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The race for the White House seems transformed by the immense public energy and excitement around U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris as the new presumptive nominee of the Democratic Party. With Joe Biden now officially a lame-duck president, change is in the air. One thing that hasn’t changed, however, is that Donald Trump still has reasonable odds to win.
What might a second Trump White House foreign policy look like? It can be difficult to find a signal in the noise of the former president’s scattergun pronouncements. Elbridge Colby, a former Pentagon policymaker who is often touted as someone who could have a significant role in a Republican White House—perhaps even as national security advisor—has long been arguing for the United States to focus more on Asia than Europe. While he doesn’t speak for the Trump campaign, Colby’s views have gained currency among mainstream GOP politicians, including Ohio Sen. J.D. Vance, the party’s vice presidential nominee.
I spoke with Colby on FP Live and quizzed him about trade-offs in foreign policy, and how he envisions a conservative framework for Washington’s engagement with the world. Colby served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development under the Trump administration, during which time he led the development of the Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy. Subscribers can watch the full conversation on the video box atop this page. What follows is an edited and condensed transcript.
Ravi Agrawal: You have popularized the argument that there is a trade-off between aiding Ukraine and deterring China. And you’ve said quite clearly that Asia is more important than Europe when it comes to U.S. national security. Why?
Elbridge Colby: I approach this from the standpoint of a colloquial realism, a pragmatic realism, focused on Americans’ practical interests. Traditional American foreign policy was basically designed to prevent potentially hostile states from dominating the most important market area, the basis for a great power to use that strength to undermine our way of life. And if you look at it that way, there’s really no question that Asia is the most important area. I think it’s about half of the global population, and it’s where growth is concentrated.
RA: Yes, but if the White House makes clear to European leaders that it is less important, doesn’t that hurt America’s most important alliances? Don’t alliances matter?
EC: Alliances absolutely do matter. My view is alliances are so important that we actually expect people to do their part.
Stepping back, the implicit understanding, if I may be forgiven, behind what you’re saying is that alliances are feel-good operations. Biden describes them as kind of sacred. I don’t think that’s how we should look at alliances. I think we should look at them as, frankly, in a business-like way, that they’re supposed to serve both sides’ interests. Obviously, they have those very deep connections. But at the end of the day, these alliances are meant to do something for us and for others.
If people are not doing that, which has been the case, for instance, in Germany, Japan, and Taiwan, then there really needs to be consequences for that. Otherwise, we’re actually not taking alliances seriously. I do take alliances seriously. And so if Trump-proofing NATO leads European countries and Canada to actually spend more and meet their defense commitments there, that’s actually the thing they should be doing anyway. So that’s good for them.
RA: But if the White House says Asia is more important, Moscow might get the signal that it can be more aggressive in policies toward Europe. The critique of what you’re saying is that words and signals matter in diplomacy.
EC: Sure, but actions matter more. And at the end of the day, we need to reconcile actions with reality and the words implicit behind what you’re saying. For many years, very high American officials of both political parties were politely ignored when they plaintively and nicely made arguments to the Europeans and others. In my view, if we’re not communicating a costly signal that this is very serious and there are real dangers, that’s actually not being good allies.
I actually don’t think Biden, who released the pressure on European allies in a lot of ways, has done them any favors. Let’s look at the record. I mean, the largest war in Europe happened under President Biden’s watch. So you want to talk about words and actions? The beginning of the uptick in spending happened under President Trump’s presidency.
Yes, you’re right that there are risks to being frank. But I think what’s been clear to me is there’s no costless or riskless course of action. And the people who say we need to be polite and so forth are smothering the reality and not doing our friends and allies any favors. I believe that it’s much better, especially in democracies like our own and that of most of our allies, to be clear and generate the political urgency and will for action. And that’s generally how things have moved in the last few years. We would have been better off, though, if we’d adapted earlier.
RA: But two things can be true at the same time. So, America can ask Europe to do a lot more, and it seems like it is. But second, America can continue to support Europe. Because with the policy you’re describing and suggesting, what if Ukraine falls?
EC: My own view is that we should remain in NATO and the European pillar should take lead responsibility. So far our conversation has been focusing on Europe, which is a symptom of the problem that we face in the foreign-policy debate. Europe is a fraction of Asia, and Russia is a 10th the size of China [in population]. Why are we spending all this time dealing with Europe? Of course, I don’t want to abandon Europe, but I’m dealing with the reality that we’re facing. There simply are constraints. China is the largest state we have dealt with. It’s the first time that we are not by far the largest state in the international system for about 150 years. So that, just by necessity, imposes constraint.
My strategy is the one that will save NATO. The people who are saying hosannas to NATO and refuse to depart from the shibboleths are the people who are going to put NATO right into the iceberg and sink it, because it’s going to stretch it too far. And that’s sort of the approach that I take. And I think, actually, we’re seeing it happen.
