Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.
The highlights this week: Pakistan experiences a whirlwind week of diplomacy amid the United States joining the Israel-Iran conflict; officials from Bangladesh, China, and Pakistan meet on the sidelines of a China-South Asia summit; and Dhaka finalizes a loan agreement with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Where Does Pakistan Stand After Iran Conflict?
The past week was a roller coaster for Pakistani diplomacy. And while Islamabad’s foreign-policy interests emerged relatively unscathed, it may have to deal with some domestic political damage.
It all began with Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, visiting Washington, where U.S. President Donald Trump hosted him for a two-hour lunch last Wednesday—just as the U.S. leader said he was considering how to respond to the Israel-Iran conflict. Pakistan condemned the Israeli strikes on Iran that precipitated the conflict and was calling for de-escalation.
Afterward, Trump told reporters that Pakistani officials “know Iran very well, better than most,” and that they are “not happy.” The next day, Trump announced that he would decide within two weeks if the United States would join Israel’s campaign, suggesting a willingness to give diplomacy a chance.
The timing provoked speculation in the Pakistani press that Munir helped convince Trump to hold off on military action.
Then, on Friday, Pakistan announced its intention to nominate Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to secure a cease-fire amid Pakistan’s recent conflict with India. The move—which was known to the White House in advance—might have been an inducement to ensure that the Munir meeting stayed on Trump’s agenda. It might have also been a tactic to put India on the back foot.
At any rate, the announcement did not go down well among many Pakistanis—especially after the United States launched military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities over the weekend. Pakistan found itself in the awkward position of having to condemn airstrikes ordered by a leader it had lauded the day before for “pragmatic diplomacy and effective peace-building.”
Pakistan has sought to balance its ties with the United States and Iran. Until Trump’s Monday announcement of a cease-fire between Israel and Iran, Pakistan seemed to face a setback. After Trump decided to bomb Iran over the weekend, Munir’s friendly engagement with Trump presumably did not go over well in Tehran. Islamabad’s excoriation of the U.S. strikes put it at odds with Washington.
The U.S.-backed cease-fire, fragile that it is, gives Pakistan a reprieve. It amplifies how Islamabad and Washington are on the same page in their desire for the conflict to end. And it reduces the possible blowback that Munir’s engagement with Trump could have on Pakistan’s relations with Iran.
Still, while Pakistan’s diplomatic liabilities may have been mitigated, there are still possible political costs to contend with. The Nobel decision continues to rankle many people in Pakistan, not just because it preceded Trump’s strikes on Iran but also because of the U.S. president’s staunch support for Israel amid its unrelenting assault on Gaza.
Furthermore, the New York Times reported Trump had “largely made up his mind” to strike Iran by last Tuesday, the day before his lunch with Munir. The Atlantic reports that Trump informed advisors of his decision the next day. This all suggests that Munir, Pakistan’s most powerful figure, was played by Trump—which isn’t a good look in the eyes of the Pakistani public.
Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership is unpopular because of economic stress, resurgences in terrorism, and massive clampdowns on the political opposition. But the country’s conflict with India enabled it to recoup some goodwill. The risk for Islamabad now is that the dizzying diplomatic developments of the past week could squander its gains.
What We’re Following
Ripple effects of Israel-Iran cease-fire. This week’s cease-fire between Israel and Iran will prompt sighs of relief across South Asia, but its fragility will keep the region nervous. The U.S. decision to strike Iran and the resulting risks of a wider regional conflict represented a worst-case scenario for most South Asian countries, which have close partnerships, energy and trade interests, and large numbers of expatriates in the Middle East.
As South Asia Brief noted last week, even India—with its deep ties to Israel—has no interest in a prolonged war. If the cease-fire were to collapse, New Delhi would face a fresh diplomatic dilemma: While most of its neighbors would throw their full support behind Iran, India would need to consider whether continuing not to condemn Israel’s military actions would be a wise stance.
