When Russian President Vladimir Putin re-invaded Ukraine in 2022 and his military was found wanting, he turned to Russian energy to force Europe into submission. It didn’t work.

At every stage of the energy war, Putin buttressed his public appearances with oligarchs who mostly earned their fortune in oil and gas, the foundation of the Russian economy. After Russia failed, these oligarchs slipped into the background while military-security elites, the Siloviki (literally – “people of power”), took center stage.

While Putin may no longer see the utility in showing unity with Russia’s business elite, going from “unshakable unity” in March 2022 to imploring “patriotism over profit” in March 2023, this does not mean they are unimportant. After being banned from traveling to most Western nations, these oligarchs lost 97 billion dollars and counting. Sanctions deeply hurt the Russian economy and even resulted in some non-energy oligarchs risking their lives publicly calling for peace.

Even as the tycoons slink into the shadows, and other elites contemplate ditching Putin, we should remember: the foundation of Russia’s capacity to wage war remains revenues from its energy, nuclear technology, and arms exports —and the cronies Putin has running these operations. The list below is far from comprehensive, but it gives the reader an idea of who these people are and how they react to the war.

So, where are all of Putin’s cronies hiding, and who is slipping through the cracks in the system?

Nikolai Tokarev

A longtime friend of Putin from their days in the KGB together, the sanctioned former KGB president of Transneft, Nikolai Tokarev’s assets, are valued at around $5 million. This may be a vast understatement considering his position and ties. He mostly managed to avoid sanctions, as evidenced by his remaining estates in Croatia. Transneft is also subject to debt and equity prohibitions. But with the increase in oil and gas demand, these sanctions may soon become meaningless.

Igor Sechin

Head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, is the only energy oligarch to appear on the United States Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. Rival to Alexei Miller, Sechin, and his family are sanctioned across the West. The US sanctioned Sechin in March 2014, and Rosneft is on the Sectoral Sanctions Identification List. In March 2022 French authorities moved to seize his yacht “St Princess Olga” which he bought for his secretary-turned-wife Olga Rozhkova. When Olga divorced Sechin for an Italian formula racing driver he renamed the boat “Amore Vero” (true love in Italian).

Despite the seizure of and a seizure warrant for Rosneft planes, Sechin has dodged sanctions and remains influential. Rosneft recently made an oil deal with India to supplement European losses, while BP remains a shareholder of Rosneft. While Sechin has suffered some damage, Western shareholders and Eastern markets continue to insulate him.

Igor Yusufov

Founder and chairman of Fond Energia, an investment vehicle focused on operating companies in the energy, Igor Yusufov is also the former energy minister of Russia. His net worth was $1.1 billion before sanctions. Yusufov is also known as Medvedev’s “purse” due to his role in allegedly hiding Dmitry Medvedev’s assets. Despite this, he is only sanctioned by Ukraine. His son, Vitaly, still owns his shipyard in Germany and his $72 million mansion in Menlo Park. However, Yusufov has not sailed through sanctions unharmed; he lost the status of a “billionaire” in 2023.

Alexei Miller

The biggest fish in the pond, the Chairman of Gazprom, Alexei Miller, has been Putin’s trusted hand in Gazprom for decades. Reportedly worth $2.5 billion, Miller is widely sanctioned. Miller appears determined to join the Siloviki. In March 2023, he attempted to establish a militia for Gazprom to protect its energy interests in the country.

Boris and Arkady Rotenberg

The Rotenberg brothers, purported owners of Putin’s Black Sea Palace, own StroyGazMontazh group, Russia's largest construction company for gas pipelines and electrical power supply lines. Despite being sanctioned across the West, Forbes estimates that the brothers and their families have become wealthier, gaining between $500 million to $6.2 billion due to lagging sanctions on vital construction materials.

Roman Abramovich

Abramovich is one of the few oligarchs whose behavior changed after the sanctions. The former head of the Sibneft oil company now owned by Gazprom, Abramovich, lost approximately $10.2 billion and is sanctioned by most Western nations except the US. Despite his ties to Putin, Abramovich and his daughter Sofia are openly pro-Ukraine, donated millions to war victims, mediated between Russia and Ukraine, and facilitated prisoner exchanges. This possibly resulted in his poisoning.

Nevertheless, Abramovich, too, has dodged sanctions. He moved his yachts to sanction-free ports, transferred millions of dollars in assets to his children days before being sanctioned, and tried to sell most Western properties but still has billions in assets abroad. He now spends his time house-hunting in Dubai and suing the EU to unblock assets as the UK targets the “fixers” that aided him. Shortly after being sanctioned, Abramovich was forced to sell his English soccer club, Chelsea, and vowed to donate the proceeds to the Ukrainian war victims.

Most energy oligarchs have avoided sanctions by keeping assets in Russia, transferring assets to other people or entities, or moving assets to sanctions havens. Many continue to do robust business in countries that theoretically sanction them, while others search for new markets. Sanctions may have transformed the composition of Putin’s court, but many energy oligarchs fund the Russian state and war machine behind the scenes, while others are watching the war and Russia’s descent into isolation and political extremism with horror.

While sanctions might express disapproval and punish states for aggressive, illegal, or abusive actions, they have done little to change Russia’s policy in Ukraine. In fact, Moscow is continuing to escalate its rhetoric and may be preparing for more radical steps in Ukraine and beyond. The Putin inner circle appears incapable of changing their leader’s policy and behavior. The only sanctions, then, that may work are those which deny the Russian state revenue to continue the war or may contribute to broad popular discontent.