RA: There’s an argument that Beijing is taking lessons from global support for Ukraine. If the U.S. pulls back in its support for Ukraine, [Chinese leader] Xi [Jinping] may read that as a signal that America could also step back from its support for Taiwan in a hypothetical Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Are you concerned about the signal that less support for Europe sends to Xi Jinping?
EC: I think it’s a factor, but I would say it’s like a tertiary factor. I think a lot of the discussion has a kind of liberal internationalist frame. Frankly, it’s almost like a pedagogical sort of idea about how international relations works. That Xi Jinping is going to learn a lesson, as if he’s sitting in class and waiting to be instructed about the behavior of the United States.
I think much more significant for Xi Jinping rationally, and I don’t know what’s in his mind, is the military balance in Asia and our perceived resolve in a potential contest with China in Asia. And that, of course, is interrelated because the more resources we have available, the less costly it will be. And so the demands on our resolve will be lower.
If the Chinese actually believed that the future of Taiwan and the Western Pacific was going to be resolved in Ukraine, they would intervene directly. Because nobody cares more about Taiwan than they do. And at a minimum, they would provide large-scale lethal support to the Russians, which they’re not doing. Instead, what they’re doing is they’re bleeding us out and they’re letting the war go on. They’re not even giving the Russians enough for a decisive victory. And at the same time, they’re building up their forces relative to the first island chain. So unfortunately, they’re acting as I would advise, which is much more practical and much more dangerous.
RA: You’ve long said that the United States doesn’t have a military that can fight two wars. And a new bipartisan review of U.S. defense strategy ordered by Congress says that the Pentagon should go back to resourcing and planning to fight wars in multiple parts of the world. Do you think the report is wrong?
EC: Well, here’s the most important part of that study. Their analysis of the American military may even be harsher than my own. They say we’re not prepared to fight even China. Their current assessment is that readiness is at historic lows, that the United States is not equipped to fight China, let alone multiple major wars, and that our defense industrial base is in terrible shape. So that’s their empirical assessment today. Their prescription is for the United States to dramatically increase defense spending to resource a multi-theater military.
Now my basic response to this commission report is I do not believe it’s a viable basis for a defense strategy going forward. Why? If our military is in such bad shape, how can we be in a position where we can be expansive or aggressive in three theaters? A number of these commissioners are people who’ve called for a military action against Iran, for no-fly zones in Ukraine—which, of course, would very realistically risk war with Russia—and for aggressive policies toward China and North Korea. How is that possible? To me, the basic criterion of a strategy is coherence, right? That you have to match the resources that are available with the strategy you’re proposing. And I think that this commission report, as far as I can tell, does not do that. So anybody who comes into office in January of next year (and I hope it’s President Trump) can’t run their playbook. The very fact that they are calling for such a radical change indicates that, if anything, they should be calling for even more laser focus than I am.
So one of my great frustrations in the defense and geopolitical debate is that the same people who’ve been saying for 20 years that we’ve been underspending on defense are now saying “we can’t afford not to be a global power.” Well, how does that even make sense? It’s incoherent! If it were true what they were saying, then, if anything, they should be far more dovish than I am. Looking forward, I see no discussion in the national political debate of dramatic increases in defense spending.
I believe that we will need to spend more, but I think we’re going to have to be pretty realistic, and we’re going to have to focus just to keep up with the Chinese.
RA: In The Strategy of Denial, one of your points is that Washington needs to deny China the opportunity to attack Taiwan. Is it your contention that this White House isn’t doing a good enough job on that front?
EC: I don’t think that’s really up for question. I think there’s phenomenal things happening. There’s progress. But somebody said to me, “Bridge, you got to give more credit. We’re putting points on the board.” And I said, “Well, they’re putting a lot more points on the board.” So, to quote Top Gun, “There’s no points for second place.” And that’s the problem.
There’s all kinds of triple-bank-shot logic arguments about how the capabilities needed in Ukraine are different than the ones in the first island chain. That’s not really true. We know air defense is very relevant. We have to assume that the PLA [Chinese People’s Liberation Army] would get ashore. So a lot of capabilities would be very similar. Moreover, the defense industrial base is stretched. Subcomponents are in demand. And, of course, money. Two-hundred billion is a lot of money that could have gone to first island chain defense.
And, of course, the Taiwanese themselves are woefully inadequate to the threat they’re facing. I mean, China has 1.4 billion people. The Journal was reporting last week that they may be ahead of us in supercomputing. Huawei has survived and is actually now doing pretty well, according to the Journal. And the Taiwanese are spending 2.4 percent of GDP on defense. That’s wildly inadequate.
RA: Is there a danger to thinking that war with China is preordained? And doesn’t that risk becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy?
