Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.
The highlights this week: Russia becomes the first foreign government to formally recognize the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar visits Beijing, and Bangladesh and Sri Lanka quickly seek trade deals with the Trump administration as Aug. 1 tariffs loom.
Why Russia Recognized the Taliban
This month, Russia became the first foreign government to formally recognize the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, nearly four years after it returned to power. The move grants the Taliban more of the international legitimacy that the group seeks while also helping to solidify its status as one of the most stable governing entities in South Asia.
Since returning to power, Taliban officials have projected the group as a more moderate version of the regime that controlled much of Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001. But this depiction is belied by Taliban policies, which include documented brutality against women and minorities and a ban on girls’ education beyond the sixth grade.
Nonetheless, much of the international community has seemed comfortable engaging with the Taliban government: Some countries, mainly in Afghanistan’s neighborhood, have reopened their embassies in Kabul and permitted Taliban representatives to staff embassy facilities abroad.
Many governments, including the United States and India, have held high-level meetings with Taliban representatives. In March, U.S. hostage envoy Adam Boehler became the first U.S. official to travel to Afghanistan since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. Last year, the United Nations allowed Taliban leaders to represent Afghanistan at the organization’s annual climate conference for the first time.
Still, until this month, none of this engagement had resulted in any formal normalization of ties. Likewise, the implications of Moscow’s decision go beyond bolstering the Taliban’s legitimacy. Russia’s move could result in policies toward the Taliban regime that enable it to further consolidate power—not to mention moves by any countries that might follow Russia’s lead, such as China or states in Central Asia.
For these countries, formal relations with the Taliban could facilitate greater economic cooperation. Trade between the regime in Kabul and many of its Central Asian neighbors is already robust, and Afghanistan depends on those states and Iran for electricity imports. Normalization could build on these efforts and lead to more positive economic outcomes for Afghanistan.
Normalized ties with the Taliban government could also lead to formal counterterrorism cooperation—most likely intelligence sharing and other nonkinetic activities—to curb the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), the most potent terrorist group in Afghanistan and a threat to the Taliban, Russia, and the country’s neighbors.
If more economic growth and fewer security threats result from normalized ties with Russia and any country that follows suit, the Taliban could take credit for these achievements and try to improve the group’s standing among the Afghan people.
Many Afghans will understandably reject Taliban rule no matter what, but the regime will still get a political boost from Russia’s recognition. The Taliban’s autocracy prevents viable political opposition; IS-K is the group’s most dangerous armed rival, but it has no capacity to oust the Taliban. Other armed anti-Taliban groups lack clout inside Afghanistan.
Unlike in the past, when some of Afghanistan’s neighbors—and, after the 9/11 attacks, the United States—armed and funded anti-Taliban militias, the international community has essentially accepted that the Taliban are in Kabul to stay. Russia’s move to recognize the government is the strongest expression of this stance so far.
Steps that global actors take to curb the Taliban today are largely symbolic. Last week, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Hibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban’s supreme leader, and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani for their persecution of women and girls. Neither leader is likely to travel to a country where the government would turn them over to the ICC.
Barring a black swan event such as internal collapse, the Taliban are likely to remain in power in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, given their ban on elections, their autocratic rule, and the absence of a successor. Russia, with its decision to recognize the regime, has only strengthened the Taliban’s prospects for longevity.
What We’re Following
Trade and tariff updates. More than two dozen countries have received tariff notification letters so far from the Trump administration, with new rates set to kick in on Aug. 1. In South Asia, they include Bangladesh (with a rate of 35 percent) and Sri Lanka (30 percent).
Pakistan has reportedly reached an understanding on a deal with the United States, but it has not been announced. Meanwhile, the Trump administration suggested a forthcoming accord with India, but it remains elusive.
On Monday, Indian negotiators arrived in Washington for another round of talks; New Delhi continues to balk at U.S. demands to ease protections in politically significant Indian sectors, especially agriculture. U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent threat of tariffs against BRICS member states, which include India, has reportedly complicated negotiations.
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are in precarious positions—both have fragile economies and send significant exports to the United States—and hope to reach deals before Aug. 1. Bangladeshi Commerce Secretary Mahbubur Rahman and advisor Sheikh Bashir Uddin, who were in Washington last week, have told reporters that a deal is close. Sri Lankan officials, by contrast, have said little.
