Russia’s drone campaign against Ukraine’s cities has moved into high gear, with nightly raids of 100 or more Shahed-type kamikazes striking energy infrastructure and apartment blocks, causing blackouts and raising concern about the winter ahead.

Ukraine has also stepped up strategic drone strikes, as recorded by Russian sources. This is just a taste of what it to follow: President Zelensky told Reuters on Tuesday he planned to build 30,000 deep-strike weapons next year.

While the most dramatic evidence of Ukrainian drone strikes comes from images of burning oil refineries and air bases helpfully posted on Russian social media, the most detailed reports comes from the official Telegram account of Russia’s own Ministry of Defense. This details every claim of a Ukrainian drone being shot down, when and where it happened.

Obviously this source must be treated with some caution. The Russian MoD notably claims that in any attack, every single incoming drone is shot down. Do their numbers only include those actually shot down, or are they inflated to include every drone they see?

By contrast, the Ukrainian Air Force gives more detail, reporting totals for each night of how many they shot down, how many were brought down by electronic warfare and how many were redirected by satnav spoofing to go back to Russia or Belarus.

The Russian MoD’s only motive for honesty would be to try and reassure the public. In places where locals saw and filmed explosions, the Ministry can tell them that all the attackers were brought down. They might understate the size of the attack to minimize Ukrainian capability, or overstate it to make their own defenders look more impressive. And if an attack is not witnessed, for example on a remote airbase, they need not admit to it at all.

Having said this, the Russian figures do give an indication of rising and falling numbers, from just one or two drones in a night to a massive onslaught of 141 drones claimed shot down on November 20^th.

The total for the month of November, according to the Russian MoD includes 908 Ukrainian drones shot down.

This compares to a figure of “over 2,500 Shahed-type drones” launched at Ukraine in November according to President Zelensky. It is worth noting that many of these were actually decoys, smaller Russian-made drones with radar reflectors intended to distract and deplete air defenses. But it is equally likely that some of the Ukrainian drones were also decoys.

The other thing we do not know is how many of these long-range drones got through on each side.

The exact November figure for attacks on Ukraine, consolidated in detail by the indefatigable ShahedTracker, are that of 2,444 known Shahed-type drones, 1,317 were intercepted (54%), 990 brought down by electronic warfare (40%), 50 ‘flew away’ (2%) , leaving 87 which are likely to have hit their targets (4%). Of course these claims cannot be verified. But we do know about Ukraine’s nationwide system of microphones which track the slow-moving drones as they approach, and the hundreds of mobile fire groups equipped with automatic cannot and heavy machineguns which are rushed into intercept positions, and there is plenty of footage of their successes.

On the Russian side the defenses are likely much less successful because of the need to protect a much larger area. There are several videos of soldiers ineffectually firing small arms at incoming drones, and more of them just watching as drone after drone sails overhead and crashes into a target. Russia does not yet seem to have the infrastructure or organization required to deal with the new threat.

Ukraine has produced a huge variety of long-range attack drones, HI Sutton of CovertShores has documented 23 different types but this may not be exhaustive. The drones are produced by a variety of different groups, and range from the primitive but effective “drainpipe drone” with a fuselage made from plastic piping, to converted light aircraft to sophisticated models like the Lyuty (“Fierce”) fielded by Ukrainian Military Intelligence. There are also the foreign-supplied models, including the Dominator from the U.S. provided as part of the Phoenix Ghost program.

However, most of these are only seen in small numbers, made by volunteer or fundraiser-supported efforts. It is only relatively recently that the Ukrainian government has become involved in the production of Shahed equivalents.

When President Zelensky met with German Chancellor Scholz this week, he unveiled yet another long-range drone, which looks like a virtual clone of the Shahed. The issue is whether Ukraine can turn these out in the sort of numbers that it needs, or whether the 30,000 planned next year will remain an unrealized aspiration.

A year ago, drone makers Terminal Autonomy were ready to turn out 500 of their AQ-400 Scythe one-way attack drones per month, a type designed for easy mass production using techniques similar to flat-pack furniture. Clearly that has not happened, and the various other makers who want to scale up production have not been able to get the government money they need. While in July Ukraine launched more drones than Russia (520 versus 426) Russian production appears to have ramped up faster.

Given that there is now a demand from the very highest level for the maximum number of attack drones, Ukraine may start to surge.

Not that it is all about quantity. Former Ukrainian Defense Chief Zaluzhnyi set out his thoughts on emerging technology in a Telegram post last month, describing a type of warfare in which the aim is to disable strategic military and civilian infrastructure across an entire nation. In this situation drones with effective AI to negate electronic warfare and precisely locate and destroy targets are more valuable than large numbers of drones which will get shot down or diverted.

Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister Fedorov told Reuters that launching techniques and communication with drones were also vital: "Russia has improved monitoring of (Ukraine's) drone launches, quickly responding and targeting launch sites. These nuances require constant launch method and connectivity changes," said Fedorov.

This suggests that rather being programmed with target co-ordinates, Ukrainian drones remain under operator control after launch and can be redirected, or may have cameras or other sensors for operators to scan targets before striking. This is far more effective than picking targets from satellite images.

Meanwhile Ukrainian Defense Minister Umerov announced this week that the "Palyanytsya" drone-missile has entered mass production with support from the Ministry of Defense. First revealed in August, Palyanytsya is described as a ‘rocket-powered drone’ able to strike targets around 400 miles away at high speed. This will greatly complicate the challenge to Russian defenders equipped to deal with low-speed drones, but it is not clear if the cost and complexity of this type of weapon will justify the expense.

Both sides have taken some time to reach a point where they can mass produce low-cost, long-range strike systems. Both Russia and Ukraine seem committed to this new type of warfare. Ballistic missiles may have a better chance of getting through, but they cannot deliver the mass that drones achieve to saturate defenses, or be produced in enough numbers to grind down an opponent over an extended period.

One some days Ukraine is already launching more drones than Russia. The government procurement process for military hardware functions intermittently and is riven with inefficiency, bureaucracy and still suffers from corruption. If these problems can be overcome and the highly capable designs are turned out in large volumes, then Russia will take a battering which will make all the previous damage look minor.