Fifty years ago, West African leaders gathered in Lagos, Nigeria, to establish the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the continent’s first post-independence regional bloc. Today, it stands as a beacon of economic integration, facilitating free movement and duty-free trade, and enabling a $700 billion market. Yet, as we mark this milestone, ECOWAS faces its greatest test.
In January, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso formally exited ECOWAS after they were suspended from the bloc due to military takeovers of their democratic governments. Their decision to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), rather than work to rejoin ECOWAS, is a stark warning of the bloc’s need for reform.
Established in 1975, ECOWAS was initially conceived as an economic project. While colonial powers drew the borders, the people of West Africa have long shared traditions, languages, and trade that transcended those artificial lines. Our founding fathers recognized that and, in the years after independence, created a treaty to reflect the lived reality of our people, progressively eliminating obstacles to the free movement of individuals, services, and capital.
Over time, the promotion of democratic norms became a defining pillar of ECOWAS. Today, this stands at the heart of the division between the bloc and AES. Even so, ECOWAS must seek to understand Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso’s grievances to be able to address their concerns and support shared regional goals.
First, the AES countries argue that ECOWAS failed to adequately support the fight against jihadist insurgency in the Sahel, a region that now accounts for more than half of global terrorism deaths. Indeed, the collapse of security under their democratic predecessors, who lost large swaths of territory to militants, served as a springboard for recent military takeovers.
Second, they accuse ECOWAS of falling under the influence of former colonial powers. Before the AES countries left ECOWAS, eight of the 15 states were Francophone, and for years, France largely shaped counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel. Now, the AES countries claim that their departure from the bloc was necessary to defend national sovereignty.
However, AES countries offer the wrong prescription. Turning away from broader regional collaboration will not protect sovereignty; it will only open the door to external influence. Instead, the region must look inward to our original promise: African solutions for African challenges.
Historically, ECOWAS’s security efforts focused on civil wars and post-coup transitions, such as those in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Gambia. This narrow focus must evolve to address asymmetric threats, including jihadist militancy. Today’s militants retreat across borders to evade pressure and regroup, making cross-border collaboration essential.
ECOWAS, which is uniquely positioned to confront terrorism, has already started to meet this challenge: In March, the bloc activated a 5,000-person standby force to combat terrorism in the subregion—with a mandate to coordinate intelligence, support national armies, and respond rapidly to threats. Once deployed, this renewed Africa-led response will offer a direct answer to the military leaders’ grievances.
Nevertheless, the force will be weaker without the three Sahelian states. They remain central to any meaningful response. Outside the ECOWAS framework, the AES countries will have limited capacity to anticipate, track, and respond to attacks with the same level of coordination. While AES has proposed its own security alliance, the threat does not end at their borders. Without a unified effort to contain it on all sides, the scourge will persist.
While ECOWAS hope for the swift return of the AES states to strengthen our collective security posture, we must also be pragmatic. The two groups should put in place a temporary mechanism to enable intelligence sharing and operational coordination in the meantime.
After all, the rupture was not as definitive as headlines suggested. Despite the withdrawal, ECOWAS maintains visa-free travel and duty-free trade across its borders with Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, even as AES imposes tariffs on ECOWAS goods. Their citizens are not in possession of power, and they should not bear the costs. This decision was also an olive branch to those countries’ current authorities: As landlocked states, they depend on access to coastal ECOWAS corridors for trade and economic survival. Preserving channels of cooperation lowers tensions, sustains dialogue, and keeps an open and smooth path for their return.
Still, ECOWAS’s foundational values, especially democracy, must endure. We have clear benchmarks that transitional governments must meet. Guinea has set an example: After falling under military rule in 2021, the country was suspended from ECOWAS and faced diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed by the bloc. Since then, Guinea has worked closely with the bloc to develop a roadmap for a return to constitutional order. With elections now scheduled for December, it is paving the way for reintegration into our regional family.
If military leaders claim popular legitimacy, then they should test that at the ballot box. In Nigeria and Sierra Leone, former military rulers demonstrated that it is possible to win power through democratic means. Security is the first duty of any state, and in the AES countries—where instability has persisted for years—administrations that succeed in restoring order are likely to be rewarded when elections become viable. Their best chance of delivering that long-elusive security lies in cooperation with ECOWAS.
The road back to ECOWAS unity runs through security, but also through the ballot box.