Jaishankar visits Beijing. Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar was in Beijing this week for a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) foreign ministers’ meeting. Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar also attended, although there were no meetings on the sidelines between the two officials.
Bilateral relations between India and Pakistan remain deeply strained since their four-day conflict in May. More than two months after a cease-fire ended the crisis, each country continues to close off its air space to the other.
However, Jaishankar did meet with top Chinese officials, including President Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, continuing a warming pattern in India-China ties after years of deep tensions. Jaishankar did call on Beijing to avoid “restrictive trade measures,” an apparent reference to Chinese threats to impose curbs on critical minerals exports. Otherwise, he largely praised the relationship’s recent progress and made pitches for cooperation.
This echoes comments made by Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, who were in China recently for another SCO summit. India is likely hedging against an unpredictable Trump administration, looking to ensure that relations with China remain manageable.
Pakistani opposition plans fresh protests. Leaders of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party met in Lahore over the weekend to discuss plans for a nationwide protest next month to coincide with the two-year anniversary of the jailing of PTI leader and former Prime Minister Imran Khan, who was convicted on corruption charges that his supporters call politically motivated.
The news of the planned protests comes on the heels of an announcement from Khan’s sister that the former leader’s two sons, who live in the United Kingdom and have not played a prominent role in advocacy, plan to travel to Pakistan to join in calling for their father’s release.
The PTI has been quiet in recent months, especially since a protest in Islamabad last November turned violent. Government crackdowns have complicated efforts to protest, and PTI leaders—at least those not in jail—have often appeared disorganized. At a press conference last Sunday, one leader seemed to contradict the party’s plans by suggesting a different timeframe for the protests.
Additionally, one key party leader, Aliya Hamza Malik, was missing from the press conference, which resulted in some public sparring between her and another leader. The PTI has always revolved around the popular Khan, and the party appears to be showing signs of strain from trying to carry on without him for so long.
Under the Radar
The Daily Star reported this week that Bangladeshi anti-terrorism officials have arrested two people on charges related to links to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban, which operates from bases in Afghanistan.
One of the suspects, identified as Md Foysal, traveled to Afghanistan last year and reportedly confessed to being inspired by TTP ideology. The other arrested individual was identified as Shamin Mahfuz. Foysal, who was arrested on July 2 while working in a phone shop, lives in the Dhaka area; Mahfuz, who was arrested on July 14, is based in northern Bangladesh.
According to Foysal’s reported confession, others in Bangladesh are disseminating TTP propaganda online and trying to recruit young people to join the organization. If these allegations are true, that would mark a significant new phase for the TTP, which is arguably the most potent terrorist outfit operating in Pakistan today.
Though based across the border in Afghanistan, the TTP is local in approach: It mainly carries out operations in Pakistan and largely focuses its recruitment efforts in Pakistan (and to an extent Afghanistan). This stands in contrast to the group’s earlier years: The TTP emerged in 2007 as a major force with strong links to al Qaeda, and it attempted several attacks on U.S. targets.
If the TTP is beginning to recruit from a wider geographic area, it could have troubling implications for Pakistan. (However, growing ties between Islamabad and Dhaka may entail intelligence sharing that contributed to this month’s arrests). There is some precedent for jihadism in Bangladesh, and TTP influence in the country could also worry neighboring India.
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Regional Voices
In the Daily Mirror, writer K.K.S. Perera reflects on the three-year anniversary of the peaceful protests in Sri Lanka that overthrew President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and argues that the movement offers two important lessons: “[P]eople have real power when they come together, but political divisions can be very dangerous and costly.”
In the Print, filmmaker Rajeev Srivastava writes on the legacy of Guru Dutt, regarded as one of India’s greatest filmmakers, on the 100-year anniversary of his birth. “On Guru Dutt’s centenary, much of the discourse gravitates toward his mental health and tragic end, often at the cost of overshadowing his towering cinematic legacy,” he writes.
A Kuensel editorial praises Bhutan’s newly launched energy strategy: “While hydropower remains central, the [policy] pivots toward renewable diversification, energy security, climate resilience, and economic transformation, aiming to meet Bhutan’s energy goals for 2040.”