The ongoing diplomacy between Iran and the United States offers cautious hope for breaking the deadlock over Iran’s nuclear program. But if Iran refuses to abandon uranium enrichment and ship its stockpile abroad, as Washington demands, and talks collapse, many assume—and a growing number of news reports attributed to government sources attest—that the United States or Israel would resort to airstrikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
The logic of a “comply or get bombed” policy is seductive. It rests on a belief that Iran is currently weak and can thus be forced into accepting maximalist demands. Iran is portrayed as suffering from degraded air defenses, a battered economy, brittle domestic politics, and a shattered network of regional proxies. The 2020 assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani—Iran’s most capable strategist—by the United States indeed triggered a decline in Iran’s Axis of Resistance. Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, assault on Israel provoked fierce retaliation against both Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon that accelerated the decline. And the fall of the Assad regime in Syria represents Iran’s most serious strategic setback in decades, which is comparable to the ousting of the country’s last shah in 1979.
But Iran is not as weak as it seems. Rather than resolve the current diplomatic impasse, military strikes are more likely to ignite a war with unpredictable consequences.
While Iran’s regional power has declined, it remains a force that cannot be marginalized. Hamas has been weakened and many of its leaders killed, but it is not defeated. Despite relentless Israeli bombing and ground operations, Hamas has replenished its ranks and still holds hostages. The continued Israeli occupation of Gaza risks fueling an insurgency. A February visit by senior Hamas leaders to Tehran signals enduring ties.
Hezbollah, Iran’s deterrence crown jewel, has taken serious blows. Israeli strikes killed its leader and top commanders, as well as destroyed missile silos and supply lines. The full extent of damage remains unclear but seems substantial. Yet Hezbollah is still armed, pushed north of the Litani River as Israel demanded, and is politically relevant through its alliance with Amal. Even in a weakened state, it may retaliate if Iran is attacked. And though Iranian forces have withdrawn from Syria, remnants of Assad’s regime and the Alawite minority may still offer Iran the ability to arm Hezbollah. While Iran has faced setbacks, Israel has yet to translate its battlefield successes into lasting strategic and sustainable victories.
Meanwhile, in Iraq, Iran is deeply embedded through Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), resisting disarmament and possible sleeper cells. Iran maintains close ties with the Shia clergy and the government in Baghdad, now one of its top trading partners. These dormant networks, bound to the fate of the Islamic Republic, could threaten U.S. interests if Iran is attacked.
In Yemen, the Houthis have become Iran’s most resilient ally, extending its reach to Saudi Arabia’s border. They disrupted Red Sea shipping and struck Israel last month, reportedly breaching defenses near Ben Gurion Airport. A recent U.S. bombing campaign—costing over $1 billion—failed to uproot them. The Houthis downed MQ-9 drones, an F/A-18 aircraft, and nearly hit F-16 and F-35 jets—factors that may have influenced U.S. President Donald Trump’s pause on airstrikes. The Houthis will almost certainly support Tehran if it is attacked.
Iran has also recently made notable diplomatic gains. It normalized ties with all Persian Gulf Arab states and entered détente with Saudi Arabia—the same country that once urged Washington to “cut off the head of the snake” in Tehran. Today, all Gulf states support a peaceful resolution to the nuclear crisis.
Tehran has also deepened its ties with China and Russia. In 2021, it signed a 25-year pact with China, and it recently ratified a 20-year deal with Russia—both agreements are aimed at expanding cooperation in areas like defense and economics. In the event of a war, Beijing and Moscow won’t defend Iran directly, but both could back Iran’s war effort in other ways.
Some hawks advocate dismantling Iran’s enrichment program completely, either peacefully, through the precedent set by Libya in 2003, or via surgical strikes. But unlike former Libyan Prime Minister Muammar Gaddafi’s rudimentary effort, Iran’s program is advanced, dispersed, and partly buried or near cities. After spending billions and enduring sanctions, Iran is now a threshold nuclear power, enriching uranium to 60 percent with a breakout time of mere months. For Tehran, accepting the Libyan model would be suicide out of fear of death.
To conduct military strikes based on a mistaken notion of Iranian weakness would be to repeat the mistake made by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in 1980, when he assumed post-revolution Iran was too fragile to resist an attack and inadvertently initiated what became a nearly decade-long war. Similarly, in 2003, the United States invaded Iraq on faulty intelligence, expecting to be welcomed as liberators. Today’s confidence in Iran’s vulnerability echoes those costly miscalculations.
Tehran would see any Israeli strike as a joint U.S.-Israeli operation, believing Israel lacks the capacity to act alone. An Israeli attack could quickly escalate into a wider conflict, with Israel on offense and the United States managing defense. Without regime change or a ground invasion—both unlikely—a strike would likely delay, not destroy, Iran’s nuclear program. It could trigger radioactive fallout, civilian deaths, and environmental damage. Tehran would likely quit the Non-Proliferation Treaty, expel inspectors, speed up bomb-making, militarize policy, and sideline moderates seeking U.S. engagement. The succession of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, could be destabilized, increasing the risk of a more hardline successor.
Often overlooked is that the Axis of Resistance is only a secondary layer of Iran’s defense and deterrence doctrine. At its core is the protection of the homeland and regime, backed by a vast missile and drone arsenal, mobile launchers, fortified bases, a modest military-industrial base, and battle-tested forces capable of both conventional and asymmetric warfare. While Israel’s 2024 strikes damaged Iran’s air defenses, its offensive capabilities remain largely intact, with the ability to retaliate asymmetrically and disrupt the region.
What if Iran and remnants of the Axis of Resistance strike U.S. bases, Israeli cities, or Persian Gulf energy sites? What if Tehran were to simultaneously disrupt both the Strait of Hormuz and, with Houthi support, the Bab el-Mandeb? The threat alone could spike oil prices, shake global markets, and stall economic recovery. What is the United States’ exit plan if Iran retaliates? More bombing? A prolonged U.S.-Iran clash runs contrary to Trump’s campaign pledge to avoid more “endless wars” and would likely derail the region’s slow shift from war to economic development. While the cost of any military confrontation would be far greater for Iran, both Israel and the United States would also pay a price.
Some believe military strikes could lead to the collapse of the Islamic Republic or trigger an uprising that cripples its retaliatory response. But this is wishful thinking. The regime is on an unsustainable path but not teetering on collapse. Economic hardship, currency freefall, repression, and disillusionment have created volatility, yet the regime remains cohesive and backed by a ruthless security apparatus that’s willing to kill for the revolution, as seen during the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests. The opposition is fragmented and lacks vision, while a wary middle class—scarred by chaos in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan—fears unrest without a viable alternative. A foreign strike would likely unify Iran’s fractured political base, fuel nationalist resolve, and rally even critics to defend the homeland.
Rather than threaten the regime, an attack on Iran could give it a lifeline. The West may believe it can coerce Iran with military escalation, but all it might accomplish is strategic overreach that it could ultimately end up regretting. A nuclear deal, anchored in mutual compromise, inspections, and sanctions relief, is the least dangerous path forward.