For many protesters who took to the streets to oust the Shah of Iran in 1978-79, the Iranian revolution felt as if it had been hijacked by radical Islamist clerics led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. While Khomeini was backed by a mass movement, his support was not universal across Iran’s classes, and the ascent of the Shiite clergy that installed an Islamic authoritarian state was not inevitable. Now, skeptics warn about the threat that an Islamist group with roots in jihadism poses to the dream of full-fledged democracy in Syria.
The new de facto ruler of Syria is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist militant organization with an ideological lineage that extends back to Jabhat al-Nusra, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria; the group remains a proscribed terrorist organization by most of the international community. Many Syrian activists now warn about the instincts of HTS that could lead to the rapid Islamization of Syrian state institutions, potentially antithetical to the revolution itself.
The Syrian revolution that sparked in 2011 was neither Islamist nor sectarian in origin. Protesters in the early revolutionary phase, inspired by the Arab Spring, were a mix of Syrian nationalists, leftists, secular liberals, and conservative Muslims. But the left-oriented political class was crushed by the Assad regime’s intelligence and security apparatus, which imprisoned, tortured, maimed, and killed tens of thousands of activists.
The anti-shah protesters who took to the streets in Iran in the year before Khomeini’s triumphant reversal of fortune displayed a similar mix of banners. The Iranian left, which was close to challenging the Islamists in early 1979, was eclipsed and banished politically. A similar concern periodically punctured the Syrian revolution, as questions arose about a Salafi hijacking of the revolution as the number of armed Islamist fighters swelled.
Concerns about Syria’s political transition are justified. The country is in the throes of a historic moment that will shape its future for decades. But, in crucial ways, Syria is not Iran in 1979. If the most iconic photographs of the Iranian revolution were those of a turbaned Khomeini returning from exile in February 1979, the transformation of HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa—until recently known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani—from wearing combat fatigues and a turban to a black suit has become a defining image of post-Assad Syria.
The Shiite clergy who swept aside the shah arose from a long theological history of debate and evolution that consolidated the role of ulema—scholars trained in Islamic law, or sharia—in Iran.
As Khomeini consolidated his influence after the overthrow of the interim government that was installed after the shah fled Tehran, his principal aim was to implement the religious system of governance that he had laid out in his lectures-turned-book, Hokumat-e Eslami (Islamic Government), which set out the principle of velayat-e faqih—guardianship by Islamic jurists authorized to interpret, implement, and monitor the application of sharia in all aspects of society. Later in 1979, the constitution ratified the principle of velayat-e faqih, with the supreme clerical leader overseeing the top-down Islamization of state and society.
The playbook that Sharaa and his followers used to launch militant campaigns to conquer and govern territory and to recruit fighters was premised on a Salafi-Sunni identity. Now, it is hardly surprising that Sharaa’s vision for Syria’s political and legal system will derive from ideas plucked from political Islam. This is a markedly complex transition for an armed jihadi movement with little precedent.
Syria’s new rulers are now demonstrating a sensitization to democratic norms, such as the rights of all sects and religions in Syria and of women. This seems far from a wholesale, theocratic transformation of society in the manner of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. Despite this, there are signs of pushback within HTS among more conservative ideologues who have a different vision for change.
A recent provisional decision by Syria’s Education Ministry to amend the national curriculum sparked controversy for introducing Islamist language, including defining a martyr as “one who died defending the word of Allah,” and eliminating the theory of evolution from science courses. The government swiftly walked this back amid some criticism, clarifying that these were proposals and that final decisions would be taken by specialist committees.
Islamists have a defeated history in Syria, epitomized by the brutal crackdown, known as the Hama massacre, against the Muslim Brotherhood that began in February 1982. From a regional perspective, the revolutionary outcome in Syria that has ushered in rulers with a Sunni Islamist worldview is a paradigm shift.
Under the post-Arab Spring status quo, Sunni political groups largely seemed to have failed in taking control of governments. Turkey is an exception, and ironically, it is owing to the outsized influence of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) that Sharaa and his interim government have a shot at accomplishing the political transition to moderation they claim to be serious about.
Qatar has already pledged to invest widely in Syria’s energy and transportation infrastructure. It isn’t difficult to imagine that hefty investments from the Gulf emirate, along with signs of Saudi engagement, could lead to an Islamist outcome in Syria. But while Arab Gulf states do not have a governance model to export to Syria, Turkey does. On the flipside, if Sharaa is successful, a case of a Sunni Islamist government in power may raise alarm bells for neighboring states that harbor political Islamist movements with similar aspirations.
Cairo has been cautious about its approach to the interim administration so far. So has Amman. The Islamic Action Front, the political wing of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood, secured nearly a quarter of the seats in the House of Representatives last September. Jordan is plainly concerned about the danger of both Brotherhood political mobilization and Iranian interference that could destabilize the West Bank.
Though political Islamist mobilization was less understood in 1979, a lot has changed in the last 45 years. Sharaa’s party could transform, as other political Islamist actors have, toward a hybrid religious-nationalist identity that harnesses Islamic tenets injected with a Syrian nationalism. While not secular, it can profess to be nonsectarian.
Sharaa likely believes that large swaths of the Syrian population will buy in to some interpretation of an Islamist-oriented political system over time, as the state bureaucracy expands, infrastructure and service delivery improve, displaced Syrians can return home, and the labor force surges with employment opportunities. Seen this way, he may be paving the way to win hearts and minds while approaching an Islamist end point.
