During his visit to Moscow in May, Chinese President Xi Jinping released a joint statement with Russian President Vladimir Putin that emphasized nuclear-weapon states’ special responsibility to “reject Cold War mentality” and “refrain from actions that generate strategic risks.”
For decades, China charted a somewhat different path from the world’s two nuclear superpowers, maintaining a relaxed nuclear posture in comparison to the United States and the Soviet Union. It kept nuclear weapons on low alert in peacetime and remains the only country to pledge never to use nuclear weapons first under any conditions.
Yet certain behaviors suggest that China may be preparing to adopt one of the Cold War’s most dangerous nuclear practices—launch under attack (LUA)—as part of its substantial expansion of its nuclear capabilities.
LUA is a policy that allows political leadership to authorize rapid nuclear counterstrikes based on early warning data. If a state detects an incoming nuclear strike, its leadership can launch immediate nuclear retaliation before enemy nuclear warheads explode over its territory.
Thus far, only the United States and Russia have adopted LUA. The United States explored options to reduce the role of LUA in its nuclear strategy under former President Barack Obama but ultimately chose to maintain it. Russia, meanwhile, has expanded the scenarios in which it may launch an immediate nuclear response—from reacting primarily to incoming ballistic missiles to including “reliable data on the massive launch” of aircraft, missiles, or drones crossing its borders—dramatically lowering the threshold of nuclear response.
While some Chinese diplomats have publicly called on all nuclear states to reject LUA, China appears to be quietly building the necessary infrastructure to adopt LUA itself—without offering any public clarification on related capabilities or policy.
Notably, it is building a comprehensive early warning system, including infrared satellites and large ground-based radars, to detect potential attacks.
Chinese military writings also increasingly endorse the LUA concept, termed “early warning counterattack,” presenting detailed discussions of LUA design and execution while asserting the policy’s compatibility with China’s no-first-use policy.
Though an LUA policy has some perceived deterrence benefits, it also introduces serious new risks of unnecessary nuclear conflict. If Beijing is indeed exploring this policy, it should have a broad and open debate, rather than leaving it to a small, secretive circle of military planners. If a decision to adopt LUA has already been made, there are several unilateral and cooperative risk-reduction measures that leaders could adopt to help safeguard against the worst.
LUA has always been risky, but changes to the international security environment in recent decades make it even riskier and more complicated for China today than it was for its counterparts during the Cold War.
Whereas U.S. and Soviet leaders only had to track ballistic missiles that follow predictable trajectories, China will have to contend with advanced missiles with maneuverable flight paths, which complicate trajectory assessments and threat evaluation. Plus, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish certain conventional and nuclear missiles from each other, further complicating decision-making about retaliation.
China’s geographic proximity to other potential U.S. targets adds another layer of uncertainty. Russia, China, and North Korea are all believed to maintain certain nuclear or strategic missile facilities near the Chinese border. In a crisis, China’s early warning system may not be able to reliably discern whether U.S. missiles heading toward Northeast Asia are targeting Russia, North Korea, or China itself, not least because of the possibility of last-minute trajectory changes.
Chinese leaders would face the formidable task of assessing threats, evaluating intent, weighing options and consequences, and deciding within minutes whether and how to retaliate. Achieving absolute certainty that an attack warning is not the result of a technical glitch, human error, or adversary cyber interference is an equally daunting challenge.
Traditionally, China has stored warheads separately from delivery systems, which delays nuclear retaliation for hours, if not days, after an attack. LUA would require mating nuclear warheads to at least some delivery systems, which increases the risks of nuclear safety and security incidents. The United States and Russia have spent decades grappling with false alarms and near-miss incidents that created some of the Cold War’s most dangerous moments. Under LUA, China could expose itself—and the international community—to similarly grave risks, despite urging avoidance of a new Cold War.
LUA adoption also challenges Chinese political leadership’s absolute control over nuclear decision-making. Because of compressed decision timelines, the People’s Liberation Army will likely shoulder greater responsibility for planning retaliation options, giving an unprecedented degree of nuclear decision-making power to the military.
Though it carries obvious risks, adopting LUA could offer China some marginal security benefits.
It could strengthen deterrence against an out-of-the-blue, large-scale nuclear attack in peacetime or a drastic escalation involving a massive disarming strike during a conventional or limited nuclear conflict, likely around the Taiwan Strait.
