• Geopolitics
• China
• India
• C. Raja Mohan

One of the unanticipated features of Asia’s new geopolitics has been the return of India to center stage. During the colonial era, British India played a decisive role in shaping the security order in the region, including substantial participation in the two world wars and other conflicts. Independent India deliberately chose to withdraw from such a security role in the name of non-alignment and opposition to Cold War bloc politics. India compounded its geopolitical abstinence by cutting links to Western capital in the name of socialism. Together, the choices steadily marginalized India in Asia—despite the centrality of the idea of post-colonial solidarity in India’s foreign policy.

This excerpt is adapted from India and the Rebalancing of Asia by C. Raja Mohan (Routledge, 220 pp., $29.95, September 2025).

With the end of the Cold War, India began to move away from these ideas, which had been dominant in India’s political class for almost half a century. As it opened its economy in the 1990s, India’s growth rate picked up. By the end of the 2020s, India is likely to overtake Japan to become the second-largest economy in Asia and the third-largest in the world. India’s economic transformation has been accompanied by growing defense expenditures, making it the sixth-largest military spender in the world in 2024. It also has the world’s third-largest armed forces. The 21st century has also seen the rapid growth of India’s technological capabilities, especially in emerging digital and related fields. India’s comprehensive national power—which was on a path of relative decline—began to grow in both absolute and relative terms in the early 21st century.

National capabilities alone, however, do not a great power make. Post-World War II Germany and Japan stand out as examples of states endowed with large capabilities but constrained by domestic pacifism and the status of junior partners in a U.S.-led alliance system. The difference is that India, like China, aspires to be a major world power. The growth of India’s national capabilities has been accompanied by a simultaneous discarding of the constraining ideology of non-alignment.

With material capabilities and a new political will, India’s location at the center of Asia and heart of the Indian Ocean makes it critical for the region’s balance of power. In fact, the invention of the term “Indo-Pacific” as a strategic region is about putting India back into the heart of Asian geopolitics. Yet as India’s relative position in Asia improves, the broader political and economic context in Asia is undergoing even more rapid change. New Delhi’s salience in Asia will be determined by its ability to effectively deal with these changes, limit their potential negative consequences, and leverage them to enhance India’s weight in the regional order.

A Chinese soldier and an Indian soldier stand guard at the Nathu La border crossing between India and China on July 10, 2008. Diptendu Dutta/AFP via Getty Images

How these two contradictions will play out has been complicated by the dramatic disruptions in U.S. policy initiated by President Donald Trump in his second term. To be sure, it was Trump’s decision during his first term to break the mold on China that set off a major shift in U.S. policy toward Asia. The emphasis on great-power rivalry, the framing of the Indo-Pacific strategy, the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and the push for an active strategy to balance against China were all products of Trump’s first term. This period also witnessed Trump’s effort to redefine U.S. alliances and restructure trade relations, accompanied by a deepening of the traditional Republican distrust of multilateral institutions.

There was a significant measure of continuity with these policies under U.S. President Joe Biden. While Biden intensified the effort to balance against China, he also underlined the importance of sustained engagement and guardrails to prevent the uncontrolled escalation of bilateral tensions. Biden did not remove tariffs imposed against China by Trump and even added a range of technology sanctions. Biden also sought to strengthen alliances and coalitions in Asia.

Trump’s return to the White House has cast a shadow over the prospects of broad continuity in U.S. policy toward Asia. In seeking a broader rebalancing of commercial relationships, the second Trump administration has not spared its Asian friends and partners. It imposed significant tariffs on most of them, including its partners in the Quad. Historically, the United States has been willing to be the main customer for Asian exports, part of a strategic decision to build security partnerships with Asian states during the Cold War. Trump has made amply clear that this is no longer U.S. policy. The United States’ economic ties with Asia must now stand and flourish on their own merits.

This idea also extends to the security domain. Trump’s skepticism toward alliances has acquired an even stronger tone in his second term, as seen in his disdain for Ukraine and NATO even as they each confront Russia. Extending that argument to Asia could have profound consequences for the regional order.

