Matt Kroenig: Hi Emma, Happy New Year! I hope you had a relaxing holiday break. We have been off for a couple of weeks, and there is a lot for us to discuss.
Emma Ashford: Happy New Year! Relaxing is certainly one way to describe it. Cooking, entertaining visiting relatives, managing over-sugared children—let’s just say I’m glad to be back to the slower-paced world of international politics.
Of course, things didn’t exactly slow down out there, either. We’ve seen a fairly significant escalation in the war in the Middle East, along with renewed Russian rocket attacks in Ukraine. It really does feel like, as the essayist Aris Roussinos recently put it, “The overriding theme of 2024 then, like 2023, will be that of imperial overstretch precipitating retreat from global dominance. From the Red Sea to the Donbas, the jungles of South America to the Far East, America’s security establishment finds itself struggling to contain local blazes that threaten to become a great conflagration.”
MK: It certainly has been an inauspicious start to the year. Let’s begin with the Middle East. Most notable to me is that, over the past few weeks, Iran and its proxies have ramped up their war against Israel and U.S. interests. Iran-backed proxies have conducted more than 100 attacks on U.S. military bases in the region. Iran-backed Hezbollah has conducted rocket attacks against northern Israel. Iran is increasing its production of enriched uranium, shrinking its “breakout” time to a bomb.
But perhaps most egregious has been the Iran-backed Houthis’ attacks against shipping in the Red Sea. They have conducted two dozen drone and missile attacks on commercial shipping. They have even hijacked ships.
This is a major problem, as Elisabeth Braw points out in FP. Roughly 15 percent of global trade passes through the Suez Canal, the gateway to the Red Sea. Major shippers, like Maersk, are now avoiding the area, instead choosing to pass south around the Cape of Good Hope. This is delaying shipments and increasing the costs of insurance and international trade.
What do you make of these attacks and of the U.S. and world response?
EA: Let me draw a few distinctions here. First, I’ve argued before that it’s usually a mistake to see Iran’s proxies as a unified, Tehran-directed network of actors, and that it’s quite important to view these groups as linked to Iran but not necessarily all acting on the same set of instructions or interests. Hezbollah, for example, has conducted rocket attacks, but often in response to Israeli attacks inside Lebanon. If you look at the group’s behavior over the last few months, you see a strong sense of caution about escalation; presumably, it correctly assesses that a full-blown war with Israel could level Lebanon. The Houthis, on the other hand, are based in Yemen and farther from the crisis, and they are clearly banking on the fact that they aren’t likely to suffer massive Israeli retaliation for their escalatory actions.
But there’s also a second distinction I’d draw here, and that’s the one about U.S. interests. It’s actually the Houthi attacks on shipping—which are most distinct and most distant from the conflict in Gaza itself—that are the biggest problem for U.S. regional interests. Hezbollah rocket attacks are not a significant concern for the U.S. unless they escalate to broader regional war. Even rocket attacks by proxies against U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria don’t threaten core U.S. interests in the region. But a significant threat to global shipping like the one we’re seeing? That’s a big problem. It kind of feels like the White House is focused on the wrong problem.
MK: I agree that international shipping is the bigger problem. The United States has made “command of the commons” and freedom of navigation on the high seas a vital national security interest for decades for good reason.
I do think the problems are more linked than you suggest, however, when looking at the strategic picture. Iran has trained and equipped (and, in some cases, created!) these groups for a reason. It wants to be able to threaten U.S. and Israeli interests to enhance Tehran’s power projection with plausible deniability. Iran benefits and knows how to operate within and exploit regional instability. It has to be pretty pleased with current developments. Hezbollah is holding back, I suspect, out of its own self-interest, not because Iran is holding it back.
If Iran ordered these groups to stop or scale back the attacks, I suspect they would do so.
EA: You just said it, though: Hezbollah is acting on its own interests, which don’t align perfectly with Tehran’s!
MK: Yes. But I think Tehran is likely encouraging Hezbollah to attack, and Hezbollah is trying to calibrate. It needs to do enough to show Iran that its investment in the group is paying off without doing so much that it invites a devastating Israeli retaliation.
But at least we agree that the threat to global shipping is a major problem. What do you make of the White House’s response?
EA: It’s interesting that this is one area where I think you and I agree more than we disagree. The protection of the sea lanes is a core part of the role that the United States plays in the world. This is a role that’s often played by the global hegemon and was played by the British prior to their decline in the 1950s.
