Ukraine has received 108 Krab self-propelled howitzers from Poland. In three years of hard fighting since the first of the 53-ton, five-person guns arrived in Ukraine, Ukrainian forces have lost no fewer than 35 of the howitzers, which fire Ukraine’s best 155-millimeter shells as far as 31 km.
On or just before 7 June, a Russian drone crew showed what happens when artillery gunners don’t take every precaution. The Russian crew flew two fiber-optic first-person-view drones through gaps in the front and back of one Krab’s covered, concealed dugout in a tree line somewhere along the 1,100-km front line—and lit the gun on fire, destroying it.
It’s probably the 36th Krab loss. And it was totally preventable.
Tiny FPV drones weighing a few pounds and clutching small warheads have, for two years now, hounded troops and vehicles on both sides of Russia’s 40-month wider war on Ukraine. For most of those two years, however, the drones’ prey were fairly safe inside or under loose concealment.
After all, almost all FPVs were, until recently, controlled via wireless radio—and radio signals can’t always penetrate wood, brick and metal. At the very least, structures limit how far a drone can fly. “Obstacles between your transmitter and receiver can significantly reduce range,” FPV expert Oscar Liang explained.
The proliferation of fiber-optic drones has changed everything. Controlled via signals that travel up and down miles-long, millimeters-thick optical fiber, these FPVs are largely unbothered by buildings and dugouts—as long as their operators can avoid snagging the fibers and find some way into the covered position: an open door or window, a gap between layers of camouflage netting.
Which explains the new genre of drone video from the front line of the wider war: indoor drone strikes. FPVs are slipping through open doors and past dangling tarps and nets to strike soldiers and vehicles hiding inside what were once safe havens from FPV raids.
Knock knock
A dramatic video of one indoor strike, carried out by the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces’ Birds of Magyar unit in April, is typical of the new genre. Easing inside a warehouse, maneuvering past one parked Russian vehicle to take aim at a BMP fighting vehicle with its back hatch ajar, the drone struck inside the BMP.
The explosion ignited a blaze that may have spread throughout the warehouse, if footage from an overhead surveillance drone is any indication. It’s possible one drone costing less than $1,000 destroyed several vehicles.
“Magyar birds are looking for worm equipment in the corners where the enemy definitely doesn’t expect the FPV drone,” someone—presumably Robert Brovdi, then Magyar’s leader and now the head of the USF—narrated over footage of the strike.
The Ukrainian Krab crew clearly also didn’t expect Russian FPVs to come snooping, which may explain why they accidentally left entrances for the maneuverable drones.
The Krab’s bulk—typical of all self-propelled guns, or SPGs—makes it hard to cover and conceal with 100% certainty. According to analyst Andrew Perpetua, it may actually be easier to dig an effective hideout for a towed gun.
And it’s not like SPGs are actually rolling around the battlefield the way they may have done in previous wars. Tiny drones have made it virtual suicide for an artillery crews to “shoot and scoot.” So they don’t need tracks. They don’t need to be self-propelled.
“Instead of investing gajillions of dollars developing crappy SPGs that barely carry any ammo and often weigh obscene amounts of tons but can ‘shoot and scoot,’ countries should be investing in ultra lightweight, long-range towed guns that specialize in push and bush,” Perpetua wrote.
That is, push into position, hide in the bushes—and stay there. The gunners just need to work much harder to completely cover their guns when they’re not actually shooting at the enemy.
