• Military
• Security
• China
• India
• Sumit Ganguly

July 17, 2025, 11:30 AM View Comments ()

More than two months after engaging in brief combat operations with Pakistan, the Indian Air Force (IAF) finds itself in crisis. There were evident shortcomings in its performance during the May conflict—especially compared with its role in India’s wars with Pakistan in 1947-48, 1965, 1971, and 1999. In this year’s skirmish, the IAF lost several combat aircraft, though the precise number remains contested.

The IAF has a sanctioned strength of 42 operational squadrons, but its actual capabilities have shrunk to 31 squadrons at best due to India’s slow defense acquisition process. Worse still, in recent months, at least three of the IAF’s British-French Jaguar fighter jets have crashed during training operations, including in a July 9 incident that killed two pilots. The Jaguars were inducted into the IAF in 1979, and India still relies on them due to cost considerations and other hurdles.

The problems facing the IAF have not escaped comment from senior military officials. In a moment remarkable for its candor, at a biennial air show in Bengaluru in February, Indian Chief of the Air Staff A.P. Singh upbraided officials from the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) for what he described as their failure to deliver aircraft in a timely fashion. Singh specifically expressed frustration about procurement delays for the Tejas Mk-1A light combat aircraft.

The Tejas program originated in the 1980s, but the initial variant’s engine—the first to be indigenously developed in India—could not generate adequate thrust and was abandoned. India was forced to acquire the General Electric F404 engine as a replacement, which current Tejas models still rely on. Even today, the latest Tejas has yet to undergo the requisite operational trials before it can be handed over to the IAF.

HAL’s alleged lapses—which include design failures, production delays, and questionable claims about making India self-sufficient in aircraft production—are obviously testing the IAF’s patience. This wasn’t always the case. In its early years, HAL worked with a German engineer to develop a supersonic fighter, the HF-24; it also manufactured a subsonic fighter jet under license with a British aerospace firm, Folland Aviation. Both aircraft proved their worth during India’s wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971.

What has happened to HAL in the intervening years remains something of an enigma, but it is apparent that its reliance on government contracts, the lack of domestic competition, and the firm’s dependence on licensed production of foreign aircraft all contributed to its decline. As the IAF is considerably reliant on HAL, it finds itself short of its full complement of aircraft.

This is not the only aircraft obstacle confronting the IAF. In addition to its aging Jaguar fleet—some countries have consigned the aircraft to museums—the air force is still flying Soviet-era  MiG-21 fighter jets that were scheduled to be retired last year after 60 years of service. The MiG-21s, sardonically referred to as “flying coffins,” have seen 104 noncombat crashes and the deaths of 73 pilots in the past decade. The IAF now plans to phase them out by December.

Another key problem dogging the air force—along with India’s other military branches—is a mostly dysfunctional weapons procurement process. Despite rapid economic growth, India still devotes less than 2.5 percent of its GDP to defense. Even this figure is misleading, though: India has the world’s fourth-largest defense budget ($78.7 billion), but it spends a disproportionate amount of it on wages and pensions. This leaves little for much-needed capital expenditures and modernization.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was willing to provide India with its most sophisticated weaponry based on rupee-ruble trade and at bargain prices. Today, Russia is willing to supply India with advanced aircraft and weapons systems—but it does not offer concessional terms. Though dependent on Russian spare parts for its Soviet-era arsenal, India has sought to diversify its sources of weapons acquisitions in recent years. Still, the extraordinary costs of advanced weaponry and modern combat aircraft remain an issue.

A case in point was India’s decision to acquire the French-built Dassault Rafale combat aircraft in 2015. Though the IAF’s operational requirements originally called for acquiring 126 of the fighter jets, New Delhi purchased a mere 36. And after nearly a decade of internal deliberations, fiscal considerations and other issues forced India to limit the initial purchase to two squadrons. India also signed a deal this year to acquire 26 Dassault Rafales for its navy, which may plug a gap in terms of naval aviation capability but is still a stopgap measure, and the IAF is in the process of acquiring 40 more. which may plug a gap in terms of naval aviation capability but is still a stopgap measure.

Finally, political considerations and reservations have also undermined India’s ability to sustain its air force’s lethal edge. In 2016, Lockheed Martin offered to move its F-16 production line from the United States to India—but the political leadership in New Delhi declined the offer with little explanation. It is widely believed that the decision stemmed at least in part from India’s unease about having the same combat aircraft that Pakistan had in its inventory.

Spurning this offer had at least two adverse consequences. From a political standpoint, India lost a key opportunity to bolster its security partnership with the United States. It was also strategic blunder: Acquiring the F-16 production line would have bolstered India’s defense industrial base.

All of these factors have brought the IAF to its dire state. Faced with two implacable adversaries—Pakistan as well as China—and grappling with a host of domestic limitations, the IAF faces demands that will weaken its military edge in the foreseeable future. In the absence of significant domestic security reforms, the air force faces an irresolvable conundrum.