• Military

September 9, 2025, 6:24 PM View Comments ()

Israel’s Sept. 9 strike on Hamas’s leadership team in Doha, Qatar, apparently an attempt to kill chief negotiator Khalil al-Hayya among others, underscores the degree to which its war aims have shifted. Israel has abandoned negotiation and embraced the uncompromising destruction of Hamas, regardless of the diplomatic or humanitarian costs.

The attack jeopardizes the prospects of a mediated settlement and the chances of recovering hostages alive. It undermines relations with Qatar and complicates U.S. policy in a region where Washington’s military presence and diplomatic leverage are already under strain. In this sense, the strike represents less a tactical blow against Hamas than a strategic declaration that Israel will continue to expand the battlefield—even if doing so forecloses any hope of a cease-fire and binds its closest partners to the consequences.

Israel’s previous assassination attempts on Hamas figures residing in relatively friendly Arab states have backfired, which in the past had made Israeli planners cautious about strikes like the one conducted on Tuesday. In 1997, Israel botched the assassination of Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in Amman, Jordan, and two Mossad operatives were captured in the process. The Jordanian government—one of only two Arab states that had signed peace deals with Israel at the time and a close intelligence partner—threatened to cut cooperation with Israel. To placate Jordan, a humiliated Israel released several leading Hamas prisoners, including its head, Ahmed Yassin. In 2010, Israel killed Hamas military leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai, leading to international criticism of Israel, including from the United Arab Emirates, which was a relatively friendly Arab state.

After Oct. 7, 2023, however, Israel’s risk calculation changed profoundly. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for all his tough talk, was historically cautious on the use of force. Despite being Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, Netanyahu had not launched any major wars on his watch, and he resisted calls by right-wing politicians to occupy Gaza. After Oct. 7, however, Israel has gone to war throughout the region. In addition to the war in Gaza that, so far, has led to more than 64,000 Palestinian deaths, Israel attacked and devastated Hezbollah in Lebanon and continues low-level operations there; struck at Houthi targets in Yemen; conducted dozens of airstrikes on Syria; and bombed Iran’s nuclear program and leadership targets.

Israel’s latest attack is ostensibly a response to the killing of six people at a bus stop in Jerusalem by two gunmen reportedly from the West Bank. There is little indication, however, that this terrorist attack was coordinated by Hamas leaders outside the West Bank. Instead, the Israeli strike on Doha is yet another demonstration by the Netanyahu government that it is pursuing a purely military approach to Hamas’s destruction. Much of the political right—Netanyahu’s core constituency—believes that Hamas must be completely destroyed in order for Israel to be safe, and attacks such as this demonstrate to those constituents that Israel will not relent in its pursuit of Hamas’s destruction.

Hamas, however, remains the strongest force in Gaza, and its complete destruction seems unlikely. This is in part due to remaining Palestinian support for the organization. But the bigger problem is that the Israeli government has opposed allowing the Palestinian Authority into Gaza or otherwise seeking to displace Hamas with a Palestinian entity. As a result, Hamas is the strongest Palestinian actor in the strip by default. When Israel’s presence in a part of Gaza wanes, Hamas reemerges, thus requiring more troops and a longer military campaign to keep the group down.

For all their political importance, Israel’s latest attacks will do little to change the military situation on the ground in Gaza. Hamas forces there are highly decentralized, and the death of leaders in faraway Doha will not change their operations in any significant way. In fact, well before Oct. 7, power within Hamas had already shifted from the external leadership to the leaders in Gaza.

The strike will, however, hinder efforts to negotiate a cease-fire. Even though Hayya apparently survived, such a strike sends a message—one impossible to ignore—that Israel does not consider the negotiations to be serious.

As a result, one of Israel’s top goals—the return of Israeli hostages—is now even less likely. Hamas holds about 20 living hostages as well as the bodies of another 30 (including two Americans) who perished in captivity. The fate of the hostages has hinged on a cease-fire, and now that is even further away.

The attack also clarifies the purpose of Israel’s renewed ground operations in Gaza. Before the strike, one theory was that the stepped-up operations were a way of putting more pressure on Hamas to make a deal over the hostages. The strike in Doha, however, shows that the operations are clearly not meant to coerce Hamas into changing its negotiating position but rather to reduce Hamas’s operational strength and control over Gaza.

The diplomatic consequences are also considerable. Conducting the strike in Doha is a clear affront to Qatar, which, along with Egypt, was one of the Arab champions of peace talks. Until the attack, Qatar had been pressing Hamas to accept U.S. cease-fire proposals.

Qatar, however, has been the subject of withering criticism within Israel since Oct. 7. Qatar provided hundreds of millions of dollars to Gaza when it was under Hamas control—although it did so with Israel’s backing. Before Oct. 7, Israel wanted to avoid a humanitarian crisis in the strip and otherwise stabilize the situation there. Netanyahu also calculated that a stronger Hamas meant a weaker Palestinian Authority, thus keeping the Palestinians as a whole divided. After Oct. 7, however, such calculations went out the window. Qatar’s financial support and hosting of Hamas leaders prompted

Israel informed the United States of the strike in advance, leading to claims that Washington “greenlit” the assassination. Any U.S. complicity, even if more perceived than real, causes complications for U.S. foreign policy in the region. In addition to helping Washington to negotiate with Hamas, Qatar hosts a massive U.S. air base that is central to the U.S. military presence in the greater Middle East.  White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt subsequently noted Qatar is a “close ally of the United States that is working very hard in bravely taking risks with us to broker peace” and declared that the strike “does not advance Israel or America’s goals.” However, if the United States did know of the operation in advance and did not tell Israel to stand down, then it appears to have tolerated an attack on the territory of an important U.S. regional partner.

Israel’s decision to strike Hamas negotiators in Doha highlights a widening gap between Israel’s military strategy and the diplomatic tracks pursued by its partners. For the United States, the attack complicates hostage recovery efforts, risks undermining Qatar’s willingness to mediate, and raises questions about Washington’s credibility to its Arab allies. Going forward, U.S. policymakers will need to weigh whether continued support for such operations advances core U.S. interests—hostage return, regional stability, and maintaining critical partnerships—or whether Israel’s current approach narrows those options and deepens the regional spiral of violence.