NEW DELHI—Back-to-back student-led uprisings in Bangladesh and Nepal have toppled governments there, signaling a generational shift in South Asian politics. From Colombo to Dhaka to Kathmandu, Generation Z is emerging as a disruptive force, challenging corruption, dynastic elites, and stagnant economies.
The scale and speed of these social movements have surprised entrenched political classes in their respective countries—but also the political leaders of India, the region’s biggest and most influential country. India now finds itself grappling with an unexpected question: What does its rise as a global power mean when its immediate neighborhood is in political free fall?
Understanding India’s current predicament requires an appreciation of the traditional foundations of its diplomatic dominance in South Asia. Because of its vast population and economy, its smaller neighbors have typically depended on it for trade, transit, energy, and labor markets, while its military strength made it a security guarantor. By serving as the region’s main transportation conduit, the dominant buyer of goods, and the largest supplier of aid and defense support, India enjoyed political leverage over nearby countries.
Some felt this leverage was misused. India sparked controversy, for example, when it applied an economic blockade against Nepal in 2015, intervened militarily in Sri Lanka through the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), and even deployed troops in the Maldives. But India’s regional sphere of influence was mostly taken for granted—until the recent wave of youth-led uprisings started redefining South Asian politics, leaving Delhi struggling to keep pace.
Amrita Basu, a professor of political science, argues that the region’s recent uprisings signal a generational rupture in the region. Unlike previous movements that were tied to nationalist or liberationist legacies, today’s students in Bangladesh and Nepal reject loyalty to long-standing allegiances. “These protests are both pragmatic, demanding jobs based on merit rather than patronage, and a stand for democratic ideals against rising authoritarianism,” Basu said.
This generational break is visible in how these movements blend traditional street power with digital strategy. “This tech-savvy generation is connected globally through the internet and learning from each other,” scholar Nusrat Chowdhury noted in an interview with Foreign Policy “Bangladeshis took cues from Sri Lankan protests, while young Nepalis were encouraged by events in Bangladesh. Ironically, when governments shut down the internet to curb protests, it often has the opposite effect, fueling more anger.”
These interconnected youth movements expose fundamental weaknesses in South Asian political stability that extend beyond individual countries. They have also undermined India’s role as a provider of such stability—and a beneficiary. Ultimately, India’s ability to project power globally depends on the maintenance of a significant degree of calm in the region.
But India’s traditional diplomatic approach in the region based on historical linkages and cultural diplomacy seems to be running against its limits, with its neighbors viewing it as unable to deliver on local expectations of economic growth and development. This has forced India into a reactive posture with consequences beyond the region. Waseem Malla, a research fellow at the New Delhi-based International Centre for Peace Studies, argues that “being confined to a regional firefighting role is at odds with the global ambition of a regional power like India.”
“If India remains perpetually stuck in regional crises, its ability to pivot outward and commit strategic capital in the Indo-Pacific gets affected,” Malla said. “This creates doubts about New Delhi’s utility in Washington’s Indo-Pacific vision as a counterweight to China.”
Nowhere is this strategic trap clearer than in Bangladesh. Months of demonstrations led by university students swelled into a nationwide uprising against corruption and authoritarianism. The fall of Hasina’s government sent tremors across South Asia, not only because it ended one of the region’s longest dynasties but also because it was driven almost entirely by young people who had grown up under shrinking democratic space. Their victory reverberated across campuses in Nepal, where students saw, in Bangladesh, a validation of their own discontent.
Basu, the professor of political science, observed that the uprisings in Bangladesh and Nepal represent a sharp break with past patterns. “There are three significant differences,” she said. “First, social media played a vital role—governments tried to restrict access, but that backfired. Second, unlike earlier party-led protests, these movements were decentralized and leaderless. Third, the goals were different: They focused on the material well-being of Gen Z youth.”
For India, these upheavals have created immediate challenges. Bangladesh’s turmoil since August 2024 has spilled into India’s security and economy: Indian forces apprehended 2,601 Bangladeshi nationals crossing illegally from January 2024 through January 2025, an 80 percent surge after the unrest began. Exports to Bangladesh fell from $11.46 billion in fiscal 24 to $11.06 billion in fiscal 25, while rail cargo traffic dropped by 45 percent.
