Venezuela’s Threat to Guyana

By Catherine Osborn

A militia member stands guard at a polling station during a consultative referendum on Venezuelan sovereignty over the Esequibo region controlled by neighboring Guyana, in Caracas, on Dec. 3, 2023. Pedro Rances Mattey/AFP via Getty Images

It is unusual for U.S. Southern Command to announce air drills over Guyana, but Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s saber-rattling over a long-dormant territorial dispute with its neighbor provoked just such a move in early December.

Many Venezuelans believe that a large chunk of Guyana known as Esequibo is rightfully theirs, rejecting an 1899 ruling that laid the ground for other agreements zoning it as part of Guyana. But they had no reason to reactivate the dispute until deposits that quickly became an oil bonanza were discovered off of Guyana’s coast in 2015.

The highly unpopular Maduro faces an election next year. He aimed to boost his own support when he organized a Dec. 3 referendum on whether to annex Esequibo, in defiance of an International Court of Justice order to halt the vote.

Official results said voters approved the prospect of annexation by more than 95 percent, and Maduro quickly ordered Venezuela’s state oil firm to drill in Esequibo. Regional powers are not taking Maduro’s actions lightly. Brazil sent troops to its border with Venezuela, and Guyana and the United States announced joint air drills for Dec. 7. (U.S. oil company Exxon has major offshore operations in the disputed region.)

The rift pits Venezuela against the United States at a time when the Caracas-Washington relationship was beginning to thaw; it also puts Venezuela at odds with Brazil and Cuba, who are sensitive to Guyana’s position. Militarily, Caracas is ill-prepared to compete in any hypothetical land battle if Brasília or Washington gets involved. But it can make provocative moves in a play toward Maduro’s domestic audience.

Maduro may also be trying to drive a rift between Latin American countries and Washington by escalating and then claiming U.S. overreach in the neighborhood. On Dec. 14, talks mediated by Brazil, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, and the Caribbean Community cooled tensions, with the Venezuelan and Guyanese presidents jointly pledging to avoid force. The dispute is already testing Latin America’s rarely-activated mechanisms to head off interstate conflict.

Subsea Sabotage Off Ireland’s Coast

By Elisabeth Braw

Storm clouds gather over the Irish Sea as a crew member stands on the bridge of the ferry on Dec. 29, 2020.Phil Noble/Reuters

Few parts of the world host as many undersea cables as the waters off the southern coast of Ireland. Should a hostile state want to wreak havoc on countries connected to the globalized economy via these networks, it could send a few vessels into Irish waters to sabotage the cables. Because Ireland only has a minuscule navy, doing so would be an easy task.

The vast majority of the undersea cables connecting Europe with the United States’ east coast travel via the Celtic Sea, the part of the Atlantic Ocean located south of Ireland. That’s a logical arrangement since the Celtic Sea provides the most efficient route to the rest of the Atlantic.

But in May this year, a group of Russian navy vessels, including the Admiral Grigorovich, which has participated in the war against Ukraine, appeared in Ireland’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and remained there. And in January 2022, Russia declared it was going to hold a naval exercise in Ireland’s EEZ. The Irish government tried to prevent the exercise from taking place, without success—but Irish fishermen managed to thwart the Russians by refusing to leave the waters.

Pay attention to any new Russian vessels in Irish waters. Though governments have the right to intervene against foreign vessels in their EEZ—and especially in their territorial waters, to protect sensitive installations—Ireland is hardly in a position to do so: The Irish Naval Service’s fleet encompasses a total of six vessels, all of them patrol ships and thus not equipped to scare away the Admiral Grigorovich or other unwanted Russian visitors.

That raises the question: If Russia decided to sabotage the world’s communications infrastructure in the Celtic Sea, would NATO intervene on behalf of Ireland, which is not a member of the organization?

A Spillover of Myanmar’s Conflict Into China and India

By Sushant Singh

Members of ethnic rebel group Ta’ang National Liberation Army take part in a training exercise at their base camp in the forest in Myanmar’s northern Shan State on March 8, 2023. AFP via Getty Images

For most observers, the conflict in Myanmar is about democracy. But the challenge has gone way beyond that, with the instability in the strategically located Southeast Asian country threatening to spill over onto the territory of its neighbors—including the two Asian giants, China and India.

