Nearly four years after the Taliban’s reconquest of Afghanistan, Moscow has formally recognized the Taliban regime as the legitimate government of Afghanistan—a move that has been welcomed by China. Moscow’s decision is an invitation for other states in the region, from China to India to Iran, to follow suit in recognizing the Taliban. But it may also backfire on Russia.
While some in the West focus their concerns about the Taliban on matters such as women’s issues and widespread human rights abuses, Afghanistan’s authoritarian neighbors have different priorities. Russia, China, and Iran emphasize their security interests over promoting internal reforms within the country. Their primary concern is preventing extremist violence, terrorism, and refugee flows from spilling across their borders—challenges that they see as more immediate than influencing Afghanistan’s political structure and reshaping its governance. Although they recognize the Taliban’s ties to regional militant groups and the potential threat that this poses, they view recognition of the Taliban regime as a means of containing that threat.
Recent statements from regional leaders confirm this perspective. The Russian Foreign Ministry has emphasized cooperating with the Taliban on transportation, energy, and infrastructure, all goals aimed at securing Russia’s security and economic interests. Similarly, Chinese Foreign Ministry statements have emphasized reconstruction and regional stability while deliberately avoiding criticism of the Taliban’s governance or their treatment of women.
For Russia, recognizing the Taliban is a strategic move aimed at strengthening influence in Central Asia, countering the West, and aligning with powers such as China and Iran. Moscow’s hope is that this move will encourage deeper coordination with Beijing and Tehran on regional security and infrastructure development. All three countries share interests in keeping the West out of Afghanistan and keeping extremist threats out of their own territory. Strategically, this reinforces an emerging anti-Western bloc that challenges U.S. dominance, promotes regional autonomy, and builds alternative political and economic structures outside the Western-led global order.
Yet it is questionable whether Russia’s recognition of the Taliban regime ultimately serves its own interests. First, by endorsing a government notorious for severe human rights abuses and the systematic suppression of women’s rights, Russia risks associating itself with those same violations. Of course, Russia hardly has a reputation for upholding human rights, but the Taliban’s repression is distinct in both scope and nature. Afghanistan, under the Taliban rule, remains the only country in the world that outright bans girls and women from secondary and higher education. Women are also barred from most jobs, especially in the public sector, and nongovernmental organizations, and they are entirely excluded from politics. Even countries in the global south that willing to stomach Russia’s own authoritarianism might be put off by Russian support for this level of regressive behavior.
More importantly, recognizing the Taliban is unlikely to help to counter terrorism. The idea that diplomatic engagement with the Taliban could lead to regional security has not materialized in practice.
Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, transnational militancy in the region has strengthened, not weakened. Amid the ensuing instability, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) has been able to regroup, recruit, and expand. The group’s operational capacity has grown not only in Afghanistan, but also across the region, with evidence of coordination emerging in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Iran, and Russia. ISKP has carried out numerous deadly attacks targeting civilians, foreign embassies, and minority groups within Afghanistan, and the group is now extending its reach beyond Afghanistan’s borders. The Russians should look at ISKP’s concert hall attack in Moscow in March 2024 if they need further evidence.
Moreover, this threat is part of a broader network of militancy that stretches across South and Central Asia. While some factions may attempt to present the Taliban regime as a potential counterterrorism partner, the group’s ongoing ties to organizations such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Jamaat Ansarullah, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and especially al Qaeda, suggest otherwise. These groups collaborate in recruitment, resource-sharing, training, and logistics, across national boundaries.
The Taliban, while claiming to be a national movement, remain deeply embedded in these transnational jihadi networks. They have long-standing ties with groups such as al Qaeda, and they have provided sanctuary to militants from across the region. By offering safe havens and failing to crack down on extremist elements, the Taliban regime has become an enabler, not a barrier, to the spread of terrorism.
In this context, the recognition of the Taliban regime sets a dangerous precedent in Central Asia and beyond. It will most likely embolden other radical groups that seek to rise to power through violence, demonstrating that this can be a viable path to political legitimacy.
Moreover, the Taliban’s domestic legitimacy remains fragile, making them an even more questionable bet for Moscow. Within Afghanistan, the Taliban’s credibility has been eroded by weak governance, a collapsing economy, the systemic repression of women, and the regime’s failure to reintegrate returnees into society. These factors have all contributed to widespread civic discontent.
While large-scale, overt protests are rare due to the Taliban’s heavy-handed crackdowns, a climate of growing public frustration is evident across the country. Many Afghans openly express anger at the regime’s inability to provide basic necessities such as medicine, food, and economic security. Women-led demonstrations have occurred in several provinces, with protesters demanding the right to work and access education.
These acts of defiance, though often met with force or intimidation, highlight the disconnect between the regime and the population that it seeks to govern. Prolonged internal instability creates fertile ground for militant groups to expand their influence, recruit locally, and further destabilize the region. Russia will eventually feel the impact of this, particularly if it is seen as the Taliban’s diplomatic sponsor.
Russia’s recognition of the Taliban regime may serve its short-term interests, but it carries significant long-term risks. It has the potential to fuel regional instability in Central Asia by emboldening radical Islamist movements and increasing the threat posed by militant groups such as ISKP. While Moscow may view recognition as a means to secure influence and protect economic interests, legitimizing a regime associated with chaos and regional unrest will ultimately prove to be a strategic blunder.