Drug trafficking is terrorism, according to a new Trump administration finding, and designated cartels now face the prospect of military response. The first test of the new policy has just occurred: the destruction by the U.S. military of a “go fast” boat off the coast of Venezuela claimed by the administration to be running drugs. It will not be the last.
Over the past two weeks, the Trump administration has overseen the largest U.S. naval deployment to the Western Hemisphere since Operation Just Cause, the December 1989 invasion of Panama. The vessels positioned in the southern Caribbean, according to officials, are there to counter narcotics trafficking from Venezuela’s Maduro regime. Military analysts were quick to point out that the deployment, and specifically the assets involved, are ill-suited to interdicting drug shipments. Normally, these activities would be the purview of the U.S. Coast Guard, but given the deployment’s size and enhanced firepower, speculation is rife that the administration has other objectives in mind—up to and including regime change.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Western Hemisphere has become accustomed to a light U.S. military footprint. U.S. Southern Command, or Southcom, the Miami area-based headquarters of the combatant command that tends to this area of responsibility, is notoriously the most underfunded and overlooked of the combatant commands in the Department of Defense. The current deployment is the most significant Southcom has seen in a generation.
Last month, the Trump administration deployed three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The administration next sent a guided-missile cruiser, the USS Lake Erie, and a fast-attack nuclear-powered submarine, the USS Newport News, toward Venezuela. The administration also announced the stationing of three amphibious ships—the USS San Antonio, USS Fort Lauderdale, and USS Iwo Jima—reportedly carrying a Marine expeditionary unit of about 2,200. The deployment of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group vessels and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit gives the United States the capability to attack targets on land, while Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and fast-attack submarines carry Tomahawk cruise missiles.
Neither the Department of Defense nor the White House has provided much detail on the purpose, duration, or strategic objectives of this formidable deployment. The publicly stated rationale is that this is a counternarcotics mission in the southern Caribbean. The president is “prepared to use every element of American power to stop drugs from flooding into our country and to bring those responsible to justice,” said White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt, stressing that she would not get out in front of the president on the announcement of any military action. Leavitt also emphasized the long-held, bipartisan U.S. position that Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is an illegitimate president, referencing the criminal nature of his regime, a position reinforced by presidential elections in July 2024 that Maduro nakedly stole from opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia.
Venezuela has announced it would send vessels to a key oil-exporting hub near Colombia, and earlier, Maduro ordered the deployment of 15,000 troops to the Colombian border. The regime has also urged citizens to join its civilian militia, but recent images of sign-up stations have demonstrated paltry interest in meeting Maduro’s call. In an unsuccessful appeal for regional solidarity, Maduro has attempted to frame the deployment as a prelude to a regime-change operation that many Venezuelans, ironically, would support.
Despite all of this, it is unlikely the Trump administration is preparing to invade Venezuela. The president has shown a clear aversion to regime-change operations in the past and their nexus to “forever wars.” Recent U.S. actions against Iran and also the Houthis suggest a pattern of quick-strike actions without the introduction of ground forces or longer engagements. And Venezuela is no Panama. During Operation Just Cause, the United States invaded with nearly 30,000 troops, many already stationed in Panama, a nation less than one-tenth the size of Venezuela. The imperative of securing one of the world’s most important waterways prior to its handover to Panama, and the desire to punish the Noriega regime for killing a U.S. service member and harassing others, provided ballast for then-President George H.W. Bush’s decision.
No such conditions exist currently with Venezuela, although the administration argues that the “drug trafficking is terrorism” determination provide a casus belli. However, the current naval deployment gives President Donald Trump optionality well short of a regime-change operation. Perhaps just as importantly, the deployment provides other ways to claim victory for the United States in the fight against drug cartels and to demonstrate reprioritization of the Western Hemisphere in U.S. foreign policy.
Rather than heralding regime change, then, the naval deployment provides Trump an escalation ladder with variegated options. Furthermore, the deployment sends multiple messages in directions beyond Venezuela. Colombia believes the United States will soon initiate the process of “decertification” as a partner on counternarcotics, bringing a much firmer approach to the country. Panama received a clear message when one of the vessels, the USS Lake Erie, transited the Panama Canal to reach its final position. Mexico sees a tougher U.S. resolve just as Secretary of State Marco Rubio arrives in the country to discuss security.