Trump’s penchant for great-power understandings—as seen in his administration’s early efforts to negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin over the heads of European allies—could also express itself in relation to China. There is thus some speculation about a potential U.S.-China grand bargain over trade and security in Asia. There is also a new argument in Washington that it should focus on the defense of the Western Hemisphere instead of frittering away its wealth and power in Eurasia.

It is by no means clear if a grand bargain or hemispheric retreat will come to pass. But the very prospect of Washington moving in that direction sends a chill down the spine of many Asian countries, especially U.S. allies. Meanwhile, Trump has reaffirmed his contempt for multilateral institutions at the global and regional level. Although the administration has expressed formal support of the Quad and AUKUS—two major U.S. institutional innovations in the region over the past decade—U.S. allies can no longer take them for granted amid the constant churn of Trump’s foreign policy.

Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar walks alongside U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the U.S. State Department in Washington on July 1. Kayla Bartkowski/Getty Images

Beyond the region, China has blocked India’s aspirations for a larger role in global institutions by opposing New Delhi’s claim for permanent membership of the U.N. Security Council and entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. India’s expanding economic engagement with China did not dampen the political friction between the two sides; instead, an expanding trade deficit generated new economic tensions.

As India’s long-held ideological goal of partnering with China in Asia soured—especially after border clashes in 2017 and 2020—New Delhi turned to balancing against Beijing through economic de-risking as well as external collaboration with the United States and its Asian allies. Washington moved decisively to build on the new possibilities with India. The U.S. adoption of the Indo-Pacific geographic framework and creation of the Quad, and India’s support for both, underlined their shared concerns about Chinese dominance in Asia. India’s move toward geopolitical balancing and partnership with the United States remained cautious, since it remained controversial at home and was designed to not prematurely provoke Beijing. Washington was willing to be patient.

To be sure, Washington has made major upfront investments—including loosening export controls, adjusting its regional policies to accommodate India, and abandoning expectations of immediate reciprocity. For its part, New Delhi has moved, if slowly, to shed its historical hesitations about partnering with Washington.

Yet Trump’s second term has posed some new questions about the trajectory of India-U.S. relations. Trump’s unexpected interest in the Kashmir question and his failure to back India during its brief military hostilities with Pakistan in May have revived Indian fears of Washington giving Pakistan a voice in U.S.-India relations. Far more consequential is the fluidity of U.S. domestic politics and Trump’s fundamental recasting of Washington’s approach to the world. Given the massive power gap between India and China, New Delhi will need Washington to continue effectively securing Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Until now, India presumed that the U.S. presence was a given and would, if anything, intensify. If there is uncertainty about the U.S. commitment to the region in the long term, New Delhi will need to do more to ensure that the United States remains in Asia.

At the same time, India is also hedging against a potential U.S. withdrawal from Asia or grand bargain with China. Both prospects have increased the incentives for India to ease the military stand-off with China and resume the political dialogue. India’s management of great-power relations amid the current flux also includes a renewed emphasis on retaining its relationship with Russia. But Russia’s war in Ukraine has increased the political cost of this relationship in the West, even as India works to step up engagement with Europe.

Yet there are limits to this diversification. Russia has drawn increasingly closer to China, which will likely constrain Moscow’s long-standing strategic partnership with New Delhi. Britain and the European Union, meanwhile, are keen to build their own partnerships with China. Managing this fluidity in great-power relations should become easier for India in the years ahead as its own national power continues to grow.

Indian Air force cadets toss their rifles during a full dress rehearsal at Chandigarh Air Force Station on Sept. 24. Arun Sankar/AFP via Getty Images

The Trump administration’s rhetoric against alliances is having political effects in Eurasia. In Europe, this has compelled many U.S. allies to discover the virtues of strategic autonomy and greater self-reliance in defense. The debate is no less prominent in Asia. “What we are seeing in Ukraine today,” then-Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio declared within weeks of Russia’s attack in February 2022, “could be what is in store for East Asia tomorrow.” His argument was that accepting the Russian invasion of Ukraine could encourage Chinese territorial expansion in Asia. Defending Ukraine’s sovereignty, Kishida argued, was part of securing the territorial integrity of Asian states.

