The regime of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has few allies in Latin America—or the world—as crucial as Brazil. Under Workers’ Party (PT) Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff—and their longtime foreign-policy strategist Celso Amorim—Brazil has consistently backed Venezuela’s left-wing Bolivarian governments, from former President Hugo Chávez to Maduro. Even before Lula’s presidency, Brazil stood by Venezuela. In 2002, under the centrist President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil swiftly condemned the coup attempt against Chávez, standing in direct opposition to the U.S. stance.
Since then—with the exception of the years of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, when relations soured—both nations have forged strong ties through energy cooperation, trade, and environmental efforts, particularly in their shared responsibility for the Amazon rainforest. This cooperation was vital for preserving biodiversity, fighting organized crime, and resisting external pressures, making Venezuela a key ally for Brazil on multiple fronts. For the increasingly isolated Bolivarian regime, Brazilian support was an essential lifeline.
In recent months, however, a subtle but clear shift in Brazil’s stance has been taking shape. This change gained momentum after Venezuela’s recent elections, which Maduro claims to have won despite them being widely condemned by international observers as flawed and illegitimate.
In a departure from his historically unwavering support—and contrary to the PT’s official position—Lula has refrained from accepting Maduro’s victory. Two weeks after the vote, Lula labeled Maduro’s government as a “very unpleasant regime” with an “authoritarian slant,” stopping just shy of calling Venezuela a dictatorship.
What explains this change in tone? Lula’s stance on Venezuela is a careful recalibration, where practical considerations are slowly eclipsing old ideological loyalties. It reflects underlying political, social, and economic changes both within Brazil and across the region. Though gradual, this shift is unmistakable.
Several factors are driving this reorientation: the scale and intensity of recent anti-Maduro protests in Venezuela, the growing influence of the Venezuelan diaspora throughout Latin America, shifting public opinion in Brazil, the waning power of Maduro’s international allies, and the persistent influence of economic pragmatism—a hallmark of Lula’s administrations.
One of the most immediate and visible catalysts for Brazil’s shift has been the intensification of anti-Maduro protests within Venezuela. For the first time in years, these demonstrations have drawn in large numbers of working-class citizens—the very people who once formed the backbone of support for the Bolivarian regime. The sheer scale and resolve of these protests have made it tough for Brazil, led by the workers’ champion himself, President Lula, to turn a blind eye to the growing wave of domestic opposition against Maduro.
The protests reflect widespread dissatisfaction with more than a quarter-century of failed policies that have led to economic collapse, widespread poverty and social unrest. Since Maduro took office, in 2013, GDP has contracted by more than 80 percent, and skyrocketing inflation (peaking at the astonishing rate of 130,000 percent in 2018) has eroded Venezuelans’ life standards.
Continuing to support Maduro under such circumstances would risk aligning Brazil with a regime that is increasingly seen as illegitimate and unwanted by both its own people and the international community.
Another major factor influencing Brazil’s policy shift is the growing visibility and influence of the Venezuelan diaspora. With more than 8 million Venezuelans having fled their country in the past decade, the diaspora has become a significant force—both socially and politically—in countries across Latin America, including Brazil. This population serves as a strong reminder of the humanitarian and economic crises caused by the Maduro regime, and their presence in Brazil, even if still proportionally small, is increasingly putting pressure on Lula.
In Brazil, the Venezuelan diaspora is not just a humanitarian concern but also a political one. Its stories of hardship and displacement resonate with the Brazilian population, which is also fed up with the implications of economic mismanagement.
Domestically, Brazilian public opinion has turned decisively against the Bolivarian regime. This shift is particularly notable among some traditional left-wing circles in Brazil, which have historically been sympathetic to socialist governments in Latin America—often in defiance of international outcry over human rights violations and lack of democratic accountability.
However, even these groups are now distancing themselves from Maduro, as recently demonstrated by the negative reception to persistently pro-Maduro statements issued by the PT and other leftist organizations, such as the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST). Polling data further confirms this growing discontent. For example, a survey published in late August by Vox Populi showed that 62 percent of Brazilians who identify as “leftists” believed that Maduro committed fraud during the July elections.
The growing disillusionment with the Maduro regime among Brazil’s left has been caused, to a great extent, by the realization that the Bolivarian project has failed to deliver on its promises of social justice and economic equality. Instead, it has led to authoritarianism, economic collapse, and human rights abuses.
