


At the end of August, nationwide protests rocked Indonesia, with demonstrators in Jakarta trying to break down the gates of parliament. The spark was a plan by lawmakers to circumvent Constitutional Court rulings about Indonesia’s regional elections in November that would disadvantage the political alliance of current President Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi, and Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto, who will succeed him on Oct. 20.
Faced with the angry protests, the lawmakers backed down in a rare defeat for the partnership that now dominates Indonesian politics. With remarkable chutzpah, both Jokowi and Prabowo quickly distanced themselves from the bills proposed by their supporters in parliament.
“Today we saw an extraordinary democratic process,” Hasan Nasbi, the head of communications for Jokowi, said on Aug. 22, the day that protesters attempted to storm parliament, adding that the scenario was just an example of “our greatness as a nation.” Prabowo took the opportunity to denounce unnamed politicians with an “endless thirst for power” who “seek to pursue interests other than those of the people.”
This year, facing a term limit, Jokowi tacitly backed Prabowo’s presidential bid in Indonesia’s February election. Some state institutions have seemed to help Prabowo, who has pledged to continue Jokowi’s legacy. Their powerful alliance has pushed Indonesia’s democratic system to its limits—but the protests show that opposition remains, even if under threat. The Constitutional Court rulings still stand in their way as regional elections approach, and Prabowo may face similar pushback when he takes office.
The surprise rulings by the Constitutional Court will reshape the regional elections in November. The first decision lowered the nomination threshold for candidates. Until now, regional candidates needed backing from political parties that collectively represent at least 20 percent of seats in regional legislatures or 25 percent of all voters. With eight major parties aligned behind Prabowo and Jokowi, there was clear coordination to back single candidates in key governors’ races, which would have let them run unopposed.
Candidates critical of the government faced a lockout. But the ruling should now enable candidates to run from Jokowi’s former party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)—which increasingly opposes the president since he backed Prabowo.
The Constitutional Court also struck down a May Supreme Court ruling that found that regional candidates needed to meet minimum age requirements only at the time of their inauguration, not when they register their candidacies—as was previous practice. Critics found the Supreme Court’s decision suspect, not least because the only candidate affected in the regional elections was Jokowi’s youngest son, Kaesang Pangarep, who was preparing to run for deputy governor of Central Java.
Last year, another Constitutional Court ruling allowed Jokowi’s eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, to run as Prabowo’s vice president despite not meeting the age limit of 40. The case was presided over by then-Chief Justice Anwar Usman—who happens to be Jokowi’s brother-in-law; he was later forced to step down for ethics violations in presiding over the case.
Faced with this double blow, pro-government parties formed their plan to circumvent the rulings in parliament. On Aug. 21, key legislators met with Minister of Law and Human Rights Supratman Andi Agtas, a member of Prabowo’s party. They emerged with a proposal to revise the regional election law’s provisions on candidate eligibility and nominations.
But while public reaction to previous controversies—such as the ruling that allowed Gibran to run—was muted, there was swift popular outcry this time around. “At the time of the Constitutional Court’s Gibran decision, the people were perhaps not yet aware what was occurring behind the scenes and the meddling of President Joko Widodo,” said Agung Pradita, a student who helped lead the protests. “The people are now becoming aware that the state of democracy in Indonesia today is not good.”
On Aug. 22, protesters launched major demonstrations in more than a dozen Indonesian cities. As usual, students and workers’ groups took the lead among the crowds, but many experienced activists said that the protests attracted more people not usually inclined toward activism. They credited much of this to social media, where influencers and others with popular accounts promoted protests with an image designed to look like a disaster warning.
Many protesters focused on Jokowi, accusing him of plotting to build a political dynasty and drawing comparisons to the nepotism of the military dictator Suharto, who led Indonesia as president for 30 years. Other activists took up broader themes: “The reason I fought hard to safeguard the Constitutional Court decisions is because, in my opinion, if we lost that decision, we’ve lost our democracy and we’ve lost our rule of law,” Titi Anggraini, a constitutional lawyer, said.