That the second Trump administration—notwithstanding a recent change in tone—has encouraged Ukraine to accept the loss of territory in return for peace with Russia generates deep discomfort among U.S. allies in Asia. The new ambiguities about U.S. commitment to Taiwan under Trump reinforce that fear. Equally important are questions about the continued credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, which, in turn, have triggered debates among U.S. allies on whether they should begin acquiring their own nuclear weapons. The debate has been particularly sharp in South Korea. That Trump might revive nuclear diplomacy with North Korea only adds to U.S. allies’ concern.

New Delhi sees an opportunity in the U.S. demand that allies take greater responsibility for regional security. India would like to explore the space between alliances and non-alignment to pursue a larger role in Asia through strategic cooperation with the United States while seeking peaceful coexistence with China, if that balance is possible. India’s strategy has come under stress amid Trump’s “America First” trade policies, including his impossible demand that India open up its smallholder-dominated agrarian economy to a flood of U.S. exports.

The first challenge concerns India’s contribution to peace and stability in Asia. The proposition that India can be a serious net security provider is rooted in the reality of India’s military heft: After China, it has the largest military and highest defense spending in Asia. India has a large defense-industrial base, and its military diplomacy has picked up steam in recent years.

Yet New Delhi’s impact on regional security is well below its potential. One reason lies in the reality that India has to operate in the shadow of China, which has emerged as the peer competitor of the United States. Total military modernization has put the People’s Liberation Army well ahead of its strongest Asian neighbors, India and Japan.

It stands to reason that New Delhi could make up for this military imbalance with Beijing by joining its military forces with those of its strategic partners. But India continues to hesitate to participate in military coalitions with the U.S. and its allies. To be sure, India is willing to participate in a range of coalition activities involving non-traditional security threats in the Quad, but it has been unwilling to undertake joint military missions.

There is also a crying need to make India’s military machine more effective for the pursuit of its national and regional objectives. India needs to raise its defense spending, which has fallen below 2 percent of GDP over the last decade, as well as bring greater efficiency to its defense bureaucracy, procurement, and production. India also needs to promote greater investment—public and private—in defense-related research and development. Ending the dominance of the public sector and encouraging a greater role for Indian and foreign private capital is critical for the accelerated modernization of India’s vast but rusting defense-industrial base.

Finally, India needs to boost its military diplomacy to lend credibility to its regional security ambitions. Urgent action on all these fronts is necessary for India to emerge as an effective partner in regional military coalitions, as well as a credible independent security actor in Asia.

The second challenge relates to India’s regional economic integration and technological collaboration. Since the era of reform and opening up, economic growth has accelerated, as has trade with Asia. But India’s commercial ties with Asia, while impressive, are overshadowed by China’s. India’s trade with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, was about $121 billion in 2023-24. In 2024, China’s trade with ASEAN was close to $1 trillion. This is not surprising given the relative size of the Chinese and Indian economies. The problem, however, is exacerbated by India’s current strategy of disentangling itself from the Chinese economic sphere. India walked out of a major regional trade liberalization effort, the ASEAN-driven Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, in 2019. The fear of the pact driving up India’s already high trade deficit with China was one of the reasons. The strategy of de-risking India’s economy from China’s has acquired greater intensity since the 2020 military confrontation in Ladakh. De-risking has not been successful so far, given the massive Indian dependence on Chinese inputs to expand its own domestic manufacturing and exports. The same holds true in the technological sector. But the direction remains: India is distancing itself from China-dominated regional economic and technological integration.

India’s de-risking strategy is reinforced by a significant new effort to strengthen trade ties with the West. Hopes of concluding a trade agreement with the U.S. were seriously damaged by Trump’s August imposition of a 50 percent tariff against India in an attempt to curb India’s purchases of Russian oil. That aside, India signed a free trade agreement with Britain in May and accelerated trade talks with the European Union. This approach seems to make sense, given that the economies of India and the West are largely complimentary, with little competition between their dominant industrial sectors. On the technological front, too, India is tied more closely to the United States and the West than to the East. Although India’s Asian trade will continue to grow, its new trade tilt to the West and quest for separation from the Sinosphere raise broader questions about the future extent of India’s economic and technological integration with Asia.