For Brazilian leftists, sticking with Maduro increasingly feels like a fast track to political isolation, both at home and abroad, as global solidarity with his regime continues to fade. Moreover, Maduro has never been a strong advocate for progressive causes such as LGBTQ+ rights or environmental protection, further alienating key segments of the Brazilian left—particularly members of younger generations who view these issues as essential.
Another domestic factor influencing public opinion on Venezuela is Brazil’s own recent democratic challenges. In 2022, Lula was forced to rely on a broader pro-democracy coalition to return to power. Prioritizing ideology over democratic values in foreign policy now risks alienating independent, centrist voters—those who were never strong supporters of Lula but trusted him to defeat Bolsonaro and safeguard Brazil’s fragile democracy.
In addition to domestic pressures, Venezuela’s increasing international isolation has made continued support for Maduro less attractive for Brazil. While Russia and China remain among Maduro’s few remaining allies, this poses a challenge for Lula’s administration. Brazil has been heavily criticized for its ties to illiberal regimes that are seen as working to destabilize democracies and the rules-based international order. Supporting Maduro risks further entangling Brazil in this group.
Even within Latin America, Maduro’s regime is facing growing repudiation, with 10 countries—including leftist-led Chile, under President Gabriel Boric—officially rejecting his self-declared electoral victory. This mounting isolation boosts the incentives for Lula to engage with Venezuela’s opposition as the region and global community increasingly distance themselves from Maduro.
Meanwhile, the Biden administration has shifted U.S. policy toward Latin America, placing a renewed emphasis on democratic governance and human rights in the region. In this context, the once-dominant leftist rhetoric of blaming the United States for Latin America’s problems has lost some of its sway, making it politically safer for Lula to engage with the Venezuelan opposition and support calls for democratic change.
This trend could intensify if Vice President Kamala Harris wins the upcoming U.S. elections, as her commitment to justice, human rights, and addressing the “root causes” of migration is generally well-received by the Latin American left.
Economic factors are also playing a critical role in Brazil’s evolving stance toward its neighbor. Venezuela’s economic decline, once seen as a temporary setback, is now widely regarded as irreversible under the current regime. For Brazil, this means that the economic benefits of maintaining close ties with Maduro are diminishing, while the potential rewards of engaging with a democratic and market-oriented Venezuela have become more appealing.
Brazilian businesses, once eager to exploit opportunities in Venezuela, have been looking elsewhere as the country’s economy continues to deteriorate. The fallout from Operation Car Wash (a massive corruption investigation that exposed widespread graft involving Brazilian companies and foreign officials, including Venezuelans) has increased the risks of maintaining close ties with the Maduro regime. The end of the flow of illicit funds from overinflated contracts in Venezuela has also removed a key economic interest that once bound the two countries together.
Moreover, Brazil is increasingly aware that its long-term economic interests in the region are better served by stability and growth, which are highly unlikely to be achieved under the current Venezuelan government. A democratic Venezuela, integrated into regional trade and investment networks, offers far more potential for economic collaboration than a failed state that is perpetually on the brink of collapse.
Maduro’s recent territorial claims over Guyana, which raised concerns among the international community and challenged Brazil’s capacity to maintain peace in South America, were only the latest example of how failing authoritarian regimes threaten the stability required for regional economic prosperity.
All these factors indicate that Brazil’s evolving stance toward Venezuela is more than just rhetoric—it represents a strategic reorientation driven by pressing domestic and international demands. Lula, along with his foreign-policy architect, Amorim, is rethinking Brazil’s role in the region.
They recognize that cautiously supporting democratic change in Venezuela, even if incrementally, is far more aligned with Brazil’s long-term interests than maintaining outdated ties to Bolivarian solidarity. It’s a case of better late than never.
However, despite signs of this strategic realignment, Brazil has struggled to turn its shifting position into concrete action. The administration’s cautious approach to Maduro’s fraudulent election—evidenced by Lula and Amorim’s reluctance to fully voice their discontent—risks diminishing Brazil’s influence in critical ongoing negotiations.
Brazil should take the lead in working with other regional power brokers to chart a diplomatic path for the future of democracy in Venezuela. As the largest economy in the region, and with explicit ambitions under Lula and Amorim to elevate its geopolitical standing, Brazil is well-positioned to do so. A trilateral effort with Colombia and Mexico to mediate between the Venezuelan government and opposition initially appeared promising. However, the lack of tangible results so far remains a concern.
Nevertheless, Brazil remains a key player in the dialogue, even if its relationship with the Venezuelan regime is no longer as steadfast as it once was.