Similarly, Nepal’s protests have forced India to tighten surveillance along the 1,751 kilometer (1,090 mile) border, restrict crossings, and absorb shocks to tourism and trade. These numbers illustrate how quickly political upheaval translates into costs for India, forcing New Delhi to divert resources from broader goals to crisis management.
Beyond Nepal and Bangladesh, India also faces pressures on its western and northeastern fronts. The Taliban’s return in Afghanistan has revived fears of militancy spilling into Kashmir, while Pakistan’s economic and political turmoil complicates border security.
In the east, unrest in Manipur and mass evictions in Assam intersect with refugee flows from Bangladesh and Myanmar, showing how external crises and domestic fragilities feed into one another. These overlapping pressures compound India’s internal unrest even as it projects itself as a stabilizing power and leading voice of the global south. The contradiction is stark: While New Delhi aspires to global leadership, its immediate periphery remains unstable, forcing constant firefighting that diverts attention from longer-term regional ambitions.
For policymakers, the fear is contagion. With youth unemployment at record highs and universities increasingly restive, Delhi recognizes that the same frustrations that toppled governments in Nepal and Bangladesh exist at home. The state has responded with tighter surveillance of campuses, censorship of student groups, and restrictions on online activism.
Uday Chandra, an independent political analyst, added that India’s trajectory since independence has often resembled those of its neighbors. “The same legitimacy loss that enabled youth uprisings in weaker states occurred in India with the Anna Hazare anti-corruption movement in 2011, but it was channeled into electoral change rather than regime collapse.”
This internal approach has undermined India’s credibility. India faced an awkward dilemma with Bangladesh, having backed Hasina as a reliable partner while overlooking the erosion of democratic freedoms under her rule. When students toppled her government, New Delhi was left scrambling.
“India’s response has disappointed Gen Z activists across the region,” Basu said. “In Bangladesh, India provided refuge to Hasina while ignoring activists’ reform goals. In Nepal, India claimed neutrality but appeared out of touch with youth demanding accountability.”
This generational disconnect is stark in the words of those who lived through the uprisings.
“Hasina’s rule was widely seen as propped up by India. When Prime Minister [Narendra] Modi visited Dhaka, protests erupted, and people were jailed or disappeared,” said Ahmed Samran, a 23-year-old student of business administration. “For our generation, this distrust became visible around 2015 during the India-Bangladesh World Cup cricket match. Many young people felt humiliated and began questioning India’s attitude toward Bangladesh.”
Samran distinguished between cultural appreciation and political distrust: “We admire Indian culture films, music, diversity and valued solidarity from Indian activists during our protests. But we cannot trust India as a government or regional leader. Many young Bangladeshis feel India has lost moral credibility, which opens space for other powers, like China.”
This credibility deficit reflects deeper structural constraints. Malla, the research fellow, said that “India’s perceived big-brotherly approach has often become a liability. Its policies tend to align closely with ruling elites, creating long-term risks.” Economic limitations compound the problem: “There is a credibility gap due to India’s inability at times to deliver on developmental promises,” he added. “This opens space for China, which has strengthened its foothold and earned goodwill in the region.”
The challenge for Indian policymakers is navigating between outdated interventionist instincts and strategic paralysis. “Rigging elections in favor of preferred candidates would reduce Indian leverage now, but inaction is equally unacceptable,” Chandra noted. “The result is extreme caution mixed with pragmatism about the costs and benefits of any intervention.”
“India’s traditional neighborhood strategy has been transactional, offering credit or aid in exchange for loyalty,” he added. “That approach has backfired, fueling Big Brother accusations and driving neighbors toward China. But China’s embrace comes with strings too, which has brought India back into the equation.”
The challenge, Chandra argued, is adjusting to a new regional reality. Smaller states such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh are no longer passive recipients of influence; they now balance ties with both powers while guarding sovereignty.
This competition, he said, creates new leverage for smaller states: “The existence of both India and China allows them to rethink national identity in dialogue with rising middle-class aspirations. Their interactions with the regional giants are shaped by overlapping yet contradictory interests of the strong and the weak.”
Yet, while states maneuver between powers, South Asia’s youth-led movements face familiar limits. Chowdhury argued that Bangladesh’s 2024 uprising sparked hope but failed to deliver reforms, echoing the Arab Spring.
That leaves India at a crossroads: Global leadership will remain hollow unless it wins the trust of a generation determined to claim its future.