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June 13, 2025, 5:38 PM View Comments ()

The Israel-Iran war is just beginning. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has announced that Israel will continue strikes for “as many days as it takes”—likely amounting to several weeks—seeking to continue to degrade Iran’s nuclear program and devastate its military. Iran has already launched drones and ballistic missiles on Israel and has a range of other retaliatory options, albeit limited ones. Although more bloodshed is likely, even inevitable, it is not too soon to think about de-escalation and ways in which this war might end.

Here are a few possibilities.

The first is that Iran conducts several high-visibility military strikes on Israel, claims to its own people that it has punched back and bloodied Israelis, but quickly accepts U.S. and international efforts for a cease-fire. In short, a grudging surrender with a facade of face-saving.

In essence, this is what Iran’s close ally, the Lebanon-based Hezbollah, accepted after the September and October Israeli campaign against the group. Indeed, the Israeli campaign in Iran today bears many similarities to that effort: devastating strikes on military infrastructure accompanied by numerous assassinations and leadership strikes that demonstrate a thorough intelligence penetration of Israel’s adversary. Hezbollah, which had a massive rocket arsenal and tens of thousands of fighters under arms, agreed to a cease-fire largely on Israel’s terms without having launched an effective counterattack.

Iran may be in a similar situation to Hezbollah in 2024. Its drone and missile attacks on Israel in 2024 fizzled, and key proxies, notably Hezbollah, are a shell of their former selves, suggesting its once-reliable deterrence is ineffective. The devastating leadership attacks Israel has conducted may put Iran’s leadership in disarray, making it difficult to coordinate missile strikes or even make basic decisions in real time. Although Tehran has announced it is quickly replacing top commanders, the effectiveness of this new leadership during ongoing conflict is unclear, and Israel is likely to strike the replacements and the replacements of the replacements. Iran, of course, does not want to surrender under fire, but it might seek to live and fight another day rather than take continued pounding.

A second possibility is that Iran hangs on and even gets in a few blows against Israel—whether in the form of terrorism, a few missiles that make it through Israel’s defense, or other means—while international pressure builds on Israel to halt the war. Its nuclear facilities at Natanz and elsewhere sustain damage but Iran is able to make repairs relatively quickly.

In general, when Israel strikes its enemies, there is often short-term support from the United States and even key European allies, but these countries quickly call for an end to hostilities even as Israel seeks to continue attacks. France and the United Kingdom have already called for de-escalation. Israel may care little about Europeans’ opinions—they’ve been calling for an end to hostilities in Gaza for many months now—but it worries more about U.S. opinion, especially that of President Donald Trump. Should he put real pressure on Netanyahu, Israel might cut operations short, hoping that the damage done is good enough for now.

Whether this would lead to productive diplomacy is unclear. The United States under Trump has pushed for a negotiated deal over Iran’s nuclear program (even though what was on the table seems painfully similar to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which Trump withdrew from in 2018). Iran was taking the negotiations seriously, with apparent support from the country’s leadership, although tensions remained over uranium enrichment. Trump has already called for a return to negotiations after the strikes, writing on Truth Social that “Iran must make a deal, before there is nothing left, and save what was once known as the Iranian Empire. No more death, no more destruction, JUST DO IT, BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.”

Such negotiations hold a certain appeal for Tehran: The country’s economy is in shambles, and the promise of reduced sanctions are attractive. In addition, after Israel’s destructive campaign, Iran would be giving away less at the table. Doing so in the face of Israeli attacks, however, is more difficult politically. Trump would trumpet any concessions, and Iran would look as if it was caving in under pressure, which it would be.

Darker scenarios are also possible, and probably more likely. One is that the Israel-Iran war expands into a regional war. Before the Israeli strikes, Iran threatened to attack U.S. facilities in the Middle East—attacks that, if they occurred, would make it far more likely that the United States would join in the bombing. Long-standing U.S.-Israel security cooperation, and U.S. support for Israel in air defense and other areas, also may convince Iran that the United States is already at war with it. While the United States has denied involvement in the attacks, Iran may view Washington as being complicit, with negotiations acting as a cover for Israeli military preparations. Although Israeli and U.S. officials had warned that Iranian refusal to a deal would result in military action, mere hours before the operation, Trump confirmed that the United States was committed to a diplomatic solution and that attacks were not imminent. If Tehran views negotiations as a cover, U.S. targets may be at increased risk of what Iran would view as “retaliatory” attacks.

The United States, for its own reasons, may also escalate. U.S. officials may view Israel as having done half the job already, and the United States can finish the work, bombing Fordow with deep penetrating munitions and otherwise taking care of what is left after Israel’s initial attacks.

Iran is likely to call on its proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere to do what they can to attack Israel, and they might add U.S. targets to their list if the United States enters the fray for whatever reason. Thus, the United States could find itself attacking targets in Yemen (an unattractive option after the U.S.-led Operation Rough Rider against the Houthis ended in a cease-fire), Iraq, and elsewhere. Iran may also use international terrorism, having in the past demonstrated the ability to strike around the world.

It is possible, though for now unlikely, that U.S. Arab allies might become involved. The Jordanian Armed Forces have already reported intercepting Iranian missiles and drones that entered their airspace on June 13. This is similar to the country’s interception of Iranian missiles launched at Israel in 2024. Although Jordan’s actions can be couched as self-defense, if the United States becomes involved it might use its bases in several regional countries or otherwise draw on them.

A final possibility is that the war doesn’t ever end—at least not in a formal sense. Although the waves of massive Israeli strikes might stop at some point, a lower-level conflict might continue for months to come. Israel might launch the occasional missile or airstrike on Iran, along with assassinations and sabotage in Iran itself. Iran would fire salvos at Israel from time to time, along with terrorism and other attempts to strike back. It’s not all-out war, but it’s not even an uneasy peace.

Amid continued back-and-forth attacks and responses, Iran may develop a clandestine nuclear program outside of arms control commitments and international inspections—using Israeli strikes as justification. If Israel does not hit all three enriched uranium storage locations, this task will not be difficult for Tehran.

Combinations, of course, are possible. Similarly, a U.S.-brokered cease-fire might be a first step toward a larger nuclear deal. Iran may concede in the short term but believe revenge is a dish best served cold, launching terrorist attacks in the months to come as a form of retaliation and thus accepting a back-and-forth forever war.