• Foreign & Public Diplomacy
• Russia
• Ukraine

August 13, 2025, 1:55 PM View Comments ()

U.S. President Donald Trump has an unsurpassed talent for pulling surprises on the weary world. But even by Trump’s rigorous standards, the announcement last week of his forthcoming summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin has dumbfounded audiences worldwide. The last time that anyone was so perplexed, horrified, or excited about any summit was when former U.S. President Richard Nixon visited communist China.

“This was a week that changed the world,” Nixon said of his 1972 trip. For better or worse, this week could also change the world.

It sometimes seems that summitry with bloodthirsty dictators is Trump’s distinct contribution to U.S. diplomacy. But this isn’t totally unprecedented. At different times, different American presidents shook hands and struck deals with some of the world’s most murderous tyrants. Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman, for example, parleyed with “Uncle Joe” Stalin. Presidents Nixon and Gerald Ford met with Mao Zedong, who was not only responsible for the deaths of tens of millions of Chinese citizens but also, through his involvement in the Korean War, tens of thousands of Americans.

But of course, when Roosevelt and Stalin met at Yalta, they were fighting on the same side of World War II. When Nixon met Mao, the fighting in Korea was over, and both countries saw a common rival in the Soviet Union.

There is something very different about inviting Putin to Alaska for a chat in the middle of a brutal war that he is waging against a de facto U.S. ally. For three years, the United States has helped Ukraine resist Putin’s aggression. Now, Trump is hosting the aggressor on U.S. soil. Imagine if President George H.W. Bush had invited Saddam Hussein for a friendly chat after he had invaded Kuwait: “This aggression shall not stand! … But please try the caviar. It is delicious.”

So it is for a good reason that so many observers have questioned what it is that Trump intends to achieve and, importantly, how. Putin has not yet shown any intention to relinquish his long-term goals in Ukraine. Putin’s peace—if it ever came to pass—would leave Ukraine in a cannibalized, subjugated state, unable to defend itself or, indeed, rely on foreign help for protection. In short, it would leave Ukraine at Russia’s mercy.

Trump may think that Putin will compromise on some of his core objectives in exchange for certain conquered Ukrainian territories, but is there Plan B in the event that he doesn’t? What if Putin chooses instead to lecture Trump about Russia’s glorious history and lament how it has been mistreated by others and cheated out of its lands, not least Alaska, which Russia sold to the United States for a pittance in 1867? If Putin does that—and there is an even chance that he might—will Trump walk out and slam the door, or will he continue to prevaricate, as he has done repeatedly, ever uncertain whether it was better to curse Putin or humor him?

The summit will take place in Alaska. Historically, most of Russian-U.S. summits have been held either in either country’s capital or in Europe, from Reykjavik in the north to Malta in the south. Helsinki saw a few summits, not least Trump’s meeting with Putin in 2018. Geneva repeatedly hosted U.S. and Russian leaders: U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev met there in 1955; President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, and U.S. President Joe Biden and Putin in 2021.

But there were some exceptions. In 1973, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev went all the way to California. He and Nixon had an intimate meeting with no American note-taker or interpreter present, and today the records for some of their conversations exist only in Russian. Ford once ventured out to Vladivostok in the Russian Far East. And President George W. Bush famously hosted Putin at his Texas ranch for what was hailed at the time as a “finger-licking good” barbeque.

Alaska, by contrast, has never seen a Russian-U.S. summit, though it has hosted important high-level meetings, including the rather frosty Sino-American encounter in 2021. As a remote and solidly Republican state, though, Alaska works well for both Putin and Trump. For Putin, it offers a degree of security and privacy unattainable in a capital city such as Washington, D.C., where his sudden appearance would likely meet with widespread protests. Trump would have probably preferred to host Putin on his home turf in Mar-a-Lago but likely deferred to Putin’s preferences. That said, it is still unclear who proposed Alaska—the Americans or the Russians.