Naval power is very important for global trade; the ability of ships carrying goods, and particularly oil, to move freely in international waters without worrying about pirates or other security threats is key to keeping prices down, goods flowing, and the global economy humming. Just look at what happened during COVID, when shipping flows were disrupted and shop shelves were empty. It’s also the reason that a coalition of states came together over the last few decades to combat Somali pirates when they threatened shipping off the Horn of Africa.
You don’t have to make tenuous arguments about liberal norms and order to see that the one thing the United States does that is indispensable—at least for now—is helping to secure global sea lanes against threats. That keeps trade and energy flowing around the world; without it, the global economy would slow down or even grind to a halt.
But the White House—for all its attention to the Israel-Hamas war—has been curiously hands-off on the maritime security question. There was one skirmish between the U.S. Navy and the Houthis this week, but President Joe Biden seems hesitant to directly engage the Houthis in case it precipitates escalation in the broader war.
I’m more sanguine about that. I think the Houthis are far enough from the action that a few punitive strikes by the United States could do a lot to deter further attacks on shipping and aren’t likely to escalate to full-blown war with Iran. I also don’t think there are any regional states capable of doing this: The Saudis just ended a catastrophic military intervention in Yemen that did very little to damage Houthi capacities, and I certainly wouldn’t want the Israelis trying to do it. So the U.S. it is.
I suspect where we differ is just on the scope of that punitive response.
MK: Amazing. Emma Ashford says, “Time to attack Iran”—or at least its proxies! So, we might agree.
The administration’s response has been almost purely defensive at this point. It is shooting down Houthi drones and missiles and firing back on Houthi ships attempting hijackings but not aggressively striking the Houthis directly. The pattern has been mostly the same in regards to the other proxy attacks against U.S. forces and bases in the region, with the United States launching only a small number of pin-prick attacks in response. But this clearly has not been enough to stop the proxy attacks.
Iranian officials allege that the United States and Israel were behind a deadly bombing at an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps anniversary celebration for deceased Iranian Gen. Qassem Suleimani, but it is implausible that the Biden administration would authorize such an attack. The more likely culprit always seemed to be the Islamic State, which fought Suleimani for years and celebrated his death. Indeed, it has now claimed responsibility.
I think you are right that the Biden administration fears that a strong response against Iran will lead to a broader escalation of the war. But I think it has the logic backward. The lack of a strong response is simply inviting more aggression. If it wants Iran and its proxies to stop, then the United States will need to show them that there will be serious consequences for their aggression.
It is basic deterrence theory.
EA: There you go again, though, lumping everything together. The Houthi rocket attacks likely do require some punishment—retaliatory strikes—to undermine their ability to attack and deter future attacks on shipping. It’s in U.S. interests to do so in a limited, well-defined way.
But responding to rocket attacks on Israel? Taking action against Hezbollah? These are steps that could easily escalate and aren’t defending any particular U.S. interest. Even the relationship with Israel—usually considered in the American interest in general—wouldn’t require us to respond to these strikes. The United States has long been supportive of Israel but has never directly fought to protect it.
Indeed, if anything, I think you can make a very good case that U.S. support for Israel in Gaza is undermining its ability to protect shipping. Spain is refusing to directly participate in the U.S. operation to protect freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Italy seems to be distancing itself from the U.S.-led operation; these European allies are refusing to associate themselves with Washington on this because they disagree with the U.S. stance on Gaza and worry about broader escalation.
The Israeli war has degenerated substantially since we last debated it before Christmas, and global support for Israel is declining. The White House is now discovering that unconditional support for Israel has costs in its relations with its allies.
MK: Well, U.S. support for Israel in Gaza is the right thing to do. Israel just suffered a horrific terrorist attack, and it has every right to defend itself. And eliminating Hamas will be good for U.S. national security and, ultimately, the Palestinian cause. This is a time for the United States to show leadership, not bend to the misguided opinion of others.
EA: Israel suffered a horrific terrorist attack in October, including around 1,200 dead. And since that time, it’s killed more than 22,000 Palestinians, many of them civilians, and forced most of the population to flee to camps in the south. Israeli government officials are now actively discussing “resettling” the residents of Gaza abroad, a plan that could meet the definition of ethnic cleansing under international law. I think we’ve passed the point of self-defense.
But since we’re not in a position to advise the Israeli government on how to fix its poor policy choices, maybe we should come back to U.S. policy?
