This article was published in collaboration with ChinaFile, a project run by the Asia Society.
While many people assume Chinese politics has been a one-man show since Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Communist Party in November 2012, the truth is more complicated. Recent signals suggest a subtle shift in power dynamics. Although Xi has clearly consolidated his authority as China’s paramount leader, he now appears to be delegating key aspects of governance—particularly in economic policymaking—to his deputy, Premier Li Qiang.
This marks a counterintuitive turn. Xi initially tightened his grip by sidelining Li Qiang’s predecessor, Li Keqiang, who had once been a rival for the top job. Serving as premier from 2013 to 2023, Li Keqiang saw his authority steadily eroded as Xi absorbed economic policymaking into party organs and weakened the State Council—the government cabinet led by the premier. The party has always directed government organs, but the latter used to have more autonomy in technocratic policy domains.
Now in his 70s and serving a precedent-breaking third five-year term, Xi seems to be transitioning from hands-on control to a more oracular leadership style: preserving ultimate decision-making authority while entrusting more day-to-day policymaking to the loyalists who now dominate the party’s elite 24-member Politburo. Prominent among them is Li Qiang, a key beneficiary of this shift, who served as Xi’s chief of staff in Zhejiang from 2004 to 2007 after rising through the province’s local ranks.
Open-source data indicates that Li’s political stature is growing. Since becoming premier in March 2023, according to my analysis of state media reports and official regulations, he has chaired more meetings, gained more powers, and enjoyed a higher public profile than his recent predecessors. His quiet rise has coincided with a more pro-growth economic agenda and could position him as an important player in future U.S.-China negotiations and in China’s next leadership team.
Perhaps the most influential policy mechanism in the Xi era has been the Central Commission for Comprehensively Deepening Reform (CCCDR), established as an informal coordination group between party leaders and line agencies in 2013 before being upgraded to a permanent institution in 2018. Chaired by Xi, the CCCDR became a key vehicle for advancing his domestic agenda, including reforms in markets, trade, innovation, energy, and social welfare. He used the CCCDR to marginalize the State Council and centralize economic policymaking within the party.
But the CCCDR has not met since August 2024. According to open-source party records, Xi has convened the commission only six times since beginning his third term in October 2022, compared to 38 times during his first term and 27 times in his second. Similarly, the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission, his main coordination body for macroeconomic and fiscal policy, has met just four times this term, down from the cadence of his last term, during which 11 meetings were held. Its most recent meeting was in February 2024.
Meanwhile, Li’s profile is growing. As premier, he has chaired eight State Council plenary meetings in just two years, matching the number held during any five-year term by both of his two most recent predecessors, Wen Jiabao (2003-2013) and Li Keqiang. These meetings previously focused on annual work reports and formalities like selecting Hong Kong and Macao chief executives but have become more substantive under Li. For the last two years, they have set the national agenda after the party’s summer retreat in Beidaihe and issued instructions following the March parliamentary session.
Li has also gained powers through underappreciated institutional reforms. In March 2023, the State Council adopted new “work regulations” that revived the “Premier’s Work Meeting” (总理办公会议, zongli bangong huiyi). These meetings are not subject to disclosure requirements, and their occurrence and content remain opaque. Beijing abolished the Premier’s Work Meeting in 2003, reportedly because outgoing Premier Zhu Rongji used it to approve major projects, launch initiatives, and create leading groups without broader State Council consultations. At the time, policy advisors criticized the meetings as allowing the premier to make “arbitrary” decisions “outside of laws and regulations.” Restoring the meeting may on one level reflect Xi’s concern that cadres with “inadequate understanding” and “insufficient ability” are slowing policy implementation and his resultant need to empower a key deputy to execute the details of his political vision. If these meetings work as they did during Zhu’s premiership, they allow Li to summon any state official, on any issue, at any time—a powerful institutional tool for getting things done.
The new regulations also reduced the frequency of State Council executive meetings—a decision-making body of about 10 top government leaders—from weekly to roughly fortnightly, further elevating Li’s central role relative to his peers. They also permit him to hold bimonthly “special study sessions” (专题学习, zhuanti xuexi), similar to the Politburo’s monthly “collective study sessions” (集体学习, jiti xuexi). Much as they function for Xi in the Communist Party, these sessions enable Li to spotlight his policy priorities and consolidate his authority within the State Council.
These institutional signals resonate with anecdotal reports of Li’s rising stature. Two people who met with him recently at the China Development Forum in March describe a leader who appears more confident and at ease. One said that where Li once stuck rigidly to scripted remarks, he now speaks in plain language, explains policies more clearly, and engages in genuine dialogue. This sentiment was echoed to me by several China-focused consultants whose clients have been in similar meetings.
A well-connected political observer in Beijing told me that Li Qiang is more closely involved in day-to-day economic policymaking than Li Keqiang was. Crucially, he does this in a way that doesn’t challenge but rather reinforces Xi’s authority, recognizing that the top leader remains his main source of political power. Li Keqiang had occasionally signaled policy independence, most notably by undercutting Xi’s narrative on poverty alleviation by revealing that around 600 million Chinese people live on less than 1,000 renminbi per month. Li Qiang, however, has thus far avoided drawing attention to himself and worked to stay in step with the top leader.
