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Yuri Zoria


Russia’s Iskander missiles are powered by sodium chlorate imported from China, Ukraine calls for sanctions

An analysis shows 2024 missile oxidizer supply came entirely from China and Uzbekistan.
russia relies foreign sodium chlorate iskander missile fuel ukraine urges sanctions against supply chain russia's iskander-m mobile launcher missiles rely foreign-sourced carbon fiber lacks capacity self-produce key components 12 report
Russia’s Iskander-M missile on the mobile launcher. Source: Wikimedia Commons
Russia’s Iskander missiles are powered by sodium chlorate imported from China, Ukraine calls for sanctions

According to the 12 May report by Economic Security Council of Ukraine (ESCU), the solid fuel of Russia’s Iskander-M ballistic missile contains ammonium perchlorate—an oxidizer critically dependent on foreign-sourced sodium chlorate.

Russia uses its Iskander missiles to target residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Ukrainian cities. On 4 April 2025, a Russian Iskander-M missile carrying a cluster warhead struck Kryvyi Rih, killing 21 civilians, including 12 children, and injuring 75 people.

Russia’s sodium chlorate fully imported from China and Uzbekistan

In its report, the ESCU refers to its March 2025 study, stating that ammonium perchlorate makes up to 52% of the missile’s propellant mass. Russia does not produce enough sodium chlorate domestically.

The Council says that in 2024, 70% of all sodium chlorate deliveries to Russia came from China, supplied by Longshore Hubei New Materials, Mingda Chemical, Qingdao Longshore Chemical, Hunan Hengguang Technology, and Tianjin Jiumao International Trade. The remaining 29% was delivered by Uzbekistan’s Fargonaazot JSC and Uzkimyoimpeks.

Sodium chlorate was not listed in part B of Annex VII to EU Regulation 833/2014 — which enumerates dual-use goods and technologies prohibited for export to Russia due to their potential military applications — and none of the companies involved in its trade were under EU sanctions as of 2024.

Carbon fiber imports and EU loopholes

The Iskander-M uses carbon fiber in its engine nozzle and body for strength, heat resistance, and radar absorption. While Russia has domestic production—led by Rosatom’s Alabuga-Volokno and Umatex JSC—it imported $11.8 million worth of carbon fiber-related goods in the first nine months of 2024, according to ESCU.

The report says these imports included 184 tonnes of carbon fiber, 403 tonnes of epoxy resin, and equipment like winding and molding machines. China accounted for 58% of fiber value and 72% of tonnage. Türkiye provided 48% of equipment, followed by China (30%) and Austria (11%).

Though some goods fall under restricted EU codes—such as HS 8207 and HS 8477—epoxy resin (HS 390730), fiber winding machines (HS 844540), and carbon products (HS 6815) are not currently banned.

Nine firms linked to missile supply chain

Ukraine identified at least nine Russian companies importing key missile-related goods. Among them:

  • NORTEX LLC imported $268,000 in Chinese epoxy resins and supplied materials to KBM, Gosniimash, and 42 contractors of Votkinsk Plant in Q3 2024.

  • Nanotechnological Centre of Composites LLC imported $1.9 million worth of Chinese carbon fiber and delivered RUB 39.1 million in goods to Perm Plant Mashinostroitel JSC and RUB 82.3 million to UAV and simulator producer Dynamika.

  • Intellectual Robotics Systems LLC imported 47 tonnes of carbon fiber worth $81,400 and supplied RUB 64.8 million worth of goods to Iskander manufacturers.

  • NPO Stekloplastik JSC imported Chinese winding machines worth $78,048 in 2024, and supplied products worth RUB 917 million to multiple sanctioned defense contractors.

  • Mak LLC, AL5-Yug LLC, and Ava-Trade LLC imported $860,000 in Turkish molding dies. All are owned by Russian citizen Gusev Andrey Vitalievich.

Policy recommendations from Ukraine

To counter this supply network, ESCU recommends expanding EU sanctions to include currently unlisted HS codes. They call on member states to strengthen customs oversight and pressure third countries, particularly China and Türkiye, to restrict exports. The council also urges sanctions against foreign and Russian entities connected to Iskander-M production.