Turkey’s defense industry just enjoyed a banner week on the international stage. Representatives from more than a 100 countries descended upon Istanbul at the end of July to partake in what was billed as the 17th International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF).
Though hosted by the Turkish Armed Forces, IDEF primarily serves as a showcase for Turkish defense contractors intent upon promoting their wares. What many firms had to announce was impressive. Turkish firms unveiled several prototypes that are under development, including new cruise missiles, fast-attack boats, and an array of unmanned systems. Adding to the excitement, representatives from Indonesia declared their intention to buy 48 of Turkey’s forthcoming fifth-generation fighter, the Kaan, and two of its indigenously built Istif-class frigates.
All of these revelations fed an eager commentariat that was well primed to celebrate Turkey’s technological prowess. With Turkey-based English-language platforms driving media exposure, several international outlets produced glowing reviews of Turkey and its booming defense industry. This slew of stories further pads a narrative that is several years in the making. A consensus now holds that Turkey is an emerging military power.
A quick look at the numbers seems to tell a clear story of the country’s upward trajectory. Turkish drone producers now account for 65 percent of sales in the world market. The country’s defense industry as a whole ranks 11th in the world in terms of exports. A growing number of countries across the world have purchased Turkish-designed ships, light weapons, and unmanned systems. Pundits outside of Turkey have mused that European countries must look to Turkish firms in their effort to bolster and modernize the continent’s collective defense.
However, a closer look at Turkey’s security sector offers a somewhat different picture. Much of what promises to be at the forefront of Turkish defense capability is still in development, meaning that it is too soon to say how sophisticated or dependable Turkey’s growing arsenal will be. There is relatively little debate, particularly inside of the country, over the potential operational challenges that likely will come with the use or integration of new ships, aircraft, and other weapon systems.
While the pace and intensity of Turkey’s progress as an arms manufacturer is admirable, overhyped expectations may be on a collision course with reality.
If you watch Turkish television or follow the right social media accounts, you will encounter a relentless stream of positive news about the country’s defense industry. Turkish ground forces have long awaited the incorporation of an indigenously built battle tank, the Altay. The naval fleet, according to one assessment, is expected to welcome roughly 24 new ships of various classes. Most anticipated is the introduction of the touted “fifth-generation” fighter, the Kaan, as well as an unmanned fixed-wing fighter, called the Red Apple or Kizilelma.
But the testing of these platforms, not to mention their actual integration, has been a far more painstaking process than the coverage suggests. Plans for a “national tank” have been in the works since 2007. Yet it is only this year that the Altay tank is projected to be manufactured en masse. And according to press reports, only 14 will be delivered to the army by the end of 2026.
More significant progress has been made in the maritime domain. Since 2011, Turkish dry docks have delivered several surface ships, a number that includes a light carrier and multipurpose frigates. Most of these ships have not seen significant service yet, and the Turkish navy still lacks craft capable of defending its new carrier far from port.
Meanwhile, it is only in the past year that the Kizilelma and the Kaan have enjoyed their first successful test flights. The Kizilelma, Turkey’s unmanned fighter, is projected to enter service in 2026; only one has been built and current plans only call for “more than 10” next year. The Kaan, according to some reporting, may still be a five or more years away from seeing action.
Absent extensive beta testing and use, one can only speculate as to the actual performance or effectiveness of any of these platforms. Meanwhile, much of the navy’s newest vessels are packed with indigenously produced munitions, sensors, and software. While industry-based reporting often presents the development of these systems as unmitigated successes, there is no hard evidence on how the fleet’s emerging technological capabilities compare to its foreign counterparts.
Indeed, while Turkey’s maturing defense industry proudly promotes its self-reliance, this too has often been overstated. Time and again, industry figures and elected official, including President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, have vowed that the country’s military relies exclusively on “national and local” parts and engineering. But as of now, there are no concrete plans for how or when Turkey will be able to produce engines for the Altay tank, the Kaan, or the Kizilelma.