The third challenge concerns India’s engagement with Asia’s regional institutions. Engaging with these was integral to India’s economic reforms in the early 1990s, as well as to New Delhi’s effort to reconnect with Asia under its Look East policy. East and Southeast Asian outreach has produced significant gains; New Delhi is now part of all major Asian institutions except Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and RCEP. India remains a member of various ASEAN-led institutions, including the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the ASEAN defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus.

Looking ahead, three sets of issues cast a shadow over India’s institutional engagement with the region. Although India has been a member of various forums, its impact has not been remarkable. Meanwhile, China looms large over these institutions, given Beijing’s centrality to regional political, security, and economic issues. China’s growing salience and influence over individual states, as well as renewed great-power rivalry within Asia, have undermined ASEAN’s ability to mediate international competition and cope with regional crises, such as the civil war in Myanmar. This weakening of ASEAN works against India. As the smaller power seeking to balance China, India’s preference is for a strong ASEAN, but it has not found a way to intensify its engagement with the bloc’s institutions. Finally, India has become part of a new regional architecture, the Quad, built by the United States. New Delhi also has no quarrel with other institutions such as AUKUS. Although India has so far navigated the tension between ASEAN-led and United States-led institutions, India is conscious of the danger of being seen as an extension of U.S. strategy in the region.

A fourth challenge relates to India’s continuing difficulties with its neighbors. Persistent tensions with Pakistan, which resulted in a fresh military confrontation earlier this year, and the rapid deterioration of India’s relations with Bangladesh after the ouster of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 underline the bitter legacies of the subcontinent’s partition along religious lines that linger nearly eight decades afterwards. Meanwhile, India’s relations with its other neighbors continue to go through cold and warm cycles. Even as India experiments with different instruments to strengthen ties with various neighbors, its relationship with Pakistan appears deadlocked. New Delhi’s engagement with Dhaka, in contrast, has seen periods of intense cooperation and sharpened conflict. India’s difficulty in stabilizing its relations with its South Asian neighbors presents an open invitation to other powers to meddle.

China’s path to solid ties with India’s neighbors has been correspondingly smooth. All China needs to do is step in to help them balance against India. New Delhi has sought to change this structural dynamic by trying to resolve its conflicts with neighbors and work with its Quad partners to improve regional ties. The only regional forum—the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation—has been put in limbo by continued India-Pakistan tensions. Efforts to bypass Pakistan and develop the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, which brings together the bay’s littoral states plus Bhutan and Nepal, has not yielded significant progress in regionalism. The problem is not with the organizational format but with India’s enduring challenges in dealing with a complex region burdened by a history of animosity and lack of a political consensus on the virtues of regionalism. This will continue to act as a constraint on India’s larger Asian and Indo-Pacific goals.

The final challenge concerns India’s domestic political orientation and its impact on India’s regional engagement. The debate over whether India has experienced democratic backsliding is largely confined to the Western foreign-policy establishment, and this criticism has not had a significant impact on Western policies toward India. It has never been easy for the West to put the ideology of democracy and human rights above other, more pressing interests in the domains of commerce, foreign policy, and security. Even more difficult has been the problem of pushing for them with any consistency over time and space, and so the credibility of these policies has taken a big hit. Moreover, hectoring by Western liberals has produced political friction with the leaders and elites of non-Western societies, including India’s.

What is new, however, is the backlash within the West, especially in the United States, against liberal lecturing. We have seen the force of that backlash since Trump’s return to the White House. America First and similar movements in other Western countries have challenged many familiar tenets of liberal internationalism.

Notwithstanding these internal Western debates, the issues of democracy and human rights have not had great resonance in the evolution of Asian geopolitics. Realpolitik has been the dominant theme in shaping the region’s power politics in recent decades. In that sense, a politically illiberal India, much like authoritarian China, is unlikely to have less success in its efforts at regional political and economic engagement than a more liberal one might. That said, growing hyper-nationalism in India—and its spread to diaspora communities—does produce negative reactions in multi-religious, multicultural Asia. Reining in hyper-nationalism and xenophobia at home should therefore be a high priority for New Delhi in crafting a weightier role in Asia and beyond.