There will be resistance to this vision. While it was the armed opposition that ultimately toppled Bashar al-Assad, vocal political dissidents and human rights activists have been chipping away at regime pillars at great personal cost. Moreover, Syria has a heterogenous population with sizable non-Muslim and non-Sunni religious affiliations, including Christian Druze, Alawite, Turkmen, and Kurdish groups, that would oppose an institutionalized Sunni Islamist state. There are also the preferences of Syria’s secular urbanites to consider. More friction may be on the horizon if intra-Sunni tensions flare between the Salafis and the Sufi tradition, which holds historic sway in Syria.
The claims of minorities and ubiquitous recognition of such rights by the international community must stand as a natural bulwark against exclusionary rule. Democracy is the only system that will guarantee the rights of minorities in Syria. In December, thousands of protesters poured onto the streets after a video circulated reportedly showing the desecration of an Alawite shrine. Blamed on disinformation efforts to stoke sectarian violence by former regime loyalists or possibly external spoilers, many images have been discredited. But in the coastal cities of Tartus and Latakia, some Christian and Alawite communities remain on edge.
Beyond the questions of democracy and pluralism is the more immediate concern of a collapsing economy. Sharaa’s government seeks to adopt a free market economic model with links to global markets. The Syrian caretaker government’s immediate goal is to gain international recognition and encourage the United States, European Union, and other actors to lift the complex web of sanctions on the country.
The U.S.-imposed sanctions date back to 1979, when Syria was designated a state sponsor of terrorism, with subsequent rounds snowballing in the 2000s and then in 2011 in response to Assad’s crackdown on protesters and the ensuing war. U.S. primary and secondary sanctions, which prohibit third parties from engaging with Syria as enshrined with the 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, equates to a near embargo and is a barrier to constructive engagement with Syria’s new rulers.
On Jan. 6, the U.S. Treasury Department introduced a six-month waiver on restrictions on Syria’s governing institutions, which will allow the entry of humanitarian aid and ease some financial transactions in the energy sector and personal remittances. While it is a move in the right direction, the sanctions regime remains intact, and the EU and U.K. have yet to follow suit.
If sanctions are seen as a punitive instrument with no end in sight, this will risk isolating Syria’s rulers and people, fuel anti-Western sentiment, and possibly unleash new cycles of repression and violence fueled by economic despair.
Unlike the political economy of post-revolutionary Iran—which could rely on its vast oil and natural gas reserves—Syria lacks sufficient natural resources that could power its economic revival, and its energy sector is in disarray. It will remain heavily dependent on access to foreign imports and trade for the foreseeable future.
The prevailing view that the international community should not prematurely abandon the strategic leverage that sanctions afford is narrow and shortsighted. There are policy and legal scenarios in between, such as an incremental, phased approach to sector-specific waivers for some sanctions. None of these impairs the ability to maintain targeted sanctions and asset freezes on individuals and entities responsible for carrying out mass atrocities under the former regime.
Importantly, continuing expansive sanctions mechanisms reduces the ability of the United States and other actors to influence Syria’s caretakers toward democratic reforms. The scale of destruction in Syria after 13 years of war requires multilateral aid and economic investment, including from regional and international states. Washington and London must not be left out of the process of Syria’s transformation, and the country’s new, technocratic rulers may be open to making concessions if they receive tacit guarantees of sanctions relief.
Tying sanctions relief to consensus-driven, genuine political reform will extend legitimacy to the new Syrian administration. But there needs to be an articulation of what this would look like rather than a prolonged state of ambiguity.
Sharaa and his deputies would do well to assure the international community that they are not pulling a fait accompli or creating facts on the ground in the absence of an electoral mandate. Political and civic groups will need viable opportunities to mobilize, especially during the transition period. The caretaker cabinet is drawn entirely from the Salvation Government in Idlib, but if Sharaa diversified this portfolio, it would send a positive message.
In late December, Sharaa announced that HTS would disband during the planned national dialogue conference, which will include representatives from across Syria’s governorates. It is important that HTS uses the conference to tangibly demonstrate how it plans to share decision-making with other actors in Syria in non-superficial ways.
The Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) in exile has stated that “the implementation of UN Resolution 2254 must occur through a Syrian-led and owned political process, facilitated through Syrian-Syrian dialogue,” referring to the U.N. Security Council resolution that laid out a road map for Syria’s political transition in 2015.
SOC President Hadi al-Bahra called for an inclusive, nonsectarian transitional government and said the group would return to Syria to resume its activities. But political mobilization under the Assad regime was a suicide mission, and there is no infrastructure to support competitive party politics in Syria. While its inclusion in the political process will be necessary, the SOC will have limited influence, especially if HTS holds on to key state functions.
While hopes for Iran’s democracy were buried in 1979, it is not a foregone conclusion that Syria must share a similar fate, nor is a sharia-based constitutional system inevitable. Unlike the anti-shah protests in Iran, the main political vocabulary of resistance to the Assad regime was not expressed through Islamism.
This changed in 2012-13, when the most powerful actors in the revolutionary movement emerged as armed Salafi-jihadi groups, with HTS later elbowing out the competition. Recently, Sharaa said that “everyone who offered sacrifices liberated the country,” signaling that a big-tent approach and alliance-building across the political spectrum can grant him the legitimacy he seeks.
It is now up to the Syrian people whether they choose to legitimize Sharaa and his party, but they must be allowed the opportunity to make that decision sooner rather than later.
A prolonged interim government transition risks sociopolitical cleavages becoming more salient, armed groups gaining ground from the bottom up in parts of the country, and a youth frustrated with not having the means to exercise their newfound right to political choice.