EC: Absolutely. I’ve tried to be super scrupulous that we don’t know what’s going to happen, and that war is not inevitable. However, we do know that the Chinese are preparing for a war, not only militarily in terms of conventional forces and exercises, but also nuclear forces. They are also economically preparing for large-scale sanctions, stockpiling, the “Delete A” campaign, and politically conditioning the population. So I think the only prudent assessment is to assume that they could go to war, and that our best chance to avoid a war is deterrence.
I think the worst policy is to not recognize the constrained situation we’re in, hand tons of money and weapons to Europe and the Middle East and then support an independent Taiwan or call Xi Jinping “Hitler” or call the government of China “evil.” People who are representing the United States, in my view, should adopt a much more prudent approach. My view is we should seek a balance of power. And we should deal with the Chinese government as it is.
RA: Where does human rights fit into this? Where does soft power fit into this? I recently conducted an interview with Singapore’s defense minister at the Aspen Security Forum. He asked me and the audience whether we thought that the United States can sustain its presence in Asia solely predicated on military power. In other words, does soft power not matter? What about the interests of all these other countries in Asia that are quite uncomfortable with America’s China policy?
EC: I think implicit in what you’re saying is a moral critique, which I reject, and here’s why. And I wrote an article in First Things about two years ago called “The Morality of a Strategy of Denial.” It’s a sort of Morgenthau-style argument; I’m not a pure consequentialist, but I think foreign policy should be judged on the reasonable anticipation of results. So the best thing for democracy, frankly, and certainly the best thing for the American people, for others, is peace and a situation in which there’s a decent peace and the ability to trade in some ways without a large war.
I think the opposite point of view that you’re pointing to, expressed by [U.S. Secretary of State] Tony Blinken or [USAID Administrator] Samantha Power, would be a foreign policy of intentionality. Are we expressing ourselves? I actually think the results are worse, and they can be anticipated to be so. And that’s really what should be measured in a model of stewardship or of trusteeship, which is what our foreign policy should be. I actually think moralism is inferior to the morality of a realistic foreign policy. Not an aggressive, conquering foreign policy, but a realistic one. You skipped over an important part that I surmise the Singaporean defense minister was pointing to, which was economics, not really soft power. I would say the bulk of American engagement in Asia should be economic and then very focused and capable military power.
RA: Since we’re talking about realism, FP columnist Stephen Walt, who teaches at Harvard University and is known as one of the world’s leading realist scholars, recently wrote an essay for us, in which he points out that the realists who have embraced the Trump-Vance ticket are basically being shortsighted. His point is that the Trump-Vance worldview overestimates the United States’s ability to do whatever it wants on the world stage, but it also underestimates how rising middle powers—countries like India, Brazil, and Turkey—are less inclined to care about a unilateral American foreign policy. I know you don’t speak for Trump or Vance, but how would you respond to that?
EC: I don’t think President Trump or Sen. Vance are at all talking about a unipolar or unilateral approach. President Trump’s approach is essentially saying, “We’re not going to be able to do everything; we expect others to step up.”
Realists have come to dominate the academy, but they’ve had almost no traction in foreign policy and here in the imperial capital. And that’s a big problem because politics is reality and it’s OK to, in fact, you need to be, political. It doesn’t mean you subordinate your principles. But you have to politically engage. And we’re in an exceptionally dangerous period. And the idea of realists of all people sitting in the ivory tower and casting thunderbolts is absurd, right? Realists should understand that it’s important to get in there and deal with the world as it is.
I mean, I am very happy to support President Trump and Sen. Vance. But even if you don’t, realists for years and years have been talking about the need to get NATO to recalibrate and to do more and to reduce our forces in the Middle East. President Trump was the first major candidate, certainly on the Republican side, who was really calling for that.
RA: Why is it so hard to define a Trump doctrine? Robert O’Brien was Trump’s fourth national security advisor and may well take up a role again if he wins. He wrote recently that Trump “adheres not to dogma but to his own instincts.” You can see that as nimble, but it’s also unpredictable and unreliable. It’s transactional. And if you are purely transactional, then you’re basically stepping away from the international system that, all things considered, has served the world order pretty well for eight decades.
EC: I would say we don’t want to be completely transactional, but we want more transaction to reinstate some balance. Biden talking about alliances as sacred is an absurdity. Nothing is sacred in American politics. So we need to be a bit more transactional, like people need to do their part. And it’s sort of grubby, but actually, if you take alliances seriously, they need to do that.
A thought about the doctrine. Most of these doctrines are artificial. But there’s a general theme that I can ascertain in President Trump’s approach. I thought it was not a coincidence, and it was compelling, that the central term in the Republican platform was common sense. There’s a practicality: Is this in our interests? Does this make sense?