Six years ago, the Syrian regime conquered the southern province of Daraa, popularly known by millions of Syrians as the “cradle of the revolution.” That military victory represented a pivotal moment for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. After all, it was the last time the regime captured a sizable swath of opposition territory, and in doing so in July 2018, its impunity was laid bare for all the world to see. On paper, Daraa had been designated a “de-escalation zone” after months of intensive international diplomacy in which the United States had played a central role.
Despite that protected status, regime forces with heavy Russian military assistance proceeded to besiege Daraa; shell it to rubble; and after weeks of brutal violence, coerce it into surrendering. Washington’s most reliable umbrella of opposition allies, the Southern Front, was abandoned—advised to surrender by U.S. officials. Since then, the regime’s status has never been in question, as international actors have methodically backed away, fatigued and disinterested. Since that decisive moment, as far as many were concerned, Assad had won and Syria’s crisis was over, its effects contained.
In truth, Assad never “won,” —he merely survived, thanks to the consistently strong support of Russia and Iran, but also to that international disengagement. In the years since, the world’s interest in working to resolve Syria’s debilitating crisis has completely evaporated. In Washington today, the mere suggestion of doing anything more on Syria in policymaking circles draws exasperated gasps and sarcastic laughs, not attention.
And yet, in many ways, the situation in Syria is worse than it’s ever been. There are clear and sustained signs of an Islamic State recovery; a multibillion-dollar regime-linked international drugs trade; and ongoing geopolitical hostilities involving Israel, Iran, Turkey, Russia, and the United States. The regime’s grip over areas under its control has never looked more frail and unconvincing.
Southern Syria offers a notable example. Six years after bombing the cradle of the revolution into submission, Assad’s rule in the south is fraying at the seams.
While Assad and his Russian sponsor intended for the south to embody a stabilized Syria that was “cleansed” of opponents, the region has been the most consistently unstable anywhere in Syria since 2018. As documented by Syria Weekly, at least 47 people have been killed in Daraa and Suwayda provinces between mid-June and mid-July alone, in a torrent of daily assassinations, ambushes, raids, and kidnappings and hostage executions. Daraa in particular is the embodiment of lawlessness and chaos.
Beyond the crippling disorder, former opposition fighters and other local armed factions in the regime-held southern provinces of Daraa and Suwayda have grown increasingly bold in challenging the regime’s abuses in recent weeks. From mid-June to mid-July, armed fighters—most of them former opposition—have kidnapped at least 25 Syrian military officers in retaliation for the regime’s arbitrary arrest of civilians from their areas. The hostages have then been successfully used as leverage to force the regime into releasing the civilian detainees. Never before has the regime been so consistently challenged and forced to submit.
Local armed factions that on paper are considered “reconciled” have now also taken to launching direct attacks on the Assad regime’s military checkpoints and buildings in retaliation for abuses. For example, when a Syrian woman from the Daraa town of Inkhil was detained while trying to renew her passport in Damascus on July 10, former opposition fighters in Inkhil launched coordinated attacks on three regime checkpoints and the local intelligence headquarters. When regime forces fired back, including with mortars and artillery, local fighters ambushed a regime armored vehicle arriving as reinforcement, destroying it with rocket-propelled grenades. Later that day, the woman was released.
Next door in the province of Suwayda, where locals have now held more than 330 days of consecutive protests demanding Assad’s downfall, regime forces unexpectedly established a new security checkpoint at the main entrance to the provincial capital on June 23. Within hours, at least six local armed factions had mobilized and launched attacks on regime positions, engaging in 48 hours of heavy fighting that drew in regime reinforcements from Damascus.
By June 25, the regime had been forced to back down, reverting the heavily fortified checkpoint into a post with no local authority. Such a direct challenge to regime security policy was remarkable, particularly for a province that never fell under opposition control.
That incident generated considerable regional attention, highlighting the regime’s capitulation. This may explain why one of the most prominent anti-regime armed group leaders in Suwayda, who had commanded many of the above-mentioned attacks, was assassinated in his home at dawn on July 17. Murhaj Jarmani, who went popularly by Abu Ghaith, was shot in the head through his living room window by a hit man equipped with a silencer. His wife had been in their home, but never even heard the shot.
During the same month-long time period, local armed groups in southern Syria have also kidnapped four regime intelligence operatives accused of a variety of abuses, including murder, torture, and organized crime. All four were themselves tortured, forced to confess to their crimes on camera, and then executed—their confession videos then disseminated locally and on social media. On top of that, the right-hand man of Daraa’s infamous military intelligence chief Luay al-Ali was assassinated in the heart of the provincial capital on July 13. The target, known commonly as Abu Luqman, had reportedly overseen nearly a decade of torture in Daraa’s largest detainee holding and interrogation facility.
Insights like these offer a glimpse into the true reality of regime rule in the 14th year of Syria’s crisis. Far from consolidating control, Assad’s authority appears to be crumbling. Meanwhile, the regime continues to fail in its intermittent effort to challenge a resurgent Islamic State. In the past month alone, at least 69 regime security force personnel have been killed in near-daily Islamic State attacks across Syria’s central desert. And that’s amid a month-long regime “clearance operation” against the jihadi group. Meanwhile, Assad’s senior advisor Luna al-Shibl died on June 3 in a mysterious car crash that some believe was an inside job, while a core backbone of the regime economy, Mohammad Bara Qaterji, was killed in an Israeli airstrike on June 15. And so much more.
Despite facing a regime so notorious for stopping short of nothing to eradicate opposition, the people of southern Syria appear to have had enough. From Suwayda’s nearly year-long popular uprising to the recent trend for local fighters to directly challenge regime abuses and security policy, this does not look anything like a resolved crisis, but rather an evolving and potentially escalating one, once again.