It’s Debatable: The Stimson Center’s Emma Ashford and the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig debate pressing issues for policymakers.
Emma Ashford: Hey, Matt. You just got back from the Munich Security Conference, right? I heard it was very exciting: Vice President J.D. Vance came in swinging, the Trump administration opened peace talks with the Russians (without Ukraine or the European Union), and European policymakers reacted extremely poorly. From the media reports, it sounded like there was brawling over the buffet table. Did you get in any fights?
Matt Kroenig: Yeah, and you should see the other guy.
No, seriously, I didn’t witness any fisticuffs, but I was in the room where it happened. You could hear a pin drop. There was mostly stunned silence and a small smattering of polite clapping.
Everyone was shocked. Most expected a traditional MSC-style speech, focused on things like NATO burden-sharing and the war in Ukraine.
Vance said a word about those issues, but then he spent the rest of his speech criticizing Europe for losing touch with its democratic values when it comes to issues like immigration and freedom of speech.
What is your take?
EA: Well, I was not at Munich, nor were most people who agree with me on foreign policy, which might explain why Vance’s remarks—and the administration’s other steps on trans-Atlantic relations this week—came as such a shock to the people in attendance. The MSC is one of the most insular bubbles I’ve ever witnessed in the security space. Why on Earth would European policymakers be shocked?
They’ve been warned over and over that this was coming—during the U.S. presidential campaign and before. Heck, if you just want to talk about NATO burden-sharing, I can show you speeches where former President Dwight Eisenhower was ranting about Europe’s poor contributions back in the 1950s!
MK: So you predicted ahead of time that Vance would use his speech at MSC to discuss European domestic politics and criticize European values? If so, you are alone. I think everyone else predicted a speech on trans-Atlantic security.
EA: No, I didn’t predict he would go up there and rail against Europe’s crackdown on free speech, but I’ve certainly predicted that this administration would push Europe hard on defense, trade, and other issues. And, let’s be honest, most of the dissatisfaction in Munich had very little to do with Vance’s comments on values and free speech.
Yes, the Germans were angry that he met with the leaders of the far-right Alternative for Germany, but for most of the other nations, the issue was with comments made the day before by U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, in particular that Ukraine wouldn’t ever join NATO, as well as the Trump administration’s outreach to the Russians without consulting Western European capitals or Kyiv, and its push to have European states spend 5 percent of GDP on defense. Or do you think the delegates were just upset to be described as illiberal?
MK: There are three separate issues here. First, the Hegseth and Vance statements about conditions for Ukrainian peace. Second, the subject and content of Vance’s MSC speech. Third, the start of peace negotiations with Russia without Ukrainian or European representation. You are right that they had a compounding effect in Europe, but as analysts we can take them one by one. (I think Trump’s demands for greater defense spending had already been baked into European thinking.)
Should we move on then from Vance’s speech to the Ukraine statements and negotiations?
EA: Yes, let’s start with Ukraine. Two key things happened last week: First, Hegseth attended the Ukraine contact group meeting in Brussels and spoke quite plainly about the new administration’s position: no NATO membership for Ukraine and the reality that gaining back all of Ukraine’s territory is unlikely. That caused an outcry. Then there was a call between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, followed by initial meetings in Riyadh between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian counterparts.
The sense that I get is that European leaders were genuinely shocked that the Trump administration might proceed with talks without their agreement. But they haven’t exactly been forthcoming on when or how to approach the subject of ending the war!
MK: Hegseth was accurate in his assessment of what a negotiated settlement might look like. My understanding is that none of this came as a genuine surprise to Zelensky or European leaders who were following closely.
I do wonder, however, whether it was the best negotiating strategy. Trump’s usual approach is to demand 1,000 when he would settle for 10. In this case, why not start with big demands on Russia to put pressure on Putin? Americans are often accused of being naive negotiators for making their bottom line their opening bid.
I should note that there seems to be a bit of a role reversal here. I have been pro-Trump for years and you have been more critical, but I would have expected a tougher bargaining position from the Trump administration in this case.
EA: I think that may soon be a trend in this column. Admitting that Ukraine won’t be in NATO isn’t a concession. It’s just a fact at this point. If saying that out loud helps get the Russians to the table, then fine.
But I suspect that a lot of the “Trump needs a better negotiating position” arguments are really just backdoor ways to keep aid flowing to Ukraine for months or even years. How is that really different from former President Joe Biden’s policy of “as long as it takes”?
MK: Getting the Russians to the table is one thing. Getting them to negotiate in good faith is another. I think Putin will be happy to talk, but I doubt he will abide by a sustainable peace agreement unless he comes under more pressure. After all, he still harbors the desire to take all of Ukraine, and he is winning on the battlefield, albeit slowly and at a high cost.
And there are many ways to turn up the heat on Russia, including threatening to seize its frozen assets, additional sanctions and tariffs, and so on. Foreign Policy ran an interesting piece by Garvan Walshe about how Europe can both defend itself and ratchet up the pressure on Putin.
Care to make a friendly bet? I bet the West won’t get a lasting peace in Ukraine unless it puts a lot more pressure on Putin.
EA: Sure. I don’t think it’s going to be easy to get peace, let alone a durable one. But I think Trump is more likely to walk away and leave Europe to handle the war in Ukraine than he is to spend a lot more U.S. resources trying to weaken Russia and support Ukraine.