The Burmese military junta seized power in a coup d’état in 2021 but has lost control of several towns and security outposts in the country’s border areas in the last few months after the largest-as-of-yet coordinated offensive from the Three Brotherhood Alliance, a coalition of rebel groups. The offensive has energized the nationwide armed struggle to overthrow the military regime and fighting has spread to many parts of the country. According to the United Nations, more than half a million people have been displaced in different parts of Myanmar due to this surge of fighting, with a total of 2 million displaced since the coup.

Many of these people are seeking refuge in bordering areas of India and China. India has been reluctant to accept the refugees because doing so adds to the already tenuous situation in Indian states such as Manipur, which has been engulfed by ethnic violence over allegations of illegal immigration from Myanmar. China is also worried about the insecurity fueled along its borders due to the rebel offensive, but its concern is also motivated by the joint Myanmar junta-Chinese offensive launched recently in the region against gangs operating internet fraud centers that China blames for cheating many of its people.

To further complicate matters, Beijing has strong ties with the coalition of Myanmar rebel groups, which led to the rare sight of dozens of nationalist pro-junta Burmese protesters gathered outside the Chinese Embassy in Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city, with posters critical of Beijing. “We request China government don’t support northern terrorist groups,” one of the posters stated in English. A junta spokesperson refused to criticize China, and soon after the two countries conducted naval drills together. Beijing has called for a cease-fire and has said the warring parties should try to resolve their differences through dialogue.

Despite Western pressure, India has been providing developmental and security aid to the Burmese junta while keeping its lines of communication with the rebels open. Like China, India’s anxieties about Myanmar are likely to grow in the short term and both the Asian powers will seek to safeguard their strategic and commercial interests. Stringent Western sanctions against the junta while Russia provides military supplies leave the region in a precarious balance. It is a flash point that could end up as a humanitarian and security catastrophe.

The Russian Navy in Abkhazia

By Natia Seskuria

Marines show off their skills during Russian Navy Day celebrations in the port city of Novorossiysk on July 30, 2023. AFP via Getty Images

Maintaining dominance in the Black Sea has been one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s key foreign-policy goals. However, lately, Ukraine has been testing Russian aspirations in the Black Sea. Multiple successful Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet have exposed new vulnerabilities for the Russian fleet stationed in the port of Sevastopol, and other ports in Russian-occupied Crimea. Recent satellite data indicates that Russia has already started moving its ships from Sevastapol to the Novorossiysk port.

However, Putin may be preparing a longer-term plan by using another strategic asset in the Russian-occupied region of Abkhazia, which is internationally recognized as Georgian territory.

Russian influence operations as well as consistent efforts to destabilize Georgia have largely remained under the radar. But Moscow’s recent decision to expand its naval base in Abkhazia’s Ochamchire district poses a threat of serious escalation. Ochamchire’s port is located only one hour from Georgian-controlled territory. Russia already maintains two fully operational military bases in the occupied Georgian regions of Tskhinvali (known in Russia as South Ossetia) and Abkhazia.

If the Kremlin succeeds in expanding and then using the Ochamchire port as a refuge for the Black Sea Fleet, it will expose Georgia to new security threats and the risk of being dragged into the Russia-Ukraine war. An Ochamchire port full of Russian warships would become a legitimate target for the Ukrainian military, hence creating an unprecedented vulnerability for the Georgian government in Tbilisi.

By pursuing expansion of Ochamchire, the Kremlin could acquire double profits. First, it would temporarily move its ships away from Crimea, where it has already been overwhelmed by Ukrainian drone and missile attacks; second, it would place additional pressure on Georgia, which recently received EU candidate status.

Should the Kremlin decide to proceed with its plans in Abkhazia, there is not much Georgia will be able to do to prevent it, since Moscow exercises effective control over its occupied territories. Georgia’s only leverage would be to request that Western allies impose further sanctions on Moscow due to its continuous efforts to expand the front lines of the Russia-Ukraine war.