As a show of force, the deployment demonstrates the Trump administration’s intention to shift the paradigm on dealing with security challenges in the Western Hemisphere. Starting in February, the Trump administration has designated nine cartels and transnational criminal organizations as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), including two based in Venezuela—first, the Tren de Aragua, and more recently, the Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns), which, according to the administration, is led by Maduro. Further, in early August, the New York Times reported that Trump had given a directive to the Pentagon to begin strategic planning for the use of military force against FTOs. The Trump administration raised the award offered for help in Maduro’s arrest or capture to $50 million.
There is evidence the Maduro regime is involved in illicit drug flows, with U.S. intelligence estimates indicating that up to 500 tons of cocaine per year may transit through Venezuela. The current deployment wasted no time demonstrating new rules of engagement—distinct from the U.S. Coast Guard, which attempts to induce vessels to surrender—when it fired on and destroyed a vessel suspected of carrying drugs.
Second, there are freedom-of-navigation concerns at play. Over several years, the Maduro regime has engaged in a campaign of harassment against Guyana over the disputed Essequibo region. As part of that campaign, the Maduro regime engaged in limited naval operations to disrupt the burgeoning oil sector in the neighboring country. Following the completion of Chevron’s purchase of Hess earlier this year, there are now two U.S. oil majors operating in Guyana, an increasingly close U.S. partner since the first Trump administration. Guyana is an important source of low-cost, plentiful crude. Coincidentally, Guyana also held presidential and parliamentary elections on Sept. 1, in which incumbent President Irfaan Ali has claimed victory. The current deployment likely has the added benefit of blunting Maduro’s appetite for continuing his harassment—at least in the maritime domain.
Third, the deployment incentivizes Maduro’s armed forces to once again reconsider their loyalties. To be sure, mass defection did not occur during the interim government of Juan Guaidó, nor after the trouncing Maduro took in the historic July 2024 elections. However, given the regime’s consolidation following more than a year of post-election repression, the Trump administration may be betting that it is worth trying to provoke schisms within the armed forces once again. The $50 million reward for Maduro may augur well for defections and could entice a renegade faction to attempt to hand him over to justice.
Fourth, the deployment provides Trump with options short of outright invasion. Trump may elect to use Tomahawks or drones to hit targets within Venezuela, including drug trafficking operations or even a decapitation strike. Riskier still, but also within the realm of the possible, would be a snatch-and-grab operation. The amphibious force loitering near Venezuela opens the possibility of receiving assistance in Maduro’s capture by a rebel faction of the Bolivarian Armed Forces, essentially abducting the Venezuelan dictator and ferrying him to U.S. forces nearby. Yet another option could be an effort to install President-elect González in a secure part of the country, as Panamanian President-elect Guillermo Endara was in 1989, but that would almost certainly require direct U.S. military engagement and substantial and sustained in-country operations.
Trump’s unpredictability has the Maduro regime on high alert and taking the deployment as a threat to regime survival. No matter what the final objective, the deployment provides Trump a number of options. Further, Trump will have the opportunity to claim multiple victories.
Once the deployment ends, the administration is likely to credibly claim that it disrupted Caribbean trafficking routes and patterns and locked down the region’s illicit activities. The deployment has also seen increased support from several countries in the Caribbean (Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago) against the Maduro regime. Some governments, such as Ecuador, Argentina, Paraguay, Peru, and most recently the Dominican Republic, have even announced FTO designations against the Cartel de los Soles.
On the most basic level, the administration can claim that it was worth rattling the Maduro regime, attempting to provoke schisms within its ranks, and providing succor to a beleaguered opposition. The deployment also provides support to a critical U.S. partner, Guyana, during one of the most important elections in the country’s history. Lastly, the show of force demonstrates the Trump administration’s more muscular approach to regional relations. With Rubio now traveling to Mexico and Ecuador to discuss security, this messaging will be hard to miss. But the overriding question remains, will there be any costs?