After a decade of ascendancy in the Middle East, leaders in Tehran are facing a moment of reckoning. With the Assad dynasty over in Syria, Iran has lost its only regional state ally. This comes at a moment when Israel’s autumn of bombardment has significantly set back Hezbollah in Lebanon, which had, until recently, been Iran’s most trusted and capable armed-group ally. Iran is now on the back foot and in dire need of a strategic rethink.
Syria and Hezbollah have long anchored Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance project. The alliance with Assad was key to securing Iran’s land corridor for replenishing Hezbollah’s financial and military supplies. Since the 1980s, Iran has spent billions shoring up these actors abroad to deter Israeli and U.S. attacks inside Iran as part of its forward defence policy. While Iran looked like it had an upper hand for some time, Hamas’ brutal Oct. 7, 2023, attacks against Israeli civilians unintentionally set off a chain reaction that has unravelled Iran’s resistance project.
But Iran remains a regional power—one that still has choices. In his first speech following Assad’s demise, Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, put forward a defiant vision. He stated that the “Resistance Front is not a piece of hardware that can be broken, dismantled, or destroyed,” but rather it is a “doctrine” that will become stronger as a result of recent pressure.
Tehran could indeed dig its heels in and double down on rebuilding the Axis of Resistance with a long-game view. In doing so, Iran could pressure allied Shia armed groups in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen to be at the forefront of the fight against Israel. It could also seek to spoil Syria and Lebanon’s chance of post-conflict rehabilitation. The outcome of such an approach is likely to be bloody for Iran’s remaining allies. It could also be utilized by the Israeli government to build a stronger case in favor of attacks directly inside Iran.
Alternatively, Iran’s leaders could conclude that the Axis of Resistance has served its time and is no longer capable of deterring attacks inside Iran. Letting go of Assad may be an indication that Iran has acknowledged this as reality. Syrian rebels reached Damascus at lightning speed, with no army willing to put up a fight. With Hezbollah battered, Tehran saw no military solution to save Assad. Salvaging his regime, yet again, would have also been politically costly for Tehran, given its important neighbor, Iraq, whose government strongly pushed back against the mobilization of Shia Iraqi armed factions aligned with Iran.
If Iran’s leaders decide to step back from the Axis of Resistance, they will certainly invest more heavily in conventional weapons—especially missiles and drones—to deter military attacks from Israel and the United States. The case for doing so is enhanced by Israel’s unhindered bombing campaign across the Middle East over the past year, including two major strikes inside Iran, and stated Israeli ambitions to remake the regional order. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has talked about “changing the balance of power” in the region through the military campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon. The Israeli Defence Force has noted that the extensive bombing raids in Syria following Assad’s fall have destroyed much of Syria’s air defences, paving the way for strikes inside Iran. Netanyahu is also pushing hard to convince President Donald Trump that there is a golden opportunity for preemptive strikes to target Iran’s nuclear program.
If Iran divests away from the Axis of Resistance and instead focuses on its military capabilities at home, the world should anticipate both opportunities and risks. As part of a new deterrence strategy, Iran could consider taking the costly leap from being a nuclear threshold state to a nuclear weapons state. If Trump gives the green light for military strikes against Iran’s nuclear program, or ramps up the United States’ maximum pressure campaign against Iran without providing a realistic diplomatic off-ramp, then those within the Iranian establishment pushing for weaponizing the nuclear program will gain ground. This would present a major threat to global security and is bound to unleash a new chapter of conflict in the Middle East.
However, at this very moment of regional discord, Tehran’s leaders could also be influenced to take a de-escalatory path out of the current crisis, including through diplomacy with the Arab Gulf monarchies and the incoming Trump administration. Even before Iran lost Syria, it had started to use trial balloons to test the prospect of direct diplomacy with Trump and had accelerated its detente with Riyadh.
In Lebanon, Iran is unlikely to sever ties with its protege Hezbollah. However, Tehran could commit to not spoiling a new governing framework—in which Hezbollah’s political, economic, and military power is significantly diluted. In Iraq, Baghdad now has greater leverage to push back against Iranian political interference and can more actively seek to assert state control over Iranian-backed militias.
Tehran may also be more open to delivering on its ongoing rapprochement track with Saudi Arabia. It is clear the kingdom cannot fulfil its “Saudi-first” priorities so long as Israel and Iran edge toward a war that threatens the region’s air space with missiles and fighter jets. Riyadh’s ties to Iran, Israel, and the United States could prove critical in preventing more military conflict. This position gives Riyadh a much stronger hand to push for concessions from Iran to cool tensions in the Red Sea and roll back its military support to the Houthis in Yemen. Saudi Arabia is in a strong enough position to make these gains with Tehran while leveraging Trump’s desire to extend the Abraham Accords and normalize Israeli-Saudi ties in order to push for an end to the Gaza war and serious progress on Palestinian statehood.
Finally, Iran’s regional misfortunes strengthen the case for direct negotiations with the Trump administration on limiting Iran’s nuclear program in return for much-needed sanctions relief. At a time when Iranians inside the country are barely making ends meet, and are demanding accountability for the billions spent in the region, Iran’s leaders need to deliver economic and political benefits to their people. Indeed, Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has promised to prioritize this. The president’s strategic advisor, Javad Zarif, has outlined that the new regional dynamics provide Iran with a new “opportunity” to pivot and focus on the main source of its strength, which is its people. The fate of the Assad family—whose long autocratic rule eventually proved hollow—will no doubt serve as a cautionary tale.
Hawks will likely attempt to block this de-escalation path. Hard-liners in Iran, who have invested so heavily in the regional project, will want to avoid being viewed as if they’re capitulating and will seek to flex their military muscle. Israel will want to ride its current high and score more military points in the region. The hawks surrounding Trump will push for maximalist demands on Iran. Yet this pathway is more likely to push the region—and the United States—into more turbulent conflict.
In 1988, Iran’s first supreme leader finally agreed to end a brutal eight-year war with Iraq through a United Nations process, one he described as drinking from the “poisoned chalice.” Iran’s current supreme leader begrudgingly accepted the 2015 nuclear deal, expressing that “heroic flexibility” was required for the sake of the country. This new phase of regional reckoning could be one of the rare moments when a similar breakthrough is possible—and deserves to be tested by regional and international players.