Examples from elsewhere in the world also provide grounds for questioning the Turkish government’s exuberance. South Korea, for example, has been in the business of developing indigenously produced weaponry considerably longer than Turkey. It also possesses a wide-ranging track record when it comes to exporting Korean-produced systems abroad; South Korea as aims to become the fourth-largest seller of domestically manufactured arms by 2027.
A cursory look at South Korea’s history suggests that patience and humility are required virtues when building a native defense industry. A particularly revealing example of the trials that accompany the production of high-end weapon systems is the KF-21 Boramae, South Korea’s own fifth-generation fighter.
Billed as a far cheaper version of the U.S. F-35, the KF-21 has been in development since the early 2000s. As with the Kaan, Indonesia showed early interest in the program, leading Jakarta to invest substantial sums of money in the hopes of co-producing the aircraft. Engineering and design challenges, as well as squabbles over payment, have delayed its production schedule. Unlike the Kaan, however, it has already undergone multiple flight tests, including a successful attempt at aerial refueling. Despite plans for it to enter service in 2026, it has yet to conduct the necessary weapons tests and other operational evaluations.
Other examples closer to home offer further reasons to be skeptical. There was a time, not long ago, when the Bayraktar TB2, Turkey’s most famous multiuse drone, was the darling of international media. As an unmanned aircraft designed for both reconnaissance and strike missions, the TB2 was lauded for helping to stave off the initial Russian onslaught against Ukraine in the spring of 2022.
But by the summer, greater Russian deployment of electronic warfare instruments and anti-air missile systems had exposed the TB2’s limitations. Despite a handful of well-publicized successes, the Bayraktar no longer serves as a primary weapon for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Moreover, recent developments on the battlefield, such as the use of wire-guided drones and other innovations, demonstrate the rapid degree to which unmanned systems may be evolving away from the kind of strike capabilities that the Bayraktar provides.
Of course, none of this is to say that Turkish-made aircraft, ships, or weapon systems are bad or unworthy of admiration. In time, these systems may well prove their worth. But foreign governments shouldn’t get so swept up in the excitement that they forget about the inevitable difficulties in fielding new weaponry and platforms.
Much of what Turkey hopes to produce remains hypothetical. Even with extensive testing, it is not yet clear whether aircraft such as the Kaan or tanks such as the Altay can hold their own in battle. Turkish prototypes must contend with proven systems with established pedigrees. They will also likely will face off against crews who have trained longer and more comprehensively on established platforms. In this regard, Turkey and the purchasers of its military hardware may encounter serious short- to medium-term challenges.
Indonesia, for one, is wagering that the Kaan and Istif will provide a needed boost to an air and naval fleet that is aging or obsolete. Jakarta has taken this step without necessarily confirming details regarding co-production or delivery of the systems. As a result, these new planes and ships may not be ready in time to help Indonesia confront adversaries in Asia.
More pointedly, in a conflict in the South China Sea, they could face seasoned Chinese pilots and sailors who have trained extensively with on their own planes and ships. Jakarta, in other words, is taking a considerable gamble.
The stakes for Turkey are no less significant. Increased tensions with Israel over Syria have generated a groundswell of commentary on the risk of a direct military confrontation. Turkish fears assumed new dimensions when Israeli warplanes targeted several Syrian bases suspected of being of future Turkish military instillations.
In spite of these ominous signs, Turkish pundits remain undaunted because of their expansive faith in Turkey’s domestic defense industry. Israel, they assume, is too risk averse to chance a war with Turkey. And if it did, the Turkish Armed Forces stand a far better chance of defeating Israel than the Iranians. Whatever Israel throws at Turkey, the argument goes, Turkish-made aircraft, missiles, and tanks will strike back still harder.
If these opinions indeed reflect thinking among Erdogan and his advisors, then the Turkish commentariat may be in for a rude awakening.