• Russia
• Europe
• Ukraine

September 24, 2025, 2:28 PM View Comments ()

The European Union appears to be listening to U.S. President Donald Trump’s demand that it cut off purchases of Russian oil in return for tough U.S. sanctions on Moscow—and experts say the bloc holds some key carrots and sticks that it can wield to get its more reluctant members on board.

On Saturday, Bloomberg reported that the EU was considering unspecified trade measures to cut off oil through the Druzhba pipeline, through which Hungary and Slovakia purchase Russian oil.

The move follows Trump’s claim that the United States is willing to impose tough sanctions on Russia as long as NATO allies cut imports of Russian oil first.

“I am ready to ‘go’ when you are. Just say when?” Trump wrote earlier this month.

In practice, that means that just three countries must cut off Russian oil: Turkey, which is not an EU member; Hungary; and Slovakia. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the EU banned imports of Russian oil, with a carve-out for Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, where infrastructure made it difficult to quickly switch to alternative sources. The Czech Republic ended its dependence on Russian oil this April following infrastructure upgrades.

Hungary’s and Slovakia’s purchases have helped fuel Russia’s government with as much as 5.4 billion euros (about $6.3 billion) in tax revenues since 2022, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, a European think tank. The think tank also found that Hungary and Slovakia, rather than reduce imports of Russian oil, had actually increased imports by 2 percent in 2024 compared to levels prior to the invasion.

Under pressure to change, Hungary and Slovakia have said they have concerns over the price of oil from Croatia’s Adria pipeline, the primary alternative to Russia’s Druzhba pipeline. Hungary has also benefited from the cheap cost of Russian oil, with the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air estimating that Hungary has, at times, received as much as a 77 percent discount on Russian oil versus non-Russian oil.

The EU is already moving toward a blanket Russian energy ban by the end of 2027, with a related vote expected in October. That process is being structured as an internal market regulation in order to prevent Hungary and Slovakia from blocking it with a veto, said Eamon Drumm, an energy expert at the German Marshall Fund think tank.

That outcome could work out well for all parties, Drumm said. On the one hand, it is fair in that it equally affects Hungary and Slovakia as well as other nations, such as France, that import Russian gas. It also allows Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to sidestep any domestic criticism by blaming Brussels for the move.

The end of 2027, of course, is a long way away, and that may not satisfy Trump’s seeming wish for more immediate action. Polish Energy Minister Milosz Motyka, in an open letter to other European energy chiefs, said on Sept. 16 that Europe should stop importing oil by the end of 2026. He also advocated for “compensatory mechanisms” to make sure that no single country was “disproportionately” affected.

As an incentive, the EU could help upgrade infrastructure and provide financial subsidies to support Hungary and Slovakia, said Charles Lichfield, an expert at the Atlantic Council think tank.

The EU appears to have already previewed that strategy with imports of Russian gas. According to the Financial Times, the bloc will provide 550 million euros (about $648 million) in funds to Hungary in order to win approval for a recently announced Russian sanctions package that includes a faster-than-planned phaseout of Russian gas.

That move marks a major step in European policy toward Hungary on energy, said Matthew Boyse, a former senior State Department official who oversaw policy toward Hungary and other countries in the region. “The very fact that the [European] Commission is thinking about this is a big change and illustrates it is serious,” he added, referring to the EU’s executive body.

In addition to carrots, Lichfield noted that the EU also has powerful sticks in the form of subsidies that it can withhold until it gets what it wants. The EU has provided billions in funding to both countries. “That’s very significant leverage,” Lichfield said.

The EU, for example, could withhold subsidies for Hungary and Slovakia over rule-of-law issues if the countries do not cut off Russian oil. The EU couldn’t connect the two issues legally, Lichfield said, but such an arrangement would be within the bloc’s political powers.

“They can launch an investigation, and they can decide whether or not they’re going to take it seriously and whether they’re going to punish one of their own,” Lichfield said.

But Hungary and Slovakia also have cards to play. For one, the renewal of sanctions on Russia requires a unanimous vote from EU members every six months, giving Hungary and Slovakia powerful vetoes. Orban has threatened to block renewal of the sanctions as recently as January.

Boyse, the former State Department official, also noted possible difficulty in getting other countries to sign on to the carrot approach—particularly those that took steps to diversify their own oil supply.

“Some member states that have cut the Russian oil habit will probably object to incentives for Hungary and Slovakia because they had to incur costs themselves, and Hungary and Slovakia have steadfastly refused to do so,” he said.

And Hungary, at least, has a powerful ally in the White House in Trump, with whom Orban is close. If Orban were to call Trump and complain of EU pressure, for instance, U.S. pressure on the EU could theoretically melt away.

Trump “triggered the acceleration of this debate, and yet he could change his mind if one of these countries calls him, because he has sympathy for their leaders,” Lichfield said.