Li is becoming a more valuable interlocutor for foreign leaders, executives, and diplomats. He regularly consults with businesspeople and economists and appears to serve as a political channel for feedback on the business environment in China. He has visited more G-20 countries in his first two years as premier than Li Keqiang did in the opening years of either of his terms, implying that Xi trusts him more to manage major diplomatic assignments. Li Qiang could play a key role in strategizing for the next phase of U.S.-China negotiations, especially given the overlap between trade and economic policy, both of which fall under the State Council’s purview.
What does Li’s political momentum mean for policy? Xi still sets the overall direction, including on economic issues. But his directives are often broad or ideological, leaving Li with significant discretion to interpret and implement them. As a provincial leader in Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shanghai, Li was widely seen as a pragmatic figure who championed private enterprise and welcomed foreign investment. His continued favor under Xi increases the likelihood that Beijing’s economic response to internal and external pressures will feature measured but meaningful reforms, together with greater fiscal stimulus to boost domestic demand and business confidence.
The opacity of Chinese politics makes it hard to determine who drives specific decisions, but Li’s rising profile has coincided with a clearer pro-growth tilt in economic policy, especially since last September. Xi has claimed credit for the shift, frequently citing the “decisive instructions” delivered at a Politburo meeting he chaired on Sept. 26. Yet that meeting largely reaffirmed a pivot already signaled at a State Council press conference two days earlier, which had triggered a surge in stock prices. Li has also rolled out several major policies aimed at supporting private firms and reviving consumption.
Li’s study session topics reinforce the impression that he supports a more pragmatic economic program. Xi often makes the Politburo study ideology and national security. Li, by contrast, has emphasized economic issues such as consumption, competition policy, capital market reform, intellectual property, and the business environment. While the State Council’s remit is more economically focused than the Politburo’s, it also oversees powerful ministries responsible for public and state security—suggesting that Li’s emphasis on development may be a deliberate effort to tilt the policy balance away from national security.
Of course, Li’s power should not be overestimated. He ultimately answers to Xi. In early 2022, while serving as party secretary of Shanghai, Li waited several weeks to lock down the city during an outbreak of the highly transmissible Omicron variant of COVID, likely due to economic concerns. But once cases began to spike, Xi dispatched Vice Premier Sun Chunlan to reinforce his “zero-COVID” policy, and Li quickly imposed a harsh two-month lockdown that caused severe economic and social disruption. The episode led some to label him a “yes-man.” In one sense, that is accurate: No leader can pursue a policy Xi opposes. But with Xi now surrounded by followers, he appears more willing to allow them input into policymaking. According to reporting from Reuters, Li helped to persuade Xi to abandon zero-COVID later that year.
There are also strategic reasons for Xi to elevate Li. Delegating governance relieves the physical burden of day-to-day leadership and ensures that Xi has someone to blame if disaster strikes. Xi may also wish to balance competing networks of loyalists to ensure no single ally becomes too powerful. Cai Qi, Xi’s top aide and longtime associate from his Fujian years, has become a linchpin of both the party bureaucracy and national security policy—earning him the informal nickname “deputy general secretary.” Li, by contrast, is from Xi’s Zhejiang circle. Encouraging quiet rivalry between them may help Xi maintain control.
Li’s growing prominence could have lasting implications for Chinese politics. In late 2027, Xi is expected to convene the 21st Party Congress to select a new Central Committee, which will then choose the next slate of national leaders. According to previous retirement norms—which required Politburo members aged 68 or older to step down—Li, born in July 1959, would be due for retirement. At the last congress in October 2022, most leaders retired on schedule, but Xi made notable exceptions for himself and a handful of colleagues, including top diplomat Wang Yi and senior Gen. Zhang Youxia.
If Li remains in Xi’s good graces, he could continue as premier or move into another senior post through 2032. His prospects brightened further in April, when Xi appointed Li’s former no. 2 in Jiangsu, Shi Taifeng, to lead the party’s powerful Organization Department, which vets officials and makes promotion recommendations.
To be sure, Xi is still the dominant figure in Chinese politics. One wrong step from Li could derail his career. And his influence does not match that of past premiers such as Zhou Enlai or Zhu Rongji, who led national policymaking in some periods. But Li has defied expectations to become a more consequential premier than Li Keqiang. Even moves once seen as signs of weakness, such as canceling the premier’s annual press conference or using charter jets instead of VIP aircraft like Xi, may reflect calculated efforts to demonstrate deference and build trust with Xi.
Xi can rule alone, but he cannot govern alone. He needs advisors, solutions, and implementers—and Li Qiang is delivering. The same dynamic is visible with Vice Premier He Lifeng, an old friend from Xi’s days as a local cadre in the coastal city of Xiamen in the 1980s, who is now leading U.S. trade talks. Xi retains full control over elite politics and strategy, but he is increasingly comfortable letting trusted subordinates manage many aspects of policymaking. For now.