However, in more plausible scenarios involving gradual, less clear-cut escalation—marked by cycles of tit-for-tat nuclear exchanges—there would be no obvious indicator for when China would or should initiate an LUA response. Without such clarity, a U.S. nuclear strike that appeared “proportionate” to U.S. decision-makers could inadvertently cross China’s LUA threshold, potentially triggering full-scale nuclear war.
China’s political leadership may not have yet evaluated the full consequences of LUA. But given the limited military benefits and serious security risks, Beijing should not move forward with it.
The early warning systems still in development will remain valuable to support other Chinese programs, including missile defense, even if they are not used specifically for LUA. As China’s nuclear arsenal grows, it also has less need for an aggressive launch policy anyway.
In fact, by simply maintaining the appearance of an LUA posture, China could create enough uncertainty to deter the United States without actually making plans to launch under attack. Indeed, during the Cold War, U.S. strategists recognized that, for deterrence, adversaries’ belief that the United States would launch under attack was more important than Washington’s actual willingness to do so.
If the decision to adopt LUA is already made, China should at least implement safeguards to mitigate the most destabilizing risks.
For instance, it could choose to launch only after confirming a nuclear detonation on its soil but before the bulk of U.S. warheads had landed, rather than on mere detection of a launch. Additionally, it could require that any missile attack warning be verified through at least two independent types of sensors to reduce the risk of false alarms. China may already be moving in this direction by developing both satellite-based infrared detectors and ground-based radars. However, to consistently uphold these standards against evolving technologies demands clear, firm, high-level directives.
The most destabilizing scenario would be if China’s pursuit of LUA signaled a broader shift in its nuclear doctrine toward targeting enemy nuclear forces and limiting damage in a nuclear war. Traditionally, China’s nuclear strategy has not prioritized strikes against an adversary’s nuclear forces or command-and-control centers. But under LUA, such targets could become more relevant, potentially steering China toward a greater embrace of nuclear warfighting.
While there is little evidence of China pursuing such a radical shift in strategy, American strategists worry about China’s growing arsenal and ability to target U.S. nuclear forces. Just as the United States adopted LUA in response to perceived Soviet hard-kill capabilities during the Cold War, similar concerns about China could push the United States toward greater reliance on LUA in the future—a shift that could undermine Chinese security in the long run.
One potential silver lining here is that exploring LUA may cause Beijing to develop greater empathy for the United States and its concerns over certain Chinese military capabilities and behaviors. This, in turn, could open new avenues for unilateral or cooperative risk-reduction measures.
For instance, LUA requires robust nuclear command, control, and communication systems, including operational early warning sensors. Both the United States and China would likely appreciate establishing a mutual understanding about not targeting these critical assets.
Beijing may also come to better understand the genuine difficulty Washington faces in assessing the nature of an incoming Chinese missile strike—particularly when the missiles are maneuverable and their payloads are ambiguous. Recognizing that any U.S. misjudgment or overreaction in such a scenario could have dire consequences for China might encourage Beijing to reflect on its own capabilities reportedly in development, including conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range missiles that can carry either nuclear or conventional warheads.
Washington also harbors significant concerns about Beijing’s reported development of an orbital bombardment system—a nuclear weapon system that can be launched into outer space and then, with minimal warning time, descend and strike targets, including enemy leadership or critical nuclear command-and-control facilities. U.S. fears about such an “early-warning-busting” weapon may now resonate more strongly with Chinese security experts, who have so far declined to seriously evaluate these concerns.
As China explores LUA, the United States should reflect on key elements of its own nuclear strategy that potentially drive China to consider such a posture, including the viability and long-term risks of its damage limitation strategy.
For their part, Chinese decision-makers should conduct critical reviews of LUA’s full security implications, including how it might erode political leadership’s control over nuclear strategy. Beijing should also recognize that even seemingly operational-level decisions may have broad, strategic-level consequences. Its choices regarding the depth of cooperation with Russia on early warning systems—and whether to share early warning data—could influence U.S. perceptions of Sino-Russian nuclear integration, potentially reshaping the nuclear triangular relationship.
Ultimately, China stands at a crossroads, and its choice could influence nuclear dangers for decades to come. Beijing can choose to emulate the most destabilizing aspects of Cold War nuclear strategies, or it can forge a path of deliberate control and strategic restraint. History will judge China not only by what it builds, but by what it has the wisdom to forgo.