We should talk about Europe’s role in all of this. Clearly, European policymakers expected to be at the negotiating table. A lot of their talk about “security guarantees” in recent weeks was geared at that point. But instead, it’s clear that the Trump administration intends to keep them on the sidelines as a third party, all while pushing for greater defense spending.
They don’t seem to be taking it well. I saw one report today about the head of the foreign affairs committee in the German Bundestag saying that“trans-Atlantic relations are over.” Another German policymaker described the United States as an “adversary” to a reporter.
This seems like a bit of an overreaction, particularly given they’ve been warned for years that without burden-sharing, the United States might unilaterally start to pull back from Europe. I even wrote an article a month or so back with my friend Jen Kavanagh trying to tell Europeans that they really needed to prepare for Trump! I guess the Munich crowd missed that one.
MK: Two points. First, I agree the Europeans are overreacting. One European leader told me at MSC that she feels like Europe “lost its last friend.” But Trump likes a pressure and engagement approach, so I think the tough position on Europe may have been designed to prod them to do more. I can imagine Trump and Vance high-fiving over Denmark’s announcement this week that it will increase defense spending by 70 percent and saying, “Good, what is what we hoped to accomplish.”
But I do take issue with your point that this is all “clear.” Another European leader said she wanted more clarity and said, “I don’t yet know what everyone is reacting to.”
Hegseth said one thing and then walked it back. Vance said another. Meetings took place without the Europeans, but U.S. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz said this is about “sequencing” and they are being consulted.
It is still early. Much of the team is still not in place. There is not a real interagency process. I don’t think the Trump administration has yet developed a clear strategy for negotiating peace in Ukraine.
EA: I think they know where they want to go. Yes, there’s no interagency process, but when has that ever stopped a Trump administration before?
Look, I agree that the Europeans are overreacting. Keith Kellogg, the president’s special envoy for Ukraine, stayed in Europe after the others left and talked to European leaders. He even made a trip to Kyiv. So I do think they aren’t completely ignoring Europe. But the administration clearly intends to be in the driver’s seat on negotiations, even as they expect European states to pony up. They even sent around a survey asking states what they can commit to future Ukrainian defense in concrete terms.
Before we leave the topic of Ukraine, though, we should talk about the elephant in the room: It also seems like Trump is having some kind of personal spat with Zelensky. He took to Truth Social this week to refer to him as a “dictator” and suggested that Ukraine should hold new elections.
Trump also suggested—not so subtly—that Ukraine itself was responsible for starting the war. All of these will raise hackles in Kyiv. And to be honest, whether or not this is some attempt at 12-dimensional chess from the administration, some people have argued that this is just about pushing Zelensky to the table. There’s a real difference between encouraging the Russians to come to the table and apparently wholeheartedly embracing their narrative.
Then there are reports that Zelensky refused to sign a document committing some of Ukraine’s mineral resources to the United States, almost as a kind of reparations for U.S. aid. The fixation on critical minerals seems strange to me. I wouldn’t be opposed to a deal that traded a stake in some of Ukraine’s mineral resources for future aid, but at least some of these resources are in Russian-occupied areas, and others will be hard to extract in wartime. Frankly, there are easier ways to source these resources. What are your thoughts?
MK: Trump’s statements have raised hackles, but we should pay more attention to what he does. In his first term, he said nice things about Putin while instituting a hard-nosed underlying policy.
The idea of using Ukrainian critical minerals as collateral for U.S. assistance is interesting. It also would give the United States a direct stake in the long-term security and stability of Ukraine. Apparently, the terms were too one-sided, but I suspect we will see more action in this space.
Can I raise an important strategy issue about a Ukrainian peace agreement?
EA: Which one? There are several.
MK: Well, as you know, a good strategy starts with a clear goal. So how will Ukraine be secured in the long run? You are right that many European allies are promising to commit troops as a kind of trip-wire force. But what if deterrence fails and Putin attacks anyway? Will these European nations, like Sweden and the United Kingdom, really go to war with Russia? Are they expecting an American military backstop? If so, how is that different from NATO membership for Ukraine?
From a political perspective, some kind of American backstop could still commit the United States to fight a war with Russia over Ukraine—something the Trump administration is keen to avoid.
There is too much talk about a trip-wire force and not enough talk about the military strategy for defending Ukraine. But this is backward. One should start with the defense strategy and then design the trip wire accordingly.
EA: Funny you should ask that. Don’t tell our editor, but I just wrote an article elsewhere on this exact point.
Ed.: FP, FA. All in the family. That’s where I cut my teeth.
EA: There are a lot of different proposals out there for what to do next: neutrality and security guarantees, global south peacekeepers, even Europe leaving NATO! But the most prevalent is this notion that Europe will send troops, either to act as peacekeepers or as a trip-wire force to prevent future conflict.
Bluntly: All the European discussions of a trip-wire force are pointless. They’re not credible, barely practical, and all of them require U.S. support of some kind. The only viable approach is a Ukraine that is strong enough to deter future attacks.
I think that’s quite achievable, particularly when Europe and the United States aren’t pouring thousands of rounds of ammunition and arms into an active conflict. It’s also likely to be more acceptable to Russia than some token European force, and it gives the Europeans more breathing space to build up their militaries for their own defense. I sincerely hope this is one of the options the administration has on the table; it’s win-win-win.
Or would you prefer something different?
MK: After a week in Germany, I would prefer a salad. Wiener schnitzel, dumplings, and beers bigger than my head are nice for a day or two, but my heart and liver can only take so much. Until next time?
EA: Maybe the United States should pick somewhere healthier the next time leaders make speeches likely to give European allies a heart attack.