• Foreign & Public Diplomacy
• Military
• United States
• China
• Russia
• India
• Europe
• North Korea
• Ukraine
• C. Raja Mohan

The Biden administration promoted the idea of a strategic linkage between the European and Asian theaters—and encouraged Washington’s friends in the two halves of Eurasia to do more with each other. In response, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea raised their engagement with European security and became regular observers to NATO. With Trump now washing his hands of Ukraine, downgrading NATO, and negotiating with Russia over European heads, he leaves these four Asian-Pacific allies terribly embarrassed. In New Delhi, there is a sense of vindication about its policy of not giving up on the Russian connection over the last three years.

The United States’ Asian allies, who believed the Biden administration’s rhetoric on a rules-based international order and stepped up on Ukraine, now have to worry about the consequences in the Indo-Pacific that Trump’s strategic retrenchment will bring. Could Trump abandon Washington’s Indo-Pacific partners like how he has put the Europeans out to dry? Will Asian allies be asked to deal with the China challenge on their own?

On the surface, the joint statements that have so far come out of Trump’s engagement with Asian leaders, including Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, suggest continuity in the Indo-Pacific strategy that began during Trump’s first term: stronger alliances and partnerships in the region as part of an effort to balance China. But Trump has repeatedly reaffirmed his desire for good relations with Chinese President Xi Jinping and continues to reflect the strong sentiment within the MAGA movement against taking responsibility for the security of others, let alone risk new wars.

And in a major flip of former President Joe Biden’s understanding of the security interdependence between Europe and Asia, Trump has signaled his interest in a triangular summit with Putin and Xi. Trump has also signaled his interest in encouraging China to play a role in ending the Russia-Ukraine war. Meanwhile, there is a sentiment in Europe favoring closer relations with Beijing to cope with Washington’s retrenchment. Next week, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will head to India with all 27 European commissioners in tow, another sign of rising European engagement with Asia.

What endures, though, is the new reality of Eurasian security interdependence. If the Biden administration framed this linkage at the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, Trump’s retreat three years later reinforces the prospect for the inevitable rejiggering of great-power relations within Eurasia.