Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.
The highlights this week: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi faces down multiple challenges at once as the United States threatens high tariffs, former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is tried in absentia for charges related to last year’s protest crackdown, and the Taliban mark four years back in power in Kabul.
Challenges Converge for Modi
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi currently faces one of the more difficult periods of his 11 years in power. Modi has faced his share of troubles in the past, including India’s catastrophic wave of COVID-19 infections in 2021 as well as mass farmers’ protests that began in 2020 and caused him to reverse new agricultural laws. But rarely has Modi faced such a quick convergence of challenges as he does now.
Modi’s most immediate concern is responding to U.S. President Donald Trump’s high tariffs, which could entail levies as high as 50 percent—significantly more than those on India’s top export competitors elsewhere in Asia. But the Indian leader must also grapple with the aftermath of the May conflict with Pakistan, which has contributed to a major crisis in U.S.-India relations and bolstered Washington’s ties with Islamabad.
Furthermore, the April attack in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, that killed 26 civilians and triggered the conflict with Pakistan has undercut an important narrative that Modi sought to project: that Kashmir has become more stable and tourist-friendly since New Delhi revoked its special autonomous status in 2019.
Meanwhile, on the political front, last week Indian opposition leader Rahul Gandhi accused the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) of colluding with the Election Commission of India in “criminal fraud” in last year’s national elections. The commission and BJP leaders have rejected Gandhi’s claims, but the detailed scope of the allegations has kept them in the headlines in India.
The fraud allegations came on the heels of two additional headaches for Modi. First, on July 21, the opening day of India’s monsoon parliament session, Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar suddenly resigned. Dhankhar reportedly upset BJP leaders for siding with an opposition motion in the upper house, where he served as chair—a rare case of a BJP leader publicly going against the rest of the party.
Second, last month, Mohan Bhagwat, the head of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the powerful Hindu nationalist organization closely linked to the BJP, said that turning 75 means “you should stop now and make way for others.” Bhagwat may have referred to himself, as he turns 75 next month—but some observers believe that he was sending a signal to Modi, who also turns 75 in September.
The BJP has advised its leaders to leave public office at that age, but there is no formal rule—and Modi certainly hasn’t indicated that he plans to do so.
More than a year into his third term, Modi’s political survival isn’t at risk. He remains deeply popular in India, and the economy remains strong despite uneven growth. Some of his recent moves—striking Pakistan, refusing to give in to all of Trump’s demands during trade talks—have resonated with the Indian public. And Modi has shown a repeated ability to bounce back after decisions that backfire.
But recent developments come against the backdrop of a more difficult environment than Modi has gotten used to in the last decade. Because the BJP lost seats in last year’s election, the prime minister is governing within a coalition for the first time. His partners haven’t caused him problems, but he still has less political leeway than in the past. Last year’s election result also made Gandhi a formal opposition leader, giving Modi’s rivals more influence.
Furthermore, Trump’s return to the White House as a more rigidly transactional figure than he was during his previous term has complicated India’s relations with a critical partner—and its foreign-policy choices more broadly.
In the next few years, questions will abound about Modi’s future when his current term ends in 2029—and should he seek a fourth, if he can continue to shake off the anti-incumbency challenge that has done in many Indian politicians in the past.
It remains to be seen who will get the last laugh: Modi backers who will look back on recent weeks as one more powerful example of his resilience or Modi critics who will point to this period as an early indication of him losing his shine.
What We’re Following
India-Pakistan fireworks. India’s air force chief, Marshal A.P. Singh, dropped a bombshell while giving a speech in Bengaluru last Saturday: He said that during India’s conflict with Pakistan in May, India shot down five Pakistani jets and one other aircraft, and that it also hit several Pakistani F-16s sitting in airport hangars.
The question is why it would take the Indian military three months to make such a major disclosure. Some Indian analysts believe that New Delhi was waiting for the right moment to get back in front of a narrative it has been losing to Islamabad. Pakistan rejected Singh’s claims and challenged India to agree to a joint independent verification of each country’s plane inventory.