China-South Asia summit. Last Thursday, Bangladeshi, Chinese, and Pakistani diplomats met on the sidelines of a China-South Asia summit in Kunming, China. According to post-meeting readouts, the officials discussed possible collaborations on climate change, agriculture, health, human resources, and other nonsecurity issues.
The meeting was attended by acting Bangladeshi Foreign Secretary Ruhul Alam Siddique; Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong; and Imran Ahmed Siddiqui, Pakistan’s additional secretary for the Asia-Pacific. Pakistani Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch joined by video link.
The meeting amplifies key geopolitical changes in South Asia since former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigned under pressure last August. Bangladesh has strengthened ties with Pakistan and stepped up already-warm relations with China. India likely viewed the gathering with concern. Its own relations with Bangladesh have plummeted since Hasina’s departure.
However, the trio may have differing perceptions of the meeting and its broader goals. Bangladesh said less publicly about the discussion than China or Pakistan. While Islamabad depicted it as the beginning of a new “trilateral mechanism,” Dhaka merely described it as an informal meeting.
Bangladeshi analysts suggest that this may be because the country’s unelected interim government isn’t positioned to pursue formal strategic realignments—a calculation that India would welcome.
India’s defense minister in China. Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh traveled to China on Wednesday to participate in a two-day summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). There, Singh will join defense ministers from other SCO member countries, including Pakistan.
Singh is not expected to meet with his Pakistani counterpart, Khawaja Asif; India-Pakistan tensions remain deeply strained after last month’s conflict. But Singh is expected to meet on the sidelines with his Chinese counterpart, Dong Jun. On Monday, Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing.
India-China ties have improved in recent months, after a period of tensions following a deadly border clash in 2020. The two countries signed a border patrolling deal in October and agreed to resume direct flights in January. In April, Beijing lifted a ban on Indian pilgrims’ travel to Mount Kailash, a holy site for Hindus and Buddhists in Tibet.
However, India-China ties now face a new test. Pakistan deployed Chinese-made jets against India for the first time during the recent conflict, and it also used Chinese air defense and radar systems. This served as a reminder of the dangers that China’s military alliance with Pakistan poses to Indian national security interests. It could lead to some awkward moments in bilateral exchanges.
Under the Radar
On Monday, Bangladesh finalized a $400 million agreement with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for a loan that will support the country’s efforts to strengthen climate change resilience. AIIB is a key donor in Bangladesh; it has proposed or approved financing for nearly a dozen projects in the past five years alone.
But this latest deal is especially significant, as it comes in the aftermath of the Trump administration’s decision to drastically cut foreign aid and dismantle the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Bangladesh, along with other countries in South Asia, relied heavily on U.S. development assistance and must now adjust to a very different development financing picture.
This shift will entail finding new supporters and expanding cooperation with existing partners. The AIIB deal suggests that Bangladesh is now focusing on the latter course of action. That makes sense, given that it already has a large number of bilateral and multilateral donors—from the European Union and Japan to the Asian Development Bank and International Monetary Fund.
FP’s Most Read This Week
- The Many Ways U.S. Involvement in the War on Iran Could Go Badly by Howard W. French
- What Regime Change Means in Iran by Arash Azizi
- How Trump Could Lose This War by Daniel Byman
Regional Voices
In the Print, Ajay Mallareddy argues that Pakistan’s cryptocurrency strategies have outpaced India’s. “Perhaps the most damaging aspect of Pakistan’s crypto diplomacy isn’t what they promised to build, but how they systematically weaponised India’s policy failures on the global stage,” he writes.
In the Express Tribune, law graduate Wajeeha Javed warns of the problems with plea bargaining in Pakistan. The practice amounts to a “self-defeating system. A mechanism born of necessity, marketed as reform, and now repurposed as cover for legalised impunity,” she writes.
A Kuensel editorial argues that the Bhutan national assembly’s plan to impose higher taxes on alcohol, tobacco, soda, and other harmful products won’t make people stop consuming them: “We need more [solutions], knowing that these products harm individuals, strain public health systems, drain foreign exchange, and jeopardize the future of our youth,” the authors write.