MK: Well, I would say the death and destruction in Gaza is indeed tragic and 100 percent Hamas’s fault. We wouldn’t be here absent Oct. 7.
But, yes, let me comment briefly on U.S. retaliatory options. I agree strikes against the Houthis make sense. But then what would you recommend Washington do in response to the more than 100 attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria? Iran is behind this broader shadow war, and I think the United States needs to go directly to the source and make sure Iran pays a price.
Hitting Iran for its aggression has worked in the past. Ronald Reagan sunk a number of Iran’s naval vessels in response to its threat to international shipping during the Iran-Iraq War, contributing to the ultimate cease-fire in that conflict. And, four years ago this week, then-President Donald Trump authorized a drone strike against Soleimani, demonstrating that Tehran will pay a steep price for killing Americans.
I think a retaliatory strike against Iran of similar magnitude is what is needed to get Iran to back off.
EA: I agree on one thing, and you are off to the races! Attacks on U.S. forces are unacceptable. But those troops are also in a vulnerable position for no good reason. They can’t really stop the rocket attacks from local militant groups, and the tit-for-tat cycle of retaliation just adds to the risk. The U.S. military responded to the rocket attacks with a drone attack of its own that killed a Shiite militia leader in Baghdad; now there are threats against the U.S. Embassy and personnel there.
To be honest, the most effective way to handle this problem would be to withdraw the troops from Iraq and Syria! Washington would lose almost nothing—some Iraqi policymakers have long pushed to expel U.S. troops—and this denies those proxies a target.
A direct attack on Iran, meanwhile, is perhaps the most likely thing to escalate this war into a regional conflagration. You say “a retaliatory strike against Iran of similar magnitude.” Does that mean another assassination? Or attacks on Iranian military facilities? As former Adm. James Stavridis put it in his article on that question, a direct attack on Iran “would bring serious danger of escalation: a widening of the war in Gaza into a regional conflict and potentially dragging the U.S. back into a high level of combat in the Middle East. It is not a step to be taken lightly.”
Again, one has to look at U.S. interests here, not what Israel or Iran might want. We don’t have an interest in a regional war; it’s about the worst possible outcome for the U.S. public. And there are enough wild cards on the table here—like the terrorist attacks that killed more than 100 mourners in Tehran earlier this week—that we don’t want to add fuel to that fire.
MK: Yes, withdrawing U.S. troops always helps. Just ask all the schoolgirls in Afghanistan.
We agree that avoiding war in the Middle East is important. You are just wrong about what will cause war. Right now, weakness is inviting Iranian aggression. You say this will bring us directly into the war. This is playing into Iran’s flimsy attempt to hide its hand in this. Iran is already attacking U.S. forces across the region.
American strength causes peace, not war. Look what happened when Reagan and Trump hit Iran: Tehran engaged in token retaliation and basically backed down. A strong show of U.S. power now will do the same thing.
EA: The Afghanistan comment is facetious. What are U.S. troops even doing in Iraq or Syria? Does anyone know?
And I hate to break it to you, but both of your examples have some problems. Reagan did major damage to the Iranian surface fleet, yes. And the conflict kept going until the United States accidentally shot down a passenger aircraft and both sides decided that it was time to de-escalate. Trump’s assassination of Soleimani caused a variety of Iranian retaliatory strikes against U.S. troops— injuring some—and is the reason why a variety of former U.S. officials now need protection details to prevent reprisals. It turns out that weakening the norm against assassination of foreign leaders isn’t the smartest idea.
Targeted strikes on the Houthis, combined with some pullbacks elsewhere, isn’t weakness. It’s smart and judicious, and reflects the limited but real interests that the U.S. has in protecting maritime transit through the region.
Let me put this to you another way: I think you care more about projecting U.S. strength than about the most important component of America’s role in the global liberal trade order: protecting the sea lanes. What do you think will happen to sea transit in a full-blown war with Iran?
MK: Projecting U.S. strength and protecting the global trade order go hand in hand and, again, I think U.S. strength is what is most likely to prevent a full-blown war with Iran. But I doubt we are going to agree, and we are over our word count. Pick this up next time?
EA: Yes, I think 2024 will see a lot of debates about U.S. policy and the future of liberal order. Whether it’s the apparent return of Trump as a contender in the 2024 presidential race or the growing dissatisfaction with U.S. policy toward the war in Gaza, it’s going to be a bumpy year for U.S. policy—and particularly for the Biden administration.