaration of principles” in April. The deal has sparked cautious optimism that the region may finally be on a path toward de-escalation after years of conflict. Yet while the agreement outlines a framework for peace, it also heavily aligns with Rwanda’s interests.
For decades, the United States has considered Rwanda a strategic partner in Africa, often praising its economic reforms and stability. This perspective is increasingly detached from reality: Under President Paul Kagame, Rwanda has played a central role in destabilizing the Great Lakes region, particularly by fueling conflict in Congo through controlling mineral resources and obstructing diplomatic efforts to resolve the long-standing Rwandan refugee crisis.
This continued instability threatens regional security and undermines U.S. interests. If the United States is committed to a stable, prosperous, and U.S.-aligned central Africa, it must reevaluate its relationship with Rwanda. And this means deciding whether a peace agreement will actually lead to lasting regional cooperation or instead perpetuate the Rwandan leadership’s ability to manipulate resources in the name of diplomacy.
Congo produces more than 70 percent of the world’s cobalt and holds an estimated $24 trillion in untapped mineral wealth and major reserves of lithium, tantalum, tin, and high-grade uranium. These resources are vital for the U.S. defense, energy, and semiconductor industries, but the United States’ access to them is increasingly at risk.
Despite its vast potential, Congo grapples with insecurity, particularly in the east, where more than 120 armed groups operate. The most powerful among them, M23, functions as an extension of the Rwandan military, securing strategic mining regions to bring them under Rwanda’s de facto control. While Rwanda officially denies backing the M23 rebel group, this position is contradicted by United Nations investigations.
Recent battlefield developments allowed Rwanda to tighten its grip on Congo’s North and South Kivu provinces. The Rubaya coltan mines in North Kivu alone account for at least 15 percent of the world’s coltan supply, which is essential for global tech giants such as Apple and Microsoft.
Though often touted as a success story, Rwanda’s economic model is now tied to the illicit exploitation of Congolese minerals. M23’s control extends beyond mining sites to critical transport corridors, facilitating illicit mineral exports into Rwanda. These raw materials are then laundered into international supply chains as Rwandan exports, circumventing global traceability measures and benefiting from access to U.S. and European markets. Despite having minimal domestic reserves, Rwanda’s coltan exports surged by 50 percent from 2022 to 2023—a discrepancy documented by U.N. experts.
This practice not only undermines ethical supply chains but also disadvantages legitimate U.S. investments. The ongoing conflict in Congo over mineral resources ensures Rwanda’s position as a key intermediary between resource-rich eastern Congo and global markets. For Kagame, maintaining this status quo is strategic: Peace would weaken his grip on this lucrative trade.
Rwanda’s role in weakening Congo perpetuates a state of chronic instability. It systematically incapacitates Congo’s political authorities and prevents the emergence of a strong state capable of asserting control over its territory and resources. This, in turn, benefits foreign actors such as China that can exploit Congolese resource wealth with impunity.
China already controls vast swaths of Congolese territory, particularly in mineral-rich regions where the country’s leadership has limited authority. There, Chinese mining operators carry out industrial-scale resource extraction beyond international scrutiny. Beijing, for its part, expands its grip through opaque mining contracts and military partnerships, ensuring that minerals essential to U.S. defense and technology industries remain outside Washington’s control.
Beyond mineral control, Rwanda’s strategy hinges on a refusal to resolve the long-standing issue of the more than 200,000 Rwandan refugees who remain in Congo—a number that likely exceeds half a million when undocumented refugees are added. These exiles are the legacy of 1994, when more than 2 million Rwandans fled en masse amid the Rwandan genocide and the civil war that followed.
Though formal repatriation frameworks—such as the 2010 tripartite agreement with the U.N. refugee agency—have enabled the return of small refugee groups, these represent a drop in the ocean. The vast majority of Rwandan refugees consistently refuse to return without credible guarantees of safety, justice, and political inclusion.