Then there’s the hastiness of Trump’s proposed summit. The mixed, if not to say confused, signaling from chief U.S. negotiator Steve Witkoff about what is and what is not on offer, suggests that the summit is not so much the outcome of a deliberate strategy as that of an emotional impulse: We will do it because it feels right!

Unlike Trump, who stands to win or lose depending on what actually happens in Alaska, Putin has won already. For him, a summit with the U.S. president is proof of the futility of the West’s three-year effort to isolate Russia and another confirmation of Russia’s special role as a great power.

That, at least, is going to be the message that the Russian propaganda will beam to domestic audiences. And it is a message that Russians will buy because they desire nothing as much as the world’s recognition of Russia’s alleged greatness. As a result, Russia—which Obama memorably described in 2014 as just a “regional power” that was threatening some of its neighbors “out of weakness”—will appear as a near-equal to the United States, proudly deciding the fate of Europe over the heads of the embattled Ukrainians and the hapless Europeans.

And it is Europeans, in particular, who stand to lose out. The very venue of the summit—in Alaska—is helpful to Putin insofar as it underscores that Russia and the United States, as neighbors, have many shared interests apart from what is happening in Europe. These include energy ties; the Arctic; and, indeed, the shape of the future world order.

Putin will no doubt double down on his offer to back Trump’s claims to Greenland. Unlike the Europeans—who were horrified by Trump’s designs on the island—Putin sees such moves as befitting a great power. He is quite willing to recognize the United States’ claims to a continentwide sphere of influence if Trump reciprocates by recognizing Russia’s sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.

The Europeans can continue to grovel in desperation and call Trump “Daddy,” but the reality remains that they are not being invited to Alaska. Matters that affect them directly, such as European security, are going to be discussed in their absence by the “leader of the free world” and an indicted war criminal. That is not a good look for Europe.

Audiences around the world will also take notice. Putin is scheduled to visit China in early September for a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and China’s celebration of its victory in the war against Japan. Russia’s growing dependence on China has created an impression that Russia has become something of a supplicant or even a vassal of its more powerful neighbor. Putin’s meeting with Trump will not immediately change the underlying economic reality of Russia’s reliance on China. But it will raise Putin’s standing vis-à-vis his Chinese counterpart and improve his bargaining power.

For all these reasons, the odds are stacked heavily against Trump. If the summit fails to lead to a viable peace in Ukraine, Trump will stand accused of legitimating an aggressor for no good reason. He will have undercut his allies—with whom he no doubt barely consulted before his dramatic announcement—and betrayed Ukraine’s trust. He will make the United States look foolish and naïve.

In the face of such odds, Trump is clearly trusting his gut. Could this be a case where his instincts pay off and, improbably, deliver a lasting peace for Ukraine?

For this to happen, several factors would have to align. First, Putin would have to accept Ukraine’s existence as a viable, independent state, capable of defending itself. This would entail Putin dropping some of Russia’s draconian conditions for a peace deal, including his demand for Ukraine to “demilitarize” and/or his opposition to Ukraine obtaining solid security guarantees from the West.

Second, Kyiv would have to accept an unpalatable compromise: It would probably have to recognize as “Russian” the territories that Putin has annexed by force. So far, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has shown little inclination to do so, and there is little appetite in Europe for this kind of deal-making. The idea that Ukrainian forces might relinquish territories that they still control—one of Putin’s core demands—is a considerably longer shot. Even Trump may find this difficult to accept, never mind impose on Zelensky.

What tools will the U.S. president have to force concessions from Putin? He can punish India or even China for buying Russia’s oil, but that may not be enough. He may promise to provide more weapons to Ukraine, something that he has been incredibly reluctant to do. Finally, he can dangle the promise of Russian-U.S. fraternity: no sanctions, lucrative trade, and a lot of respect all around.

It will take a miracle for Putin to buy this bargain. And in diplomacy, it’s dangerous to depend on miracles.