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Sep 25, 2025  |  
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NextImg:Canada Is NATO’s Soft Underbelly

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In September 2021, Russia and Belarus launched Zapad (or “West”)—a massive military exercise on NATO’s eastern flank, near the borders of Lithuania and Poland. It included around 200,000 troops, 80 aircraft, 300 tanks, and 250 artillery pieces simulating how they would defend a hypothetical NATO invasion of Belarus. The arms buildup provided cover for Russia’s real intention: preparing for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine just months later, in February 2022.

So when Russian drones violated Polish airspace on Sept. 10—just ahead of Zapad 2025 exercises—NATO allies rushed to the skies. Dutch and Polish fighter jets took out the drones that had crossed the border—momentarily bracing for war. Last week, Russia again broached NATO’s borders: Romanian officials detected a Russian drone in their skies on Sept. 14, and a few days later, Russian fighter jets briefly entered Estonian airspace before NATO mobilized to intercept them.

Although the alliance reacted effectively to Russia’s latest provocations, the episodes should give NATO pause. It may not be as well positioned to address such Russian actions if they occurred near its soft underbelly: Canada.

There are at least two explanations for Russia’s dangerous and provocative behavior on Poland’s border. Neither is good—and both are applicable to Russia’s potential activities and well-documented interests in the Arctic boundary waters it shares with Canada.

First, Russia may have conducted its aerial incursion in Poland purposefully, intending to probe the nature of NATO’s response and see what Moscow might get away with if it pressed even harder. Russia and Belarus have denied that the drones violated Polish airspace intentionally, but their claims are not credible: not only because they are the words of dictators, but also because testing boundaries, hybrid warfare, and imposing psychological trauma on neighbors is well-documented Russian behavior.

The second option—that Russian drones did violate Polish airspace unintentionally—is hardly better. Russian President Vladimir Putin is acting increasingly recklessly against Ukraine, causing a scenario in which the drones could have crossed the border accidentally. This month, Russia conducted its largest-ever aerial attack on Ukraine, although it is ostensibly in the midst of U.S.-brokered peace talks. It’s clear that Putin has no desire for a settlement and prefers to continue his reckless campaign for the foreseeable future.

Perhaps the only silver lining to this incredibly dangerous episode is the clarity of NATO’s response, and that of the United States. Poland immediately convened an emergency discussion under Article 4 of the NATO treaty. A less formal and urgent response would have signaled weakness to Russia and invited further aggression. The United States—which under President Donald Trump has sent mixed messages about its solidarity with NATO—declared unequivocally that it would partner with allies to defend “every inch” of NATO’s sovereign territory.

Whether it was probing or recklessness that drove Russia’s drones into NATO territory, the alliance appears more united and credible than at any point since Trump took office. But what transpired on Sept. 10 took place in Poland—at the pointy end of NATO’s treaty zone, where allies are armed to the teeth and at a high state of readiness. They inhabit a tight geographic area buoyed by a massive presence of troops from across the alliance.

If Russia probed the alliance’s western flank—which is to say, Canada’s boundary waters with Russia—the inverse would be true. The vastness of the Arctic region, which Russia is working daily to militarize and leverage for both security and economic reasons, combined with Canada’s weak security readiness, represents an enormous NATO vulnerability.

These concerns are not hypothetical. Last year, there were 12 instances when Royal Canadian Air Force and U.S. Air Force jets had to scramble planes to address and occasionally escort Russian aircraft flying provocatively and needlessly close to North American airspace, according to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). And these are the probes that North American surveillance systems can easily see.

Even within the NORAD partnership, Canada lacks the ability to credibly deter Russian probing and infiltration in the Canadian Arctic. In a recent policy paper for the Mitchell Institute, Houston Cantwell—a retired U.S. Air Force brigadier general—underlined the weakness of NORAD’s current defensive capabilities in the north, which represent a gaping soft spot in the NATO phalanx.

Russian bombers could launch cruise missiles, Cantwell said at an event presenting the paper, and “return to base without detection by the existing radar system,” called the North Warning System. Russia maintains a nuclear-powered submarine fleet, destroyer-class combatant ships, strategic bombers, hypersonic missiles, and a world-leading collection of icebreakers right next door to Canada.

Canada is on track to deploy a new Arctic icebreaker in partnership with fellow Arctic state and NATO ally Finland. New submarines should also be ready in the next seven to 10 years, according to Canadian Broadcasting Corporation reporting. Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government, to its credit, seems poised to prioritize defense with alacrity not seen in generations. But Canada remains woefully unprepared to address Russian incursions head-on.

As Abbas Qaidari recently noted in Policy Options, a range of near-term solutions could boost Canada’s ability to patrol the high north and safeguard its sovereignty. These include a hybrid air fleet and multidomain surveillance network to expand visibility of manned or unmanned aerial incursions, seabed sensors and unmanned subsurface ships to patrol underwater routes, and mobile missile units capable of responding to threats.

Cantwell recommended a range of new defense initiatives, including securing allied commitment to acquiring and deploying an aircraft known as the E-7 Wedgetail. The twin-engine planes would be used to sight aerial threats and report on them to NORAD and NATO commands. The report also recommended developing enhanced space-based Arctic domain awareness capabilities such as space-based radar systems and leveraging Canadian and U.S. public investment in a new push to secure the Arctic.

These proposals should be considered in the context of Trump’s plan to establish a “Golden Dome” for North American aerospace defense. Canada has been in talks to join this initiative since earlier this year to ensure that it has a seat at the table when defense decisions are made that impact Canadian national security. The next several months, as Canada pursues new trade and security agreements with the United States, will be pivotal for charting the right path forward.

Though Canada’s honorable and strong commitment to Ukrainian and European defense remains essential, it also needs to make up for decades of neglect at home. It can achieve that through smart, massive new investments in defensive capabilities and international security cooperation.