Thomas Lembong, a former trade minister under Jokowi who is now a critic, was one of the few prominent political figures to publicly side with the protesters, giving a speech at a demonstration in Jakarta. “Democratic values … are deeply embedded in our society some 26 years after our transition to democracy, and what we’re witnessing is our people reacting strongly to efforts by certain political elites to dismantle the institutions of democracy,” Lembong told Foreign Policy.
The upcoming regional elections now look more competitive, with some caveats. Few races look set to have just a single candidate, although a number of races include only candidates supported by parties within Prabowo’s coalition. Still, limits on Prabowo’s ability to corral parties that nominally support him may serve as a check on his power. The PDI-P is the one party currently providing opposition to Prabowo and Jokowi, but its plans to back former governor of Jakarta and presidential candidate Anies Baswedan to run in either Jakarta or West Java foundered.
Lembong said he is hopeful that the Prabowo-led government might reverse course from Jokowi once it takes office next month. “With a fresh electoral mandate, and inheriting all the levers of power as the continuation of the ruling coalition, the incoming Prabowo administration has every opportunity to rehabilitate our democratic institutions,” he said.
However, if the executive has chipped away at limits on its power under Jokowi, there are reasons to believe that this trend could continue under Prabowo. The onetime son-in-law of Suharto, Prabowo was implicated in the kidnapping and disappearance of democracy activists in 1998; he has previously expressed dissatisfaction with how democracy functions in Indonesia and suggested that regional elections should be abolished.
“For a long time, there’s been the Indonesian struggle for democracy,” said Kevin O’Rourke, founder of the political risk consultancy Reformasi Information Services. “Now it seems more the Indonesian toggle for democracy: toggle off one day, toggle on the next.”
The Constitutional Court is already under pressure. Anwar, the former chief justice, is pursuing a court case to be reinstated to the role. Pro-government lawmakers have proposed bills that would weaken the court, in part by changing term limits for judges that would remove some of the judges who voted against the Gibran ruling last year.
The military, a mainstay of the political system under Suharto, may also stage a modest comeback when Prabowo takes office. Senior politicians expected to serve in Prabowo’s government have privately indicated that he is keen to see the military play a role. Political analysts have expressed alarm over proposed legal changes that would help the military expand its influence in politics. The revisions to laws governing the military would allow active-duty officers to serve in a wider range of bureaucratic posts, and the military has also started lobbying to regain its right to engage in business activities.
Meanwhile, the potential for active political opposition in Indonesia has narrowed. Prabowo has recently suggested that such opposition was a Western cultural import and that Indonesia should cultivate a consensual political culture. He has already secured the support of seven of the eight parties that will sit in the next parliament. Leaders who don’t fall in line face being forced out. Airlangga Hartarto, the head of Golkar, Indonesia’s second-largest party in parliament, suddenly resigned on Aug. 11 without a clear explanation. He was reluctant to accept plans for all parties backing Prabowo to throw their weight behind the same candidates in regional races.
The new head of Golkar, Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Bahlil Lahadalia, is seen as a close ally of Jokowi. In his speech accepting party leadership, he emphasized that Golkar would support the Prabowo government, adding cryptically: “We have to do better, because we’ll be doomed by this ‘Javanese king’ if we play around. I’m telling you, don’t try to play around with this thing. It’s terrifying.” Politicians and analysts interpreted the comment as a reference to Jokowi.
The only party that seems to be in the opposition now is the PDI-P, Jokowi’s former home; it pushed back against the proposed plans to disregard the Constitutional Court rulings and has at times raised the alarm about democratic erosion. However, Prabowo has signaled interest in working with the PDI-P, and while party leader Megawati Sukarnoputri may feel betrayed by Jokowi, she has worked with Prabowo in the past. (He was her running mate for the presidency in 2009.) Sukarnoputri’s daughter and heir apparent, parliamentary speaker Puan Maharani, has seemed particularly open to taking a cooperative approach.
How long Prabowo’s current cozy arrangement will work for him remains unclear. The political gossip in Jakarta today often revolves around when Jokowi and Prabowo’s relationship will break down. Until then, the room for opposition within the political system will likely remain limited—but if the opposition cannot find an outlet within established structures, it will continue to express itself outside the system as it did last month.