Meanwhile, the Print published leaked comments from Pakistan Army Chief Asim Munir at a private event in Tampa, Florida, with members of the Pakistani diaspora over the weekend. Munir reportedly threatened to use nuclear weapons against India if it faced an existential threat in a future conflict and to destroy any dam built by India in violation of the Indus Waters Treaty, which governs how the two countries manage their shared rivers.
The inflammatory comments—which Munir would not have made publicly—are notable for two reasons. First, they signal how concerned Pakistan is about India’s decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty after the Pahalgam attack. Second, Munir appeared to reassert Pakistan’s posture of not adopting a “no first use policy” with nuclear weapons. (India does have such a policy.)
Pakistan’s government, military, or event attendees have not publicly refuted Munir’s reported comments.
Sheikh Hasina’s trial in Bangladesh. Former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is being tried in absentia on multiple charges in a court case that began last week in Dhaka. The charges are mainly focused on crimes against humanity, related to Bangladeshi security forces’ deadly crackdown against protesters last summer, as well as corruption.
The trial against Hasina is being held under the auspices of Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal—a body set up by the former prime minister herself. Hasina has been living in India since fleeing Bangladesh a year ago, and New Delhi—which views her as a close partner—isn’t about to send her back, even though the two countries have an extradition treaty.
In that sense, the trial is somewhat symbolic—but depending on the outcome, Hasina could be banned from politics for life. Though her immediate prospects for a comeback are practically nil—Bangladesh’s interim government has cracked down hard on her Awami League party ahead of elections scheduled for February—dynastic leaders in South Asia are rarely prepared to retire from politics.
Indeed, according to a report in the Times of London, Hasina recently met with party members and other confidants to explore a comeback—news that won’t go over well with her many critics in Bangladesh.
Taliban mark four years in power. Friday marks four years since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan. Despite its brutality and international sanctions on many of its leaders, the regime has managed to develop workable, albeit unofficial, relations with many South Asian countries, including India, and around the world.
Though Russia is the only country to have formally recognized the Taliban regime, some foreign governments—most of them in Afghanistan’s broader neighborhood—have reopened their embassies in Kabul and permitted Taliban representatives to staff Afghan embassies in their capitals. At home, the Taliban face no imminent threats to their political survival.
This has prompted the Taliban to take some bold diplomatic steps—including calling on the United States to let Taliban officials take control of the Afghan Embassy in Washington. In a television interview on Sunday, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid cited the direct engagement between U.S. officials and the Taliban and indicated that the regime also seeks official recognition from the United States.
The embassy request is unlikely to be granted, given the sanctions on Taliban leadership and the security risks of having a group with long-standing links to al Qaeda based on U.S. soil. That said, one can’t completely rule out Trump exploring the possibility—particularly if the Taliban signal a willingness to first make concessions.
FP’s Most Read This Week
- Why Everyone in Washington Is a ‘Realist’ Now by Michael Hirsh
- Meet the New Middle East, Same as the Old Middle East by Stephen M. Walt
- The Next Israel-Iran War Is Coming by Trita Parsi
Under the Radar
Air India, the country’s national carrier, announced this week that it will suspend direct flights from New Delhi to Washington, effective Sept. 1.
With U.S.-India relations in crisis, some Indian commentators have questioned whether the move is a form of retaliation against the United States for its high tariffs on India. But it appears to be strictly a business decision for the airline—and a reminder that not everything is about geopolitics.
Air India explained that the combination of a planned retrofitting of some aircraft, coupled with bans on Indian planes using Pakistani airspace, has made fewer planes available. Passengers will still be able to fly to Washington from India via connections on partner airlines, and direct Air India flights to other U.S. cities will continue.
The logic of retaliating against the Trump administration by suspending flights to Washington would make little sense, given that Indian Americans and nonresident Indians rely so heavily on the flight route. They will bear the brunt of the impact, not the U.S. government.