When it comes to the war, the Kremlin’s actions outside of Ukraine are worth paying attention to. Russia has a full operational advantage in its occupied Georgian territories, where it does not allow any international observation missions to operate. An escalation in Abkhazia would impact not only Georgia and Ukraine but also the entire Black Sea region, which is used as a key trade and connectivity route between Asia and Europe.

The Taliban Threat to Pakistan

By Lynne O’Donnell

A police officer stands next to a bullet-riddled wall as he inspects a compound after taking control of the building, following an attack by Pakistani Taliban in Karachi on Feb. 17, 2023. Asif Hassan/AFP via Getty Images

Pakistan is fighting for its life. Politically unstable, economically spent, militarily stretched, morally bankrupt, the Pakistani state is now at war with the terror group it once sought to control for its own nefarious ambitions. After supporting the Taliban for 20 years against the U.S.-backed government of Afghanistan, seeing the group as a tool of its “strategic depth” policy of containing India, Pakistan’s establishment has realized, too late, that it has been had. The Taliban’s Pakistani franchise, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is now engaged in an escalating war against the Pakistani state.

Since the Taliban could beat the mighty United States, the TTP, like extremist groups worldwide, is calculating the odds are in its favor. Protestations from the Taliban that they are neither harboring nor helping the TTP are not borne out by the evidence. Pakistan has already bombed TTP positions inside Afghanistan, and U.S.-made military equipment delivered to Afghan defense forces during the republic’s war with the insurgency has been found in Pakistan.

Anwaar ul Haq Kakar, Pakistan’s caretaker prime minister ahead of elections scheduled for February, has ruled out talks with the TTP, spurning offers to intercede from the Taliban’s de facto Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani (who leads the Haqqani network, a blacklisted terror group that, like the TTP, is affiliated with al Qaeda).

Many thousands of people in Pakistan’s northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province have marched against the resurgence of Islamist extremism and called on the government to see off the TTP. They know what they’re in for if the TTP prevails, having lived under the group’s veil of terror for a decade before the state finally took action in 2014 and pushed the TTP over the border into Afghanistan.

The weakness of the Pakistani state, however, does not inspire much hope that the same will happen again before the TTP becomes re-entrenched. As Pakistan’s politicians and military officers squabble and plot for power and wealth, the TTP is preparing to march in 2024.

An Arctic NATO-Russia Showdown

By Matthew Kroenig

A photo distributed by Russian state agency Sputnik shows a nuclear submarine during a flag-raising ceremony led by Russia’s president at the Arctic port of Severodvinsk on Dec. 11, 2023.Kirill Iodas/AFP via Getty Images

Geopolitical analysts have long talked about “frozen conflicts” in Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and elsewhere, but they should pay more attention to a conflict that is about to become unfrozen.

With the melting of Arctic ice caps, geopolitical competition is heating up in the High North. Arctic countries are eager to benefit from unlocked natural resources and new trade routes; Russia is ramping up its military presence in the region; and even China is looking to get in on the action, ludicrously declaring itself a “near-Arctic state.”

A major NATO-Russia conflict, starting in Ukraine or the Baltic States, could easily escalate to engulf the High North. While Russia’s army has been chewed up in Ukraine, its navy, air force, and nuclear forces remain largely untouched. Russia’s Northern Fleet is based near Murmansk, Russia, a city just 120 miles from Kirkenes, Norway (where NATO begins).

Due to melting ice, Russian warships now have greater freedom of maneuver (including north of the Norwegian island of Svalbard) to evade NATO detection. Russia’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) bubble might seek to close the Baltic Sea in a war, making Norway’s long, protected western coast an alternate disembarkation point for U.S. and NATO deployments and resupply convoys—and also an attractive target for the Russian navy, setting the stage for a new battle of the Atlantic.

