For decades, Russia’s power in Central Asia rested on pipelines. Moscow built these oil and gas networks to tie Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan northward, making Russia both a market and a gatekeeper to global exports.

But today, those ties are becoming a lifeline for a country waging war in Ukraine—and a liability for investors betting on Moscow’s staying power.

The pipelines Moscow still controls

Kazakhstan’s crude still flows mainly through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) to Novorossiysk on Russia’s Black Sea coast. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan import Russian fuels and rely on Moscow for short-term gas contracts.

Russia has repeatedly used its control over transit to pressure Astana, and Gazprom’s gas deals with Tashkent carry as much political weight as economic benefit. For smaller Central Asian states, Moscow remains a supplier of last resort.

How they feed the war

When Europe cut imports after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, these regional ties softened the impact. Moscow collects transit fees and can veto Kazakhstan’s largest export route. Gazprom has expanded gas sales to Uzbekistan from just over one billion cubic meters in 2023 to more than five billion in 2024—a revenue stream and a reminder of dependence.

Through swap deals, Iran provides Russia with another way to mask or redirect energy flows. These arrangements blunt sanctions and keep revenue flowing to the Kremlin’s war chest.

Cracks in Moscow’s grip

But the system is breaking down.

China has replaced Russia as the primary buyer in the region. Turkmenistan’s gas flows almost entirely east, financed and secured by Beijing. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are expanding their energy partnerships with China faster than Moscow can counter.

Türkiye benefits from most of Europe’s diversification. It hosts the Southern Gas Corridor, which brings Azeri gas west and could eventually carry Central Asian gas. Even without new pipelines, Kazakhstan is sending more oil across the Caspian to Türkiye, bypassing Russian routes.

Meanwhile, Moscow is cracking: Ukrainian strikes on refineries, the loss of Western technology, and shrinking investment all weaken its reliability as a partner.

The case for pulling out

Russia’s ability to sustain its energy relationships in Central Asia is eroding and will continue over the next five years. Investors who double down on Russian projects are not only complicit in financing aggression against Ukraine, but they are also exposing themselves to stranded assets, unreliable contracts, and mounting reputational risk.

Redirecting capital toward alternative routes—Caspian shipments west to Türkiye, pipeline expansions to China, and even swap deals involving Iran—accelerates the unraveling of Russia’s coercive energy web. It also positions investors for the energy future already taking shape: one where Moscow is no longer the indispensable hub, but a fading player struggling to maintain influence.

Regional actors are already finding routes and reasons to ensure their independence from Moscow. Kazakhstan announced the new port of Kostanay and improvements to existing ports on the Caspian Sea to develop a “Middle Corridor”, an alternate maritime transit route to those passing through Russia.

Azerbaijan and Armenia, longtime players in the regional energy market, signed a peace deal on 8 August that makes energy independence achievable for both Baku and Yerevan.

Russian energy is not and has never been just a commodity. It is a weapon whose power depends on fragile and declining regional relationships. Pulling investment now is not only the right choice morally, but it is also a wise choice strategically.

Randall Schmollinger

Randall Schmollinger is an analyst at Geopoly Global focusing on technology and security issues, with a regional interest in the post-Soviet republics.