The situation is aggravated by recent forced returns in M23-controlled areas where refugees are tracked, arrested, or deported under pressure. Rather than address this crisis through reform, Rwanda exploits it by conflating all refugees with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a political-military movement composed of Rwandan refugees. Since the First and Second Congo Wars (1996-2003)—in which Rwanda played a leading role—the Rwandan government has consistently framed the presence of the FDLR as the core threat to regional stability, a narrative that has justified successive Rwandan military interventions. Now, that same pretext continues to legitimize M23’s offensives, resulting in mass displacement, civilian casualties, and the looting of Congolese resources.
Instead of resolving the problems created by Rwanda’s behavior, the recent Washington agreement rewards it. The FDLR is cited more than 40 times in the agreement’s text, while M23 is mentioned only twice. This stark disparity suggests that the agreement will not address the root causes of the current crisis. More likely, it will entrench Rwanda’s position at the expense of Congolese sovereignty and regional stability.
The current accord formalizes both countries’ commitments to de-escalation, disengagement, and joint security coordination. But Rwanda has shown no indication of recalibrating its strategic calculus. On the contrary, within just 48 hours of the Washington agreement being signed, M23 launched new territorial offensives in eastern Congo.
The comprehensive peace agreement risks being rendered meaningless without accountability. Should Rwanda fail to withdraw its troops and end support to M23 within the three-month deadline set forth in the agreement, tangible consequences must follow. The mechanisms for oversight and sanctions already exist—what is required is the political will to activate them.
To safeguard its long-term interests, the United States must resist the temptation to treat the peace agreement as a platform for concessions to Rwanda. Offering Kigali economic or commercial incentives in the hope of anchoring Kagame in a cooperative regional order fundamentally misreads the nature of his regime. Kagame’s power comes from domination, not collaboration, and his influence is sustained through direct or proxy control over eastern Congo. Any commercial or security arrangement arising from the agreement must be conditional, reversible, and backed by real enforcement.
Though short-term engagement may help stabilize eastern Congo, U.S. strategy must remain focused on the long game: phasing Kagame out of the regional equation. This requires a different U.S. policy—reducing strategic dependence on Rwanda, reinforcing Congo’s sovereignty, and supporting the emergence of a regional framework not centered on Kagame’s regime.
The challenge is not simply Kagame as an individual but the consolidation of a de facto one-party system that suppresses dissent, criminalizes opposition, and obstructs political pluralism. Over the last three decades, Kagame has systematically dismantled domestic political opposition, removing all checks on his authority. The recent arrest of Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza, Rwanda’s most prominent opposition leader, highlights the regime’s ongoing crackdown on dissent.
Durable stability in the Great Lakes region will depend on U.S. and international efforts to foster democratic alternatives. This includes engaging credible opposition forces and conditioning support and partnerships—particularly in the mining sector—on tangible political reforms within Rwanda. U.S. military support to Rwanda should also be gradually reduced and Rwanda’s participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations reevaluated. A system built on exclusion and coercion cannot anchor long-term peace. Finally, Washington must also confront the enduring exploitation of the 1994 Rwandan genocide as a political shield to justify authoritarian rule and external aggression. Policy toward Rwanda should be based on present realities, not historical guilt.
To break the self-defeating cycle in which U.S. support for the Kagame regime ultimately undermines U.S. interests in the region, Washington must prioritize direct engagement with the Congolese government. Strategic investment should aim to ensure that the mineral value chain maximally benefits both Congo and the United States—by supporting medium- and long-term in-country processing within Congo, rather than allowing transformation to continue in Rwanda. Infrastructure projects such as the Lobito Corridor—a rail and port network linking eastern Congo to Angola—can help bypass Rwanda, enhance traceability, and secure mineral supply chains, reducing U.S. dependence on China. While U.S. companies may pursue strategic mining concessions in eastern Congo, such ventures remain fundamentally insecure when undertaken in a war zone, under rebel occupation, and de facto Rwandan control.
While relying on Kagame and on Rwanda’s image as a model of order may offer short-term convenience, it is a strategic illusion. The recent peace agreement will only advance regional stability if it is rigorously enforced and doesn’t serve to consolidate Rwanda’s grip on eastern Congo. Peace cannot be built on the goodwill of a regime whose power depends on permanent conflict and systemic destabilization.