For years, politicians, diplomats, analysts, and journalists working on the Middle East worried that a war between Iran and Israel could quickly spill over into the Arab world. If Israel attacked Iran’s nuclear program, many assumed, Iran would retaliate against U.S. interests in neighboring Arab states. Fears centered on Iraq and Syria rather than the Gulf. Given that Iran had stabilized relations with the Gulf over the past few years, the thinking went, it would avoid actions that could upset its new ties.
On June 23, these theories were put to the test. After the United States launched missile attacks on Iranian nuclear sites, Tehran retaliated by striking U.S. bases in Qatar. It was an unprecedented act. Iranian proxies had targeted the Gulf previously, most prominently with the Houthi attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities in 2019 and on infrastructure in Abu Dhabi in 2022. In these cases, Tehran was able to maintain plausible deniability. But the Qatar attack was different. Iran launched missiles directly at Qatar, striking the regional headquarters of U.S. Central Command and the Al Udeid Air Base. Tehran may have informed Doha of its plans ahead of time and developments were largely controlled. But the fact remains that strikes on the tranquil Qatari state crossed a line.
It is somewhat ironic that Iran chose to strike Qatar. During his visit to the Gulf last May, U.S. President Donald Trump heard from leaders in Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi that peace was needed for prosperity in the region. But Trump specifically praised Qatar for its accommodating attitude toward Tehran. “Iran should seriously thank the emir of Qatar, because there are others who want to deal a hard blow to Iran, unlike Qatar,” Trump said. “Iran is very lucky to have the emir because he’s actually fighting for them. He doesn’t want us to do a vicious blow to Iran.”
Indeed, the aftermath of Iran’s attack demonstrates just how accommodating Qatar can be. The same day as the strikes, Majed al-Ansari, advisor to the Qatar’s prime minister and spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that Qatar “reserves the right to respond directly in a manner equivalent with the nature and scale of this brazen aggression, in line with international law.” Despite that statement, however, Qatar appeared eager to move past the incident. Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani received a call the following day from Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, who “expressed regret” over the strikes, according to a statement released by Qatar’s news agency. Similar calls were made to other Gulf leaders.
The level of coordination between Gulf states was evident in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian strikes, as demonstrated by the statements that were issued in quick succession. They condemned the attack, expressed solidarity with Doha, and endorsed its right to respond should it choose to do so. However, none of the statements were escalatory in tone or nature.
This result should be considered a significant diplomatic success, reflecting regional commitment to avoiding a drawn-out military confrontation. Iran’s strikes did not cause tangible damage to Qatar because of both advanced coordination and strong air defenses, and the Iranians were quick to call Gulf leaders to express regret. As a result, bilateral relations endured.
With missiles flying, the leaders of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates chose to prioritize reconciliation and calm. Put differently, this means that the carefully cultivated ties between Iran and the Gulf bore fruit.
Tehran should not take this for granted. Just because war has been avoided, Gulf states will not forget what happened. Iranian diplomats and officials need to work on rebuilding bilateral confidence in the coming months and years.
Five days after the strikes, Anwar Gargash, a diplomatic advisor to the UAE president, publicly said what Gulf officials had been saying closed doors: “As we turn the page on war, Iran must rebuild confidence with its Gulf neighbors, after it was damaged by this attack.”
Without a concerted effort to show good faith, Tehran risks the support that Gulf states have shown it so far. As Iran continues its negotiations with the United States, European Union, and United Nations, it needs its neighbors to continue advocating for peace with their Western allies. Iranian officials have an open channel to the Gulf. If that channel is closed, then they will not only struggle to improve regional ties, but they will also lose an important channel with the United States and Trump himself. For Tehran to risk that during a time of heightened suspicions would be particularly reckless.
Tehran, for its part, appears to recognize the need to rebuild trust. Iranian officials have reached out to Gulf counterparts, with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visiting Saudi Arabia and meeting Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Furthermore, proxies have largely toned down their rhetoric and threats against the Gulf.
While the most recent round of conflict has thankfully passed without major civilian casualties in the Gulf, the specter of war has not gone away. With part of Iran’s nuclear program still intact and diplomatic talks with the E3 moving at an incredibly slow speed, the possibility of renewed Israeli or U.S. strikes is very real. Therefore, the onus is on Iran to prove that it is serious about negotiating. If negotiations fail, then it will then fall on Iran to prove that it does not intend to widen the fallout from any ensuing war.
The lesson of the June 23 strikes is that, ultimately, leaders can choose whether or not to escalate. Thankfully, Qatar and its Gulf allies chose de-escalation. Now, the region is watching to see whether Iran can build upon this fragile momentum.