


The communique from the 2024 NATO summit in Washington condemned Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and clearly stated that “Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” The allies also agreed to prepare a new Russia strategy for their next summit in 2025, to take account of the new security threats. After Donald Trump’s election, however, work on this new strategy was abandoned, because top NATO officials understood that it would now be impossible to reach consensus between Washington and Europe on how to deal with Russia.
Trump is determined to reset relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin and achieve what none of his predecessors since 1991 have been able to do—create a productive relationship with the Kremlin. Unlike previous U.S. presidents, whether Republican or Democratic, Trump’s understanding of the drivers of world politics is similar to Putin’s: The world is divided into spheres of influence, each dominated by a great power with absolute sovereignty, while smaller powers only enjoy limited sovereignty. The negotiations on ending Russia’s war with Ukraine have faltered because Putin has no intention of ending the war any time soon. But the White House continues to seek better ties with the Kremlin regardless of whether or not Russian aggression continues.
During the upcoming truncated NATO summit, the main goal is to avoid any major trans-Atlantic blow-ups. There will only be one leaders’ meeting instead of the usual several. Russia and Ukraine will apparently hardly be a subject of discussion, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will not attend the main summit meeting.
Were Trump’s reset with Putin to succeed and the U.S isolation of Russia to end while the war continues, NATO would be seriously challenged. With the exception of a handful of NATO members such as Hungary and Slovakia, who argue for ending support for Ukraine and reengaging Russia, European NATO members remain united in their condemnation of Russia’s war and support for assisting Ukraine. They view Russia as a major threat to European security because of Putin’s determination to revise the post-Cold War settlement and reestablish Moscow’s dominance over both the former Soviet states and the former members of the Warsaw Pact. If the Trump administration were to end its military, economic, and intelligence support for Ukraine and fully reengage Russia, it would be the first time since NATO’s founding that European and U.S. threat perceptions about Russia have diverged so dramatically.
Going forward, then, the main challenge for NATO’s European members (and Canada and Turkey) will be devising an effective strategy for deterring future Russian aggression even if the most powerful member of the alliance disagrees that Russia has to be contained. NATO’s non-U.S. members have, in the past few months, demonstrated their determination both to spend more on defense and to take over more responsibility for defending Ukraine. Nevertheless, maintaining these commitments in the face of U.S. reluctance to punish Russia will remain an uphill struggle for at least the next three years.