On July 24, Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa, the heads of the European Commission and the European Council respectively, will be in Beijing for a summit to mark the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and the European Union. They will most certainly talk about U.S. President Donald Trump and his recent announcement of a 30 percent tariff on EU imports.
This visit comes on the heels of the Munich Security Conference in February, where Washington and China offered starkly contrasting messages to Europe. U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance denounced Europeans’ penchant for, in his view, “shutting down media, shutting down elections, or shutting people out of the political process.” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, for his part, gave a speech praising the virtues of multilateralism, open trade, and the rules-based global order. Without explicitly mentioning Trump or the United States, his message to Europeans was: Look, we are in the same boat and should therefore stick together.
One might think Wang’s line would resonate amid European frustrations with Washington. But the reality is, Trump’s ascent does not mean a lovefest between Europe and China. Von der Leyen and Costa’s mission is to manage conflict, not to pitch a shiny new partnership with Beijing. The very fact that the summit is not taking place in Brussels and that big guns such as French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz will be absent speaks volumes about the myriad problems bedeviling Sino-European ties. From trade and technology to Russia’s war in Ukraine, the list is becoming even longer.
Both European and Chinese leaders want a functional relationship, as their meeting in Beijing shows. But such efforts should not be taken as evidence that Europe is turning to China out of frustration with the United States.
First, economic relations between the EU and China have become contentious. European businesses used to see China as a promised land as they set up shop there. In the 2000s, following its entry into the World Trade Organization, China accounted for up to 40 percent of Volkswagen’s global sales and a similar percentage of BMW’s. But these days the tables have turned. After losing market share in China, now German carmakers face competition on their home turf. Chinese brands such as BYD are establishing a foothold as Europe is poised to shift from internal combustion to electric vehicles in the 2030s as part of its effort to decarbonize. Unfair practices such as state subsidies give those companies an edge against European rivals.
The EU is watching with unease. In a recent speech before the European Parliament, von der Leyen noted that China had “unique instruments at its disposal to play outside the rules,” allowing it “to flood global markets with subsidized overcapacity—not just to boost its own industries but to choke international competition.” Back in 2020, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the European Commission chief called China a “competitor and a rival” and has been a prominent advocate of “de-risking” from dependency on the Chinese economy.
Now, for all the diplomatic niceties, the Europe-China rivalry is heating up, with China making worrying inroads on European markets. Last year, the EU slapped hefty tariffs on Chinese EVs, alleging unfair competition. BYD is still building a manufacturing base in Hungary as well as Turkey—which has unfettered access to the EU thanks to the customs union in place. Worse, from Europe’s perspective, China controls the raw materials essential for green technology, from batteries to solar panels. European EV builders may still be dependent on Chinese-made batteries, for example, and Beijing knows how to leverage that. China recently imposed restrictions on rare earths’ export to the EU as a tit-for-tat of excluding Chinese medical equipment from public procurement.
From Europe’s economic perspective, tensions between China and the United States might actually make things worse. The fear on the continent is that the goods diverted from the U.S. market will be dumped on European consumers. Europe’s trade deficit with China surpassed 300 billion euros in 2024. Trump’s tariffs coupled with China’s overcapacity will be a major headache for Eurocrats and businesses alike. As a result, the EU is vowing to launch further probes into Chinese malfeasance, similar to the EV investigation.
China is insisting that the 2020 Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) with the EU is still very much on the agenda. But the European Parliament still refuses to ratify the deal over concerns about human rights. China skepticism has now taken hold in key EU capitals, too, and the summit will not make it disappear.
Tensions are rising in the security realm as well. Early in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Europeans had a reason to see Chinese President Xi Jinping as a moderating influence on his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. For instance, the Chinese leadership was credited with issuing a behind-the-scenes warning to the Kremlin against the use of tactical nuclear weapons in early 2023.
But even these modest grounds for optimism are waning as China comes closer to open support for Putin’s war. At a meeting with EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas this month, Wang reportedly said China could not afford to have Russia lose in Ukraine. Xi’s attendance of this year’s Victory Parade at Moscow’s Red Square—alongside EU leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, one should add—is telling, too. Reports that China is delivering lethal aid to Russia have further inflamed Europeans’ anxiety. Chinese electronic components also feed into Russian military capabilities, such as missiles and drones, which could threaten NATO—even if such components are also used by Ukraine’s hugely successful unmanned platforms.
Despite these tensions, Europe is not seeking to decouple from China. China and Europe are aware that they need each other and want to ensure that competition takes place within certain bounds.
There are signs that both sides are finding their way toward such a modus vivendi. In April, Beijing announced it would lift restrictions on several EU lawmakers, in hopes of resuscitating the CAI. In contrast with the 2024 NATO summit, there was no hawkish language on China in the communiqué from The Hague last month—largely because Trump wanted to keep it short.
Dialogue is also continuing at multiple levels. On July 14, Teresa Ribera, the European Commission’s green transition chief, accompanied by three of her fellow commissioners, headlined the Sixth EU-China High-Level Environment and Climate Dialogue in Beijing. The U.S. exit from the Paris climate accord underscores the importance for Europe and China, the two key stakeholders, to team up on cutting emissions. And there are still EU member states, such as Spain and Hungary, that view Beijing as a welcome partner and not a menace.
Finally, opportunities in cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence will continue to give both sides reasons to work together. The launch of DeepSeek has revived investor optimism about China’s economy, which has been underperforming post-COVID. The European tech sector also welcomed the launch. The AI model’s open-source code has allowed other companies to tailor the technology to their needs while improving it and developing new products. This makes it a public good of sorts and highlights China’s centrality in the global economy. With Europe lagging behind the United States on AI, DeepSeek may narrow the gap at least a bit.
Europe will continue to secure benefits like this from its relationship with China. But Europeans no longer believe, as they did through the 2010s, that relations with Beijing are win-win. Moreover, Europe appreciates that trans-Atlantic ties have thus far proved resilient, as illustrated by Trump’s U-turn on NATO and tougher line on Putin. If forced to pick a side in the U.S.-China competition, European decision-makers will—unenthusiastically—side with Washington.
In the meantime, they recognize that strategic autonomy also involves reducing excessive reliance on Chinese resources, trade, investment, and technology. The tepid tone at the anniversary party in Beijing will be a testament to that.