France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, known collectively as the E3, have triggered the “snapback” process against Iran, starting a 30-day countdown after which all U.N. sanctions lifted under the 2015 nuclear deal will return. Snapback promises to restore U.N. sanctions that froze Iranian assets abroad and imposed travel bans and an arms embargo. The European countries will also move to reimpose their own nuclear-related sanctions against Iran, including extensive restrictions on the financial and energy sectors.
The E3 hopes that the ticking clock pressures Tehran and Washington into new talks to avert another, potentially worse, war. Yet snapback is a gamble—one that could set the stage for a resumption of war unless major diplomatic weight is now thrown behind a political process.
The E3 held off using snapback despite pressure during the first Trump administration to use it as part of maximum pressure on Iran. (The United States has fully backed the current move.) The main reason the E3 has acted now is that the snapback tool—the veto-proof mechanism for reimposing sanctions on Iran included in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231—will expire in October. Letting it lapse would make it impossible to rebuild international consensus on new sanctions against Iran.
Before the June strikes by Israel and the United States against Iran, the European nations had made clear to Tehran that unless it rolled back its nuclear activities, they would invoke snapback by the end of the summer. The E3 encouraged Iran and the United States to reach a new deal to limit Iran’s nuclear activities (that had far exceeded the limits set under the 2015 deal) and improve access by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). There was some hope that Oman-mediated talks could achieve progress despite the major deadlock created by U.S. President Donald Trump’s insistence that there be “zero enrichment” of uranium inside Iran.
However, Israel’s surprise attack against Iran, and Trump’s decision to then bomb key Iranian nuclear facilities for the first time, threw diplomacy under the bus. Following the halt in fighting, the E3 made an offer to Tehran for a six-month extension to the snapback mechanism. An extension proposal was the right call for Europe—preserving sanctions leverage while giving Washington and Tehran political space to return to talks.
The extension offer hit a dead end for several reasons. First, the E3 terms for the extension set the bar too high. They required Iran to provide the IAEA with full access to its nuclear sites and to account for the large stockpile of highly enriched uranium that could be used to dash for a bomb. On the face of it these are reasonable asks that Iran is obligated to perform under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but they ignore the new political realities created by the 12-day war with Israel.
While Israel and Iran have halted the war, there is little confidence that the pause is durable. From Iran’s perspective, providing transparency over the most sensitive parts of its nuclear program and giving away critical information about its uranium stockpile were the last bargaining chips for future negotiations with the United States. It refused to play these cards as part of a snapback extension deal with Europe—from which Tehran could not receive any security guarantees preventing more Israeli strikes or economic benefits. Indeed, given the ever growing U.S. sanctions and trade restrictions in place since 2018, Iran has already largely absorbed the economic hit from snapback.
Second, divisions within Iran’s leadership undercut the offer. While some in Tehran signaled they might have accepted improved terms, the government did not present convincing counterproposals. Part of Iran’s political establishment even welcomed snapback, which is a constant European gun to their heads. Under this view, by allowing snapback to run its course, Europe will have used up its main sticks with which to beat Iran.
Third, Trump’s seeming disinterest in diplomacy doomed the deal. After striking Iranian facilities, he declared the nuclear program “obliterated,” while his envoy Steve Witkoff downplayed Iran as a priority. Tehran, sensing U.S. disengagement, may even see snapback as a way to trigger a crisis that forces Washington back to the table.
Unless these three factors are corrected and an extension deal is reached within the 30-day window, snapback will take effect, opening multiple crises. The Security Council will split, with Russia and China likely obstructing enforcement. Countries worldwide will face pressure to choose sides, and Tehran already attempted to rally Shanghai Cooperation Organisation nations behind it during this month’s meeting. Iran will keep exporting oil to China, while Russia may defy U.N. bans on arms transfers in exchange for Iranian support in Ukraine.
Snapback will no doubt provoke Iran to retaliate. Tehran may suspend what little cooperation remains with the IAEA. Its hard-line parliament, which already succeeded in restricting IAEA access, is now pushing for Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT altogether. Such moves will no doubt embolden Israel’s hawkish government—which has made clear that its war with Iran is far from over—to restart attacks.
A renewed Israel-Iran conflict would likely be bloodier and costlier, risking further U.S. involvement and devastating the region. Strikes cannot erase Iran’s nuclear knowledge. Nor have they forced Iran’s leadership to give up what it perceives as the country’s right to enrich uranium. Instead, each attack strengthens arguments inside Iran for nuclear ambiguity—or even worse, nuclear weapons—to secure the country’s survival.
To avoid this outcome, European countries must intensify high-level diplomacy with both Trump and Iran. The immediate goal should be to draw Trump personally into deal-making with Tehran as the most durable pathway to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. One way to do so would be to bring together Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian at a Security Council meeting during the upcoming U.N. General Assembly. This would be a historic meeting at which both a U.S. and Iranian president are present.
Trump has long signaled interest in high-level talks, but Tehran has stubbornly resisted bilateral meetings under maximum pressure. Such an international setting would provide a face-saving venue for Iran’s leaders and could be justified as an exceptional measure given the exceptional times of having to make a choice between resumed war and durable peace. Europeans should work with Saudi Arabia and Qatar to combine their influence on Tehran and Trump to take this leap.
The second goal should be to land an extension deal in the form of a new Security Council resolution. The timing of the General Assembly this month overlaps with the 30-day window before snapback comes into force. At the Security Council, a new resolution could be agreed on, based on three pillars. First, it should call for an end to direct military attacks between Iran and Israel. Second, it should urge intensified nuclear talks between the permanent members of the Security Council and Iran over the next year. These two factors would provide Iran with some limited assurance that the United States will not greenlight new Israeli attacks so long as resumed negotiations are making progress.
Finally, this resolution should endorse a 12-month extension to the snapback provision in return for resumed diplomatic talks and a pause in enrichment and enhanced transparency by Iran over its nuclear activities. While Iran is likely to protest against a pause in enriching uranium, this is a practical reality now following the U.S. strikes and something that Iran may be willing to digest.
Transparency will however need to be a phased process—and Iran is unlikely to provide the IAEA with full access until this is tied to concrete U.S. sanctions relief. One way to enhance transparency at the initial phase of an extension period would be for the IAEA to work exclusively with Chinese and Russian inspectors (with whom Iran will have greater confidence sharing information) to begin accounting for its fissile stockpile.
If the E3 leverages snapback to spark such a breakthrough, it will reaffirm itself as an influential political actor. This process will, of course, be the start of an even harder negotiation between the United States and Iran aimed at a new comprehensive deal. Failure, however, will leave the E3 complicit in fueling conflict and abandoning two decades of leadership on Iran policy.