• United States

October 9, 2025, 10:41 AM View Comments ()

The long-awaited cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas, now underway in Gaza, includes significant gains for both sides. Israel will get back its remaining hostages—about 20 are believed to be alive—along with the bodies of others. In return, it will release some 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, according to reports, end its two-year war on Gaza, and pull troops from large parts of the territory. The Trump administration deserves credit for pushing a deal through.

But the basic outline of the agreement had been on the table for many months. By accepting it, both sides are giving up on key demands. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had vowed to destroy Hamas, yet the group remains the strongest actor in Gaza. Hamas in turn wanted a complete Israeli withdrawal and guarantees that Israel would not resume operations, both of which remain uncertain.

So why did the two sides agree to something less than their maximalist goals? And why now?

Let’s start with Hamas, which had long clung to the hostages as a form of leverage. Hamas seized hostages when it attacked on Oct. 7, 2023, because it knew Israel would make major concessions to get them back. In 2011, Israel released more than 1,000 mostly Palestinian prisoners in exchange for one soldier, Gilad Shalit, also captured by Hamas. In addition to seeking such massive concessions, Hamas leaders probably worried that giving up all the hostages would simply free up Israel to conduct even more aggressive attacks on Gaza.

Yet the hostages increasingly seemed a slender reed for Hamas to cling to. Although their fate preoccupies many Israelis, this concern did not restrain Israel’s military operations. Israel consistently prioritized killing Hamas leaders and fighters, such as trying to collapse tunnels, even if this endangered the hostages. Its recent push deeper and deeper into Gaza City was only the latest indication that risk to the hostages was not a constraint. With the U.S.-brokered deal, Hamas can at least use the hostages to claim a form of victory, forcing Israel to withdraw and, in the process, gaining the release of imprisoned Palestinians.

Hamas itself is battered by two years of fighting the Israeli juggernaut. Israel killed many of the group’s most senior leaders, including Yahya Sinwar, who orchestrated the Oct. 7 attack, and has killed or tried to kill Hamas leaders in Iran, Lebanon, and Qatar—nowhere seemed safe. In January, Israel claimed that it had killed nearly 20,000 Hamas fighters. Precise figures are disputed, but the numbers are certainly high. Hamas has recruited new fighters, but they are untrained and less skilled.

Few Palestinian families in Gaza have escaped without any losses—the death toll surpassed 67,000 last week—and Gaza itself has been devastated. Palestinians there have long wanted the war to end. On the verge of starvation and lacking medical care, Palestinians have been constantly displaced by Israeli military operations. Each additional day of war was agony, and now, they hope, food and medicine can surge into Gaza, and rebuilding can soon begin.

Israelis, too, are exhausted by two years of grinding war. The constant call-ups of reserves are straining Israeli families and the country’s economy. Israel has lost 466 soldiers, a high number compared with previous Gaza wars. In a recent poll, two-thirds of Israelis favored a cease-fire.

Both sides also faced international pressure. In July, the Arab League called on Hamas to disarm and end its rule in Gaza—and also, for the first time, explicitly condemned the Oct. 7 attack. European states have called repeatedly for a cease-fire and criticized Israeli operations, with Canada, France, and the United Kingdom formally recognizing a Palestinian state.

Israel usually shrugs off European pressure, but it could not ignore Donald Trump. The U.S. president is politically strong when it comes to Israel. If Joe Biden had pushed Netanyahu for a deal and Netanyahu had resisted, almost all Republicans and some Democrats would have sided with the Israeli leader. When Trump does so, most Democrats agree, and Trump can carry his own party with him. Trump also personalizes politics, and Netanyahu must worry that if he snubs the president, Trump will neither forgive nor forget. On Syria, Yemen, and other regional issues, Trump has taken positions at odds with Israel’s stances.

Trump’s security guarantee to Qatar also plays an important role. Trump was furious when Israel attacked Qatar, a close partner of the United States and a country that has actively wooed the president himself with gifts such as a luxury 747 jet. By promising Qatar protection, the United States enables the country to serve as a refuge for Hamas members who might otherwise be on Israel’s target list if they stayed in Gaza.

For Netanyahu, the increase in U.S. pressure after the Qatar strike meant it was decision time. In addition to the general exhaustion and public support for a deal to bring the hostages home, Netanyahu’s own coalition was already fraying because of the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision in June that ultra-Orthodox men must do military service. Defying Trump in an increasingly unpopular war was both strategically and politically risky for Netanyahu, and—as most Israelis recognize the importance of strong ties to the United States—he can cite Trump’s pressure as a reason to finally call it quits without losing his credentials among the Israeli right. Netanyahu is also a master of politics, and as Israel enters election season, he can now position himself as the man who shattered Hamas and Hezbollah and set back Iran’s nuclear program.

The current deal is a major accomplishment and an important step forward for both Gaza and Israel—making it last will prove even harder. The good news is that some of the factors that contributed to a deal, such as exhaustion on both sides and Arab and European pressure, are likely to continue. Other factors are more tenuous. To gain political advantage during election season, Netanyahu might violate the cease-fire—to target a Hamas leader, for example—or drag his feet on making unpopular concessions, such as releasing a particularly hated Palestinian leader from Israeli prison. Hamas, for its part, might reason that it cannot risk losing power completely in Gaza or give up its hard-won credentials as the top Palestinian resistance movement.

All this means the United States must constantly coordinate with its partners and press all parties to honor the deal—and move to more ambitious steps involving the reconstruction of Gaza, the return of a non-Hamas government, and progress toward a Palestinian state. Trump, however, is mercurial. His positions might change; he might focus on a different problem or otherwise reduce the pressure on Israel.

Ultimately, the deal represents not a triumph for either side but an uneasy pause born of exhaustion, pressure, and political calculation. Whether it endures will depend less on the text of the agreement than on the willingness of all parties—especially Washington—to turn this fragile cease-fire into the foundation for a more durable settlement.