The new geography of NATO enlargement, however, also creates vulnerabilities for Russia. With Finland and (likely in the near future) Sweden in NATO, the alliance suddenly has strategic depth near the important Kola Peninsula. In the event of conflict, NATO could attack Russian supply lines and cut off and isolate Russia’s Northern Fleet. This vulnerability could also become important pressure point against Russia in peacetime—but only at the risk of creating another possible flash point for nuclear escalation.

The Collapse of Belarus

By John R. Deni 

Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko meets with foreign media at the Independence Palace in the capital Minsk on July 6, 2023. Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images

The last couple of years has seen an emerging consensus among many Belarus-watchers that Russia has successfully implemented a “soft annexation” of its smaller neighbor. Russian influence and outright control now extends throughout the Belarusian economy, government, and military.

However, this has not turned Belarus into a complete marionette just yet—for example, despite ongoing concerns about opening a new front in Russia’s war on Ukraine, Belarusian troops have yet to enter the fray. It’s conceivable, though, that the Kremlin, facing manpower challenges, might demand more of the Belarusian government in Minsk. If that happens, and Belarus’s dictatorial president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, resists once more, Moscow may finally tire of him, pushing him out and installing an even more malleable leader.

Given evidence of deep divisions within the Belarusian elite, among average citizens, and within the military, there’s no guarantee that all elements of society would simply roll over. Instead, it’s possible civil strife would unfold, with different factions taking up arms either to make way for the Kremlin’s anointed leader or to maintain Lukashenko’s network and patronage system.

Of course, a third alternative is that Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, exiled in neighboring Lithuania, might seek to return and rally anti-Russian, anti-Lukashenko forces. Regardless, Russia’s military and security services would likely become involved.

For his part, Lukashenko could conceivably flee westward, under the belief that Putin intends to treat him as well as the late Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and that governments in Poland or the Baltic states would be eager to debrief him. He likely wouldn’t be alone in such a move—a massive Belarusian refugee flow into Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia would probably follow.

If Ukraine is any indicator—around 14 percent of the population has fled the country—the West could expect somewhere around 1.3 million Belarusian refugees. Also, as in Ukraine, the United States and its allies would be confronted with how to respond—openly arm and support Tikhanovskaya’s followers or some other faction? Conduct covert operations designed to keep the strife on simmer and Putin off balance? Stay out completely, given the presence of Russian military forces? The collapse of Belarus would present yet another potential mess along the East-West fault line.

A Coup in Cameroon

By Folahanmi Aina

Internally displaced people gather water as they shelter with local residents of Kerawa village, in which clashes with militants have taken many people’s lives, in Cameroon, Aug. 7, 2023. Saabi Jeakespier/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

Armed conflict in Cameroon stemming from the Anglophone Crisis that began in 2017 is now in its sixth year. The crisis has resulted in the internal displacement of approximately 1 million people. The situation on the ground is further worsened by a looming humanitarian crisis, with at least 2 million people currently in need of humanitarian aid in both the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon. At least 6,000 civilians have been killed in both regions since 2016, by government forces and the armed separatists.

While the crisis has not received the international coverage it deserves, it is nonetheless expected to escalate and become even more complex in 2024, owing to the continued threat posed by the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP), a breakaway faction of the militant Boko Haram group, which has killed more than 3,000 Cameroonians in the Far North region and resulted in worsening insecurity.

The situation on the ground is further complicated by the resurgence of coups nearby, including in the Republic of Niger. Niger’s post-coup decision to limit its participation in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a regional security alliance by the Lake Chad Basin countries, of which Cameroon is a member, exposes Cameroon’s northern flank to the likelihood of more terrorist attacks.

As Cameroonians become increasingly distrustful of their government (led by President Paul Biya, who is 90 years old and spends much of the year abroad in Switzerland) heightened insecurity in 2024 would likely trigger an exacerbation of the Anglophone crisis, potentially paving the way for a military takeover of power.

Biya’s inevitable exit from the political scene would no doubt accelerate tensions within the ruling party as well as aggravate conflict within Cameroon’s deeply divided security establishment. This has been the case in Sudan, which is currently embroiled in a